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At any rate, when light breaks over me 
The way it did on the road beyond Coleraine 
Where wind got saltier, the sky more hurried 
And silver lame shivered on the Bann 
Out in mid-channel between the painted poles, 
That day I'll be in step with what escaped me. 
-Seamus Heaney 
From "Squarings" 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is less difficult now than it might have been twenty years ago to justify a 
comparative study of Aristotle and Heidegger. It long ago entered the canonical Heidegger 
mythology that Brentano's dissertation on the four senses of being in Aristotle inspired 
Heidegger to ask the one question that obsessed him. However, the publication of 
Heidegger's courses have revealed the extent to which Heidegger was in conversation 
with the Greek master on the question of being. 
The following pages take a largely historical approach to the question of the 
relationship between being and God in Aristotle and Heidegger. My text treats less the 
influence of Aristotle on Heidegger, or Heidegger's interpretations of Aristotle, than the 
problem itself as conceived by each of the two philosophers. How, I ask, is the 
relationship between being and God construed in each thinker, and what is the role of 
methodology in the determination of this relationship? 
I look first to Aristotle for the roots of Western ontology, and then at the reversal 
of the traditional lines of metaphysics as interpreted by Heidegger. Aristotle cannot 
discuss being without reference to a temporally infinite god; two thousand years later, 
Heidegger replies to Aristotle with a finite- and godless- ontology. But the question of the 
infinite, a notion traditionally associated with God, remains present, though unspoken and 
non-thematized, in Heidegger's thought. The final chapter of the dissertation offers some 
indications of how we might rethink the relation of the finite to the infinite, accepting 
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Heidegger's finite ontology, but seeking a way to coherently reincorporate a notion of the 
infinite. 
In the first part of the following work, I examine Aristotle's notion of being [to on] 
with a view to the essential role played by God in the framework of that ontology. I argue 
that whether we conceive the science of being qua being [to on he 6n] as ontology, 
ousiology, or theology, in the final analysis the unity of this science is determined through 
aetiology .1 
Science for Aristotle is the search for aitia, which, as I discuss, I translate as 
"grounds".2 God appears in Aristotle as the ground of the movement from potentiality to 
actuality characteristic of all beings in the physical world. In the Physics, the word "God" 
does not appear. The deification of a primary ground is not possible within the scope of 
natural science, anymore than it would be appropriate for the modem physicist to appeal 
to God as explanatory of the "big bang". However, throughout the Metaphysics, and 
particularly in book Lambda, Aristotle does use the work "God" to designate that which 
in the Physics was named the primary principle of movement. God is further characterized 
in the Metaphysics as fully actual and eternal. 
Whether as active causal principle or as the teleological focus of desire, God is 
firmly placed within the realm of being. Neither God nor being are ever characterized as 
1 These four aspects of Aristotle's science of being, viz. aetiology, ousiology, 
ontology, theology, are often characterized in the literature as irreconcilable (Jaeger, 
Natorp, Aubenque); as reducible to theology (Owens); or as in harmonious unity (Reale). 
My argument relies on a study of the Posterior Analytics, where Aristotle presents his 
view of science. 
2 See Chapter one, sec. II for a justification of this translation. 
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apeiron (non-limited or infinite in respect of quantity); however, both God and the 
cosmos are temporally infinite. Being is thus quantitatively finite but eternal; and the 
eternal movement of beings from potentiality to the fulfillment of actuality is grounded 
in the eternal presence of a non-kinetic, immaterial, fully actual God. 
The second part of the dissertation looks at how the early Heidegger (up until the 
"turn" in the mid-1930's), re-interprets and transforms Aristotle's notion of being: he sets 
it against the backdrop of human existentiality- a constellation not found in Aristotle-
and disentangles being from the concept of God. Heidegger's fundamental ontology 
entails the destruction of ontotheology. The study of ontology has traditionally been 
divided, in his view, between the questions of: 1) what is common to all beings; and 2) 
what unifies beings as a whole. Whereas Aristotle grounds general being [to on]- treated 
as the study of form- in a supreme being [the6s] that unifies beings, Heidegger unifies 
the two questions through an appeal to the perspective of finite human being living in a 
world of concrete activity. In this reading, the radical linking of ontology and theology 
in Aristotle- wherein God is explanatory of being- is abandoned for an approach to the 
meaning of being that begins with human involvement in determining the meaning of 
being. 
Heidegger examines being through a phenomenological study of "Dasein", human 
being understood in its ontic and ontological character. His question in Being and Time 
concerns the meaning of being for Dasein:3 this changed view of the type of questioning 
3 This is true also of his lecture courses in the years surrounding the publication of 
Being and Time (see bibliography). 
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that belongs to philosophy makes the aetiological role God played in Aristotle irrelevant 
to Heidegger's ontological framework. 
Nor does Heidegger develop desire in relation to God, but in relation to Dasein as 
transcendence towards the world; Dasein reaches out to possibilities it sees in the world. 
Heidegger reverses the Aristotelian priority of actuality over potentiality, arguing that 
human beings interpret the world in terms of possibility. He no longer seeks grounds for 
what is actually present, but looks at the limits of human being in understanding 
possibilities. This indicates a further shift from the priority of the theoretical in Aristotle, 
to Heidegger's emphasis on the more primordial praxis of Dasein in transcendence. Since 
Dasein is temporally finite (human beings are mortal), the possibilities it can reach 
towards in transcendence are finite: being therefore, which is always meaningfulness for 
Dasein, is also experienced as temporally finite. What then of the infinite? 
At the end of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger asks but does not 
respond to the question of what the presupposition of an infinite might imply for Dasein. 
In point of fact, Heidegger does not have much to say about either the infinite or God, 
although he is uncompromising about the non-identification of his own notion of being, 
and God. In Heidegger's thought, it seems there is no role left for an infinite "God", yet 
it seems that the concept nonetheless remains, and remains unaccounted for. Is there any 
way to accept Heidegger's analyses without abandoning a philosophical concept of God? 
These are the questions with which my dissertation ends, although I do in the last pages 
offer some suggestions towards a solution. In the disposition of angst, Dasein, confronted 
with the limitations of its own finite existence, is thrown back on its own finite 
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possibilities which it appropriates in authenticity. I suggest that equally gratitude, 
phenomenologically experienced as a response to being in the world at all, is an 
experience of the infinite. 
Although I refer to many of Aristotle's texts, my interpretations of Aristotle focus 
primarily on the Metaphysics, which, as I discuss below, I read as an integrated work; and 
on the Posterior Analytics, which I use principally in relation to Aristotle's treatment of 
"scientific" method. I also treat the Nichomachean Ethics, particularly the sixth book, and 
De Interpretatione, works which Heidegger frequently discusses in his courses. 
In general, I work with Heidegger's published texts, lectures and courses from the 
years immediately preceding the publication of Being and Time, (GA 19-24; from WS 
1924\25 to SS 1927), to those in the subsequent five years (GA26-33, up to SS 1931). I 
include references to an early text published as an introduction to a book that never 
appeared, Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle (1922). This is a seminal text 
which contains in embryonic form some of Heidegger's later views on Aristotle. I also 
treat On the Essence of Truth, which, though published late, was presented in a series of 
lectures in 1930. I make occasional reference to later texts, in order to show a line of 
development in Heidegger's thought. 
The rationale for treating only this period is first of all manageability. Heidegger's 
thought takes a different tum in the early thirties: a tum away from the Dasein-analysis. 
In these later years, Heidegger develops a notion of the divine not found in the earlier 
work, and it would be a very large task, one meriting a separate volume, to treat this in 
relation to Aristotle. It seems clear that Heidegger's thinking after the Kehre is a 
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development of his thought before the turn;4 all the more reason to have a good grip on 
the large corpus of early writings before broaching the later works. Another reason to 
focus on the early Heidegger is that it is in the writings surrounding Being and Time that 
his debt to Aristotle is most clearly in evidence, both explicitly and implicitly. 
A further, important note. Much of the recent scholarship on Heidegger has been 
concerned with documenting his involvement in National Socialism. There is now no 
doubt whatsoever that Heidegger was an member of the party, gave active support to anti-
semitic administrative decisions, betrayed his friends and colleagues, and maintained 
belief in a peculiar version of National Socialism from 1932 virtually to the end of the 
war. The question of whether his writings are infected with such thinking remains open. 
In the works I treat here, I find no textual evidence that supports any particular political 
stance; though we might want to look twice at concepts such as "fate", "destiny" and "the 
history of being", given uses Heidegger made of these terms in other nefarious contexts. 
4 See Heidegger's preface, written in 1962, to Richardson (1974). Heidegger says that 
there is a turn or a change in his thought, already underway ten years prior to 1947. But 
"the basic question of Being and Time is not in any sense abandoned by reason of the 
Kehre" (xviii). Further, "only by way of what [Heidegger] I has thought does one gain 
access to what is to-be-thought by [Heidegger] II. But the thought of [Heidegger] I 
becomes possible only if it is contained in [Heidegger] If' (xxii). 
PART ONE 
ARISTOTLE 
It is always possible to ask why.5 
The role that God plays in Aristotle's metaphysics is dictated by methodology. In 
part one of this dissertation, I argue that for Aristotle, God is eternal non-kinetic complete 
actuality: pure form. As such, he is the ground of the movement from potentiality to 
actuality that defines beings in the physical cosmos; and he is the principle of 
understanding being qua being. The seeking of aitfa, or grounds, determines a science, 
or episteme, and the kind of knowledge characterized by the understanding of grounds is 
the goal of science. Aristotle says that the Metaphysics treats the first episteme, which he 
calls both the science of being qua being and the science of theology. In order to grasp 
the formal relation between God and being in Aristotle's ontology, I argue, it is important 
to understand what episteme means, and how the search for grounds colours Aristotle's 
questioning. This is the task of my first chapter. 
Science, I argue there, is the search for universal grounds of phenomena peculiar to 
a particular subject genus. To be scientifically explicable, phenomena must be grasped 
according to their essence or species form; this essence is expressed as a universal in the 
definition. Knowledge of universal grounds and definitions is possible by means of the 
5 An. Post. II: 92 b 25 
7 
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identification and noetic intuition of universal principles. Knowledge of these is ultimately 
grounded in perception of particulars. 
In chapter two, I discuss the Metaphysics as a search for first principles and aitia, 
ones that apply universally to being qua being. The study of being is focussed on ousia, 
the primary phenomenon of the primary science. Ousia must be understood according to 
its form or essence in order to be universally explicable. Sensible ousia is the starting 
point for knowledge of universal principles, since knowledge begins with perception. 
In chapter three, I argue that the first mover or the ousia named God is the primary 
ground of sensible ousia, and the primary principle that makes universal knowledge of 
grounds possible. God is the primary formal and final aition of being qua being, and is 
also consequently the primary efficient aition of movement in the physical cosmos. 
The inextricable link between ontology and theology in Aristotle sets us up for a 
debate that possesses much of contemporary philosophy: the debate concerning 
ontotheology. The relation between Aristotle's method of scientific seeking of grounds 
and the role that God plays in his theory of being is especially important to examine, 
given the overall task of this dissertation. I argue that whereas God is an essential part 
of Aristotle's aetiological metaphysics, for Heidegger, the God of metaphysics is not an 
object of philosophical study.6 The reason for this is not that Heidegger arbitrarily decides 
against doing ontotheology, but rather that his phenomenological method no longer seeks 
explanatory grounds. As we will see in Part Two of the dissertation, phenomenology in 
6 Though as I argue in chapter six, a different kind of God might be compatible with 
Heidegger's ontology. 
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the early Heidegger begins with description of the concrete and finite existence of human 
being, an ultimately groundless existence. Aristotle also begins with the concrete, but he 
posits the eternity of the physical cosmos, and seeks grounds. For Aristotle, there is a 
ground for everything concrete, even if this ground is an inexplicable principle. 
CHAPTER ONE 
Aristotle's Method 
The Requirements of a Science 
A hard look at the meaning of science will help to delineate the project of the 
Metaphysics, and to clarify the relationship that holds there between ontology and 
theology. In this first chapter, then, I explore the method of Aristotelian science, before 
discussing in subsequent chapters how this method lights the problem of being qua being 
and its relation to the concept of God. 
This chapter concentrates primarily on the Posterior Analytics, since it is in that 
work that Aristotle discusses the meaning and methodology of science. In the first 
division, I engage in a broad exploration of the notion of episteme, and the task of the 
Posterior Analytics. The second section looks at the notion of ait{a, grounds, while the 
third examines the nature of the principles, archa{, which are used to provide ait{a. How 
we come to know these principles by means of epagoge and nous is the subject of the 
fourth section. Finally section five discusses episteme and nous as dianoetic dispositions 
[hexeis], and soph{a, wisdom, as the combined working of episteme and nous. 
My argument is that science is the seeking of explanatory grounds, and the search 
for principles that bring those grounds to light. Scientific explanatory grounds are 
universal, and the formal aftion is primary. This requires that phenomena must be 
understood universally, according to their definition. Definitions are ait{a, universal 
10 
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can be communicated through teaching, and all teaching starts from what is previously 
known, proceeding either by way of deduction [sullogism6s] or induction [epagoge] (NE 
1139b 25-27). Induction supplies archaf, whereas deduction works from archa{. Episteme 
designates the outcome of a deduction from first universal principles, which are 
themselves known through epagoge (induction) (NE 1139b 30) and nous (intuition)(NE 
114la 7). Episteme then is the understanding of universal explanatory grounds, formally 
revealed through deductive applications of archa{. 
The Posterior Analytics lays out the characteristics of episteme in much more detail. 
The work is the study of what constitutes scientific understanding, and what the 
requirements are for something to be called a demonstrative science. In the second 
Analytics, Aristotle is concerned with the general conception of science. He does not 
examine any one science in particular, but rather lays out the grounds for what constitutes 
an ideal, or demonstrative science. Each science should have its own object, a particular 
subject genus, and its own indemonstrable first principles, though all sciences have 
recourse to common axioms (APo: 77a 27). A demonstrative science uses these 
unprovable principles to form proofs, explicitly drawing out the consequences implicit in 
the juxtaposition of two such principles. This it does using a syllogistic form known as 
a demonstration [ap6deixis]. 
Demonstration, or the scientific syllogism [sullogismos epistemonik6s] (71 b 17-8), 
like any syllogism, has a conclusion that follows from the premisses by the rules of 
13 
inference, but it is particular in that it must have true but unprovable premisses.7 The 
conclusion is a factual statement describing a state of affairs, and that must also be true. 
The purpose of the demonstration is not simply to "prove" a conclusion, however, but 
also and primarily, to show why the conclusion is true. For a science to be demonstrative, 
it must already have a set of first principles established, and then it should draw out 
proofs on the basis of these principles. Since science deals with the universal and the 
necessary, the body of facts resulting from demonstrations are universal statements that 
are always true. Since demonstration works by giving the reason why a conclusion must 
follow from premisses, the body of facts that composes a completed demonstrative 
science is also explanatory of why what is- in the specific subject genus of a science- is 
as it is. 
There is one supreme or primary science that furnishes first principles upon which 
other sciences are based (though not the first principles specific to each science). This 
science is the one that Aristotle pursues in the Metaphysics. As I will argue in chapter 
two, the Metaphysics is concerned with seeking the most universal grounds and principles 
of what is. Since the first principles of this science apply to being qua being, and 
specifically ous{a, they are applicable to any of the more specific subject matters of the 
other sciences, which study "some portion of being" (Meta: 1003a 25). 
The science discussed in the Metaphysics, I will argue, is not a demonstrative 
science. First philosophy as Aristotle treats it there is not a demonstrative science, since 
7 Or its premisses must be themselves demonstrable on the basis of true and 
unprovable premisses. A non-scientific syllogism can have false premisses. 
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it remains in the preliminary stages of seeking and establishing its own first principles 
(which are used by all other sciences). Indeed establishing first principles is the stated aim 
of the work; and principles, as we will see below, are not demonstrable. Why then discuss 
demonstration here, given that this dissertation concerns a metaphysical problem, that of 
the relation of ontology and theology? First, because outlining the elements of a 
demonstrative science, that is, an ideal science, permits exploration of the constitutive 
elements of any science whatsoever, including that of being qua being. Second, because 
the sort of knowledge that results from demonstration, episteme, is what Aristotle is 
seeking with regard to ousia in the Metaphysics, even if he cannot achieve it by means 
of demonstration. 8 
Aristotle writes in the Nichomachean Ethics that scientific knowledge deals with 
universals and things that are of necessity and cannot vary [ex anagkes ara esti to 
epistet6n]; it studies eternal things that do not come into existence or perish (NE: l 139b 
20ff; l 140b 30). This indicates that scientific knowledge is of: 1) universals that express 
formal relations between phenomena; or 2) form as the unchangeable element of sensible 
things; or 3) God, which we will see is pure form, and thus the principle of rationality, 
the first principle of the sciences. Though all knowledge begins with perception, scientific 
knowledge is of the universal. Form, though particular to an individual sensible thing, 
8 Because in the Metaphysics Aristotle is seeking grounds of ousia, he must find 
principles. When he finds God as the first principle, he has found a ground; he does not 
take the next step of engaging in formal demonstration. Nonetheless, the study of 
demonstration shows us the standard that Aristotle is attaining to, in seeking grounds for 
ousia in the science of being qua being. 
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(this form in this matter), is also universal (the same form common to many individual 
things). Science treats the form of particulars in its universal, unchanging aspect. Science 
works with "facts" or propositions, statements that are based on perception of particulars, 
and it seeks universal true statements that are explanatory of particulars.9 
In the second Analytics, in constructing a demonstration, Aristotle begins with 
perception of things or relations between things, and then puts these perceptions into 
predicative form. He then uses a deductive procedure that uses pre-established first 
principles in predicative form to seek the explanatory grounds of the predicative 
statement. He begins for example with the observation that the planets do not twinkle, and 
seeks to construct a syllogism with this fact as the conclusion. The two premisses should 
be known to be true, and must entail the truth of the conclusion. Furthermore, they must 
be explanatory of the conclusion, i.e., they must give a reason why the planets do not 
twinkle. If such a demonstration is possible, then we can be said to scientifically 
understand the fact that the planets do not twinkle. 10 
9 The problem of particular and universal is complex and crucial, and will receive 
detailed treatment below and in subsequent chapters. See Hintikka (1960) for a discussion 
of how "truth in every instance" in Aristotle implies the necessity of universal attributes, 
as well as their universality in time. See also Hintikka (1986) on ambiguity between the 
being of facts and individuals in Aristotle. And further on the topic as it applies here see 
McKirahan (1992: Chapter ten), who discusses that necessary and eternal scientific facts 
can clearly apply to non-eternal particulars. Aristotle writes that scientific facts are always 
and eternal, but this does not entail that science requires particulars that exist eternally. 
10 In the Metaphysics, such a method is not possible until the first principles, which 
could serve as premisses, are established. Nonetheless, the Metaphysics is an attempt to 
ground certain phenomena; it is a search for first principles which could be used in 
demonstrations to reveal the aina of these phenomena. 
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Science, as the search for grounds, begins with what is the case, and looks for 
conditions explanatory of its possibility. I call this type of argument "transcendental". 11 
Transcendental arguments are of course aetiological: they seek grounds for givens. Such 
arguments in a sense have the form of deductions "read upwards" from conclusion to the 
premisses that ensure the truth of the conclusion. But the important difference between 
demonstration and transcendental argument is that the principles (or formally speaking, 
premisses) of transcendental arguments are not established prior to the conclusion. They 
are rather necessary postulates, made on the basis of the perceived truth of the conclusion, 
and in order to ground the conclusion. 12 Though the primary function of demonstration 
as discussed in the second Analytics is to ground perceived phenomena and not to 
establish new facts, it works with principles that are already established. Demonstration 
is the formalized mode of a search for grounds: it is an ideal form of argument, since it 
not only reveals grounds transcendentally, but also works downwards from known 
premisses, and thus deductively proves the conclusion. 
It is naturally possible to construct demonstrations using previously known premisses 
for the purpose of arriving at new facts, but this is not the primary function of science, 
11 My use of this term is not to suggest that this method of reasoning should be 
equated with Kant's "transcendental": Aristotle is in no way attempting to ground the 
given in a body of a priori principles. Any notion of "pre-existent" knowledge in 
Aristotle is in relation to first principles which are known prior to any possible deductive 
outcomes of their use in demonstration. I choose the term "transcendental" merely to 
denote the direction of inquiry, from a given, to the condition of possibility for that given. 
The argumentation is "re-ductive" rather than deductive. 
12 The arguments that Aristotle constructs for the necessity of a prime mover are 
transcendental and non-demonstrative in this sense (see chapter three). 
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demonstrative or not. Jonathan Barnes maintains in his revised translation and 
commentary (1993) that the Posterior Analytics has as its chief aim to determine how 
facts and theories discovered by scientists should be systematically organized and 
intelligibly presented; the purpose of demonstration is to arrange facts such that their 
interrelations and grounds become clear, not to discover what is unknown.13 This 
corresponds with McKirahan's view, in his seminal text devoted to the Analytics (1992). 
In chapter seventeen particularly, Mckirahan distinguishes between "knowledge of the 
fact" and "knowledge of the reason why", arguing that to expose the latter is most 
properly, in Aristotle's own view, the purpose of the scientific syllogism. Ferejohn (1991) 
argues for a two-stage interpretation of Aristotle's demonstrative science, in which 
demonstration only applies to the organization of patterns of reasoning in a "finished" 
science, (one in which the research has been completed). But in this second phase, it is 
the explanatory function of the demonstration which is primordial: "a demonstration must 
above all constitute an explanation". 14 
The general consensus among these major commentators then is that the purpose of 
science is not simply to gather new information deductively on the basis of what is 
already known but rather, and even primarily, to ground observed states of affairs. The 
13 Barnes originally argued in this context that in the Posterior Analytics Aristotle 
was "giving the pedagogue advice on the most efficient and economic method of bettering 
his charges" (1969, 147). However he recanted on this point. See the introduction to his 
translation and commentary on the Posterior Analytics (1993), particularly the 
supplementary notes on pp. xviii-xx. 
14 Ferejohn (1991) p. 65: Part two the book is in fact entitled "The Explanatory 
Content of Demonstrations". 
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second Analytics does not tell us how to uncover new facts or truths, but it does give us 
a method of grounding what we observe. The method proposed there is formal 
demonstration, but it is the exposition of explanatory grounds that is primary in 
determining a science. Science is knowledge of explanatory grounds; thus as we will see, 
the Metaphysics qualifies as a science even if it is not demonstrative. It seeks grounds for 
the primary phenomena, ous[ai, and finds this in the supreme principle of God. 
In brief, scientific knowledge, episteme, is the understanding of universal grounds. 
We can know these by constructing demonstrations that ground the relation between a 
subject and predicate which themselves describe a perceived thing or state of affairs. But 
in order for it to be possible to reveal ait[a we need to comprehend certain principles: we 
need nous. These principles can function as premisses in a demonstration, and can be 
known through induction.15 
II 
Aitia 
Science works in two phases: it establishes arc ha[, 16 and it then seeks ait[a for 
apprehended states of affairs by means of these archa[. Science uses principles to ground 
the reason why something is as it is. I will look at archa[ and their establishment below. 
15 Induction is not the only means to noetic apprehension of principles. See chapter 
three. 
16 
"Arche" means literally a beginning or source; or sovereignty, power or dominion. 
"Principle" the traditional translation, captures these meanings, as well as the technical 
and logical meaning of the word as an established truth or proposition used to deduce the 
truth of other things. 
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But first let's see what aitfa means in the context of science, starting with a discussion 
of the term, and my translation of it by "grounds". 
The etymology of the word aitfa, used as a substantive, suggests one who is 
accused, one who is blameworthy, one who is responsible or guilty in the face of an 
accusation: the culprit. Aristotle in his more technical usage employs "aftion" in relation 
to what it is for a thing to be what it is: when he asks about the aftion, he is asking what 
is to blame, what is responsible, for something being a certain kind of thing. 
To use "cause" to translate the term is to distort the etymological meaning of aftion, 
as well as to betray the technical use that Aristotle makes of the word. "Cause" in our 
mechanistic age suggests only what Aristotle calls "he tf proton ekfnese", that which 
initiated the change, or the "efficient cause". It leads the reader away from the more 
complex Aristotelian notion of "responsibility" or "guilt" that the term "aitfa" implies. 
We can see clearly the complexity of Aristotle's notion of aftion in the fourfold 
distinction (material, formal, efficient and final aitfa) established in the Posterior 
Analytics (94a 22-24), discussed in the Physics (194b 23-35) and presumed in the 
Metaphysics (985a 13). 
Another possibility of translation is "explanation". This is used by Michael Ferejohn 
in his important work, The Origins of Aristotelian Science (Yale University Press, 1991). 
The problem with this translation is that it suggests that aitfa are epistemic principles, 
dependent in some sense upon human perception or reading of a given "state of affairs". 
However, as I argue at length (see particularly this section below and ch. two, sec. II, esp. 
the discussion of being as truth), for Aristotle there is no distinction between what I 
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(accurately) know, and what is truly the case in the world. To identify an aftion (to be 
able to explain some aspect of why something is at it is), is at the same time to relate 
something about the ontic condition of that which is being explained. In other words, my 
explanation of what is, is dependent upon what truly, or "objectively" is. "Explanation" 
covers up this more original condition of truth. The explanation is what must be said or 
thought in order for knowledge to be possible; the "object" of that knowledge is the 
ground, what it is that makes the ousfa as it is. An aftion is not just our account of why 
something is, but also and primarily what it is that is responsible for something being as 
it is. I sometimes emphasize the epistemic sense of aftion by use of the phrase 
"explanatory grounds". "Reason" suffers the same fate: it denotes epistemic rather than 
ontic conditions. 
"Grounds", on the other hand, has a certain legitimacy. Its definition in the OED (II 
5) as "fundamental principle", or "circumstance on which an opinion, inference, argument, 
statement or claim is founded" is consistent with the Greek meaning. Because the term 
relates both to the epistemic condition of knowing the reason why ("fundamental 
principle"), and (primarily) to the "objective" conditions in the world that make such 
knowledge possible (the "circumstance" on which claims are founded), "grounds" is 
adequate in conveying the sense of "responsibility" that the Greek word carries. It is wide 
enough, and abstract enough, to apply to all of Aristotle's four aitfa as technical terms. 
Not only this, but "grounds" is used by some top scholars in the analytic tradition 
to translate "aitfa". McKirahan particularly, in his seminal work, Principles and Proofs: 
Aristotle's Theory of Demonstrative Science (Princeton University Press, 1992) uses 
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"grounds" without comment, so standard a usage has it become. Furthermore, in the 
German tradition of Aristotle commentary, the word "Grund" has long been employed.17 
Though my motivation in choosing "grounds" was not guided by this consideration, the 
German use of "Grund" does make my comparison of Aristotle and Heidegger rather 
more neat. Now let's look at how Aristotle uses the search for grounds in his scientific 
method. 
a) The questions we can ask; The things we can know 
The well-known passage at the beginning of the second book of the Posterior 
Analytics discusses the four kinds of questions that we can ask, corresponding to the four 
kinds of things that we can know. We can ask questions about the to h6ti; to di6ti; ef esti; 
or the tf estin. In other words, we can ask about: the that it is, the why it is, the if it is, 
and the what it is (APo: 89b 23-25). These are said in general to correspond to: 18 
1) questions about the fact (can P be predicated of S); 
2) the reason why (why does "S is P" hold); 
3) simple existence (is there an S); and 
4) essence (what is S). 
Before continuing, it is important to be clear on some terminology. Every syllogism 
has three terms: a major term, the predicate of the conclusion; a minor term, the subject 
of the conclusion; and the middle term, a term that appears in both premisses but not in 
17 Admittedly, in the French tradition, Carteron, Tricot, Aubenque, all use "cause"; 
Reale, representing here the Italian tradition also uses "causa": the Teutonic root of the 
word "grounds" makes translation of "aitfa" more difficult in romance languages. 
18 See for example Barnes (1994), McKirahan (1992). 
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the conclusion, and which provides the ground for why P is true of S in the conclusion. 
Take the classic syllogism: 
Prl: 
Pr2: 
Cone: 
All humans are mortal. 
Socrates is a human. 
Socrates is mortal. 
Here, "mortal" is the major term, "Socrates" is the minor term, and "human" is the 
middle term. "Human" is the link between "Socrates" and mortal, and provides a ground 
for the fact of Socrates' mortality. The major premise is the one that contains the major 
term (here Prl); and the minor premise contains the minor term (here Pr2). We know that 
"Socrates is mortal" is true because we know both that all humans are mortal and that 
Socrates is a human. What is proved then, is that Socrates is mortal, but what is grounded 
or explained is the reason why the proposition "Socrates is mortal" is true. 
Now Aristotle writes that of the above questions, the first and the third ask about 
whether there is a middle term or not; whereas questions two and four ask what the 
middle term is. And "the middle term is the a{tion, and that is what we are trying to find 
out in every case" (90a 7). The four questions that we can ask then can only be 
adequately answered by reference to some ground. Let's look at these questions and the 
relation between them and a middle term, or an a{tion. Though aitfa are not restricted to 
their appearance in the demonstration, this will tell us what kind of information a ground 
provides. 
Aristotle divides the four questions into two discrete sets. Thus he says that once 
we have established 1) that something is the case, then we ask 2) the reason why. 
Likewise, once we have established 3) that there is a so and so, then we can ask 4) what 
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it is to be this so and so. But what is the difference between the first and third question? 
The first deals with predications of things or concepts and asks whether or not "Sis P" 
is the case, whereas the third asks whether there is such a thing as the subject mentioned. 
The third question "if x is" asks, for instance, whether there is such a thing in the world 
that corresponds to the nomination "centaur''. If there is not such a thing in the cosmos, 
we are then left with simply a name and cannot begin to search for aitfa. Aristotle argues 
that unless we know that something exists, that is, that there is something in the cosmos 
that corresponds to the name, the essence of something can be discussed only nominally, 
but not in a real sense (92b 5-8). Thus we must know if there is an x, we must know 
whether the term x corresponds to anything real, before we can ask about the "what" or 
the essence of that x. 
How can a simple ef esti question be answered through a middle term? Or in other 
words, how can existence be grounded? Some commentators are concerned with making 
the third question susceptible to answer through demonstration.19 But this seems 
unnecessary, since the demonstrative phase of a science does not begin until after 
ascertaining the existence of a subject or the factual reality of a state of affairs. Looking 
for the aftion begins, as Aristotle clearly states, after the apprehension of a state of affairs 
or of a being that corresponds to a nominal subject. If I cannot find a reason to explain 
the state of affairs being what it is, or that supports the existence of an x, then I cannot 
be said to scientifically know a proposition involving that state of affairs or entities. Thus 
I do not have to demonstrate that the fact or being is, but must rather generate an ground 
19 For discussion on this point see G6mez-Lobo 1980; also Hintikka 1986. 
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for the fact or being from previously established premisses. If I can generate such a 
demonstration, then clearly there is a middle term.20 
In summary, science only explains or grounds things that it knows already to be, or 
to be the case. Knowledge begins with and is bound to perception; so grounds cannot be 
20 This seems initially at odds with the fact that Aristotle says that questions of 
existence ask whether there is a middle term. But there is no conflict. If the subject does 
not "exist" (if there is nothing real that corresponds to the nominal definition) then there 
can be no middle term. No proposition involving centaurs can be said to be scientifically 
true, so no middle term could be used in premisses (which have to be known to be true) 
that would lead to a conclusion in which "centaur" was the major term. Therefore, the 
question "is there a middle term" will be answered negatively of any existential 
proposition involving centaurs, or other non-existent entities. 
("Non-existent" clearly applies to "thoroughly" non-existent things, as opposed to 
"currently" non-existing things, that is, to goat-stags as opposed to either dodo birds, or 
to eclipses that are not presently happening. There never were any particulars that could 
ground a universal statement about goat-stags, therefore no nominal definition, or 
statement of essence, of goat-stag can be demonstratively proved to apply to a particular 
goat-stag. The same is not true of dodos. See Mckirahan: 1992, p. 131. How then do we 
know what goat-stags are? By nominal definition, but we cannot know them 
scientifically.) 
It is possible to find such a middle term in cases where the simple existence of an 
subject C is asserted. Thus Hintikka (1986) suggests a demonstration of the form: 
Prl: 
Pr2: 
Cone: 
Every B is simpliciter. 
Every C is B. 
Every C is simpliciter. 
However, this demonstration could only work for things that we already know to exist, 
as a way of explaining how we know that they exist. If C were non-existent, then the 
second premise would be false, and, as will be made clear below, both premisses in a 
demonstration must be known to be true. For the same reason, the demonstration could 
not work if it were not known whether C exists. Aristotle therefore does not admit 
demonstrations of simple existence, except as explanatory of why we know that a certain 
thing exists. Mckirahan offers a different example of an existence proof which I think is 
susceptible to some of the same criticism ( 1993, p. 188ff). His proof, which is similar to 
Hintikka's, works (like Hintikka's) if it is seen as an explanation of a fact that is already 
known to be true, viz., the existence of a certain subject C. In fact he writes that the third 
question "does not investigate simply whether something exists, but in addition whether 
its existence can be proved from the principles of the science" (p.191 ). 
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speculative. This point will be significant in showing that Aristotle does not "prove" the 
existence of God. The existence of God is not demonstrated or demonstrable, but God is 
offered as a ground of perceived things.21 Aristotle writes that demonstration proves 
something of something, affirmatively or negatively (90b 34); and proving what 
something is, is different from proving that it is (90b 38). The difference is that showing 
that something is, indicates that a demonstration involving such a thing is possible; on 
the other hand, proving what something is shows the reason why such a thing is what it 
is. To know what something is, is the same as knowing the why of it (90a 15-16). The 
primary question is thus ·what something is. Knowing the answer to the fourth question, 
that of essence, will provide grounds. 
Returning to the first question: questions of fact ask not about "existence", but about 
the positing of a predicate in relation to a certain subject. Here, "is there a middle term" 
means "is there a ground of the fact"? Aristotle's example here (89bff) is a predication 
of "sun" by "eclipse", thus we ask whether the sun suffers eclipse. Once we know that 
it does, then we ask why it does. We take into account our knowledge that the earth 
moves, and construct a demonstration with the eclipse of the sun as conclusion. Such a 
demonstration exhibits the reason why it can be said that "the sun suffers eclipse" is true. 
But the reason why it is true is based on a definition of solar eclipse; on showing what 
a solar eclipse is (blocking of the sun by the movement of the earth). To answer to the 
21 The arguments concerning the prime mover are in other words transcendental or 
re-ductive, in the sense defined above, rather than deductive. 
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first question, then, we must know the reason why; but the answer to the reason why is 
again provided by a middle term that exhibits what something is. 
Aristotle says we have unqualified scientific knowledge22 of something when we 
know 1) that the aftion because of which the thing holds is (indeed) its aftion (at first 
glance, this seems tautological: the point is that we must be able to recognize the aftion 
as the aftion; we must have epistemic understanding of the ontic ground); and 2) that the 
thing being grounded cannot be otherwise (71 b 9-12). Science, it seems, is ultimately 
aetiology. To understand the aftion is at the same time to understand what something is, 
and the necessity of something's being what it is. 
To describe science in these terms seems to conflate aitfa and archaf. In fact 
principles and grounds are in a sense identical: in book Delta of the Metaphysics, 
Aristotle writes that "all aitfa are archaz"' (Meta 1013a 17). He clarifies the form of 
identity in book Gamma, where he says that aitfa and archaf, like "being" and "one", are 
the same in that they denote the same thing, though they are not the same in definition 
(1003b 24). In the Posterior Analytics the identity of the two is not explicitly stated. 
However, it is clear that the aftion of the relation between major and minor terms is 
expressed by the middle term in a demonstration. This middle term is "carried by" the 
premisses; primary aitfa then are expressed in primary premisses or first principles (and 
never in conclusions). The middle term itself, as a simple term, is not an aitfa however: 
the term "man" does not itself ground the relation between "Socrates" and "mortal". It 
22 Episteme haplos, as opposed to the accidental knowledge [kata sumbebek6s] that 
a sophist might have, which would not fulfill one of or both the conditions mentioned 
here. 
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is the definition of "man" as expressed in the principle "all men are mortal" that makes 
it possible to understand: 1) why it can be said truly that Socrates is mortal (epistemic 
ground); and 2) why it is in fact the case that Socrates is mortal (ontic ground). Thus 
principles and grounds are the same nominally; the difference lies in function, or 
definition. 
In the context of demonstration, archai are used to establish the logical truth or 
validity of conclusions; they assure that, as the outcome of a syllogism, the statement 
under consideration follows from known premisses and is true. Aitia, on the other hand, 
though they are inseparable from their appearance in premisses, reveal the grounds of the 
relation between the subject and the predicate in the conclusion, and are thus the 
"internal" grounds of the truth of the conclusion, and the soundness of the demonstration. 
Succinctly, principles are used to show that a proposition is true; grounds show why a 
relation holds, or why something is at it is. Grounds are known in the same way that 
primary premisses or principles are, and are in a sense applications of principles to 
particular cases, as we will see below. 
b) The four kinds of ground 
In book two of the second Analytics, (94a 20ff) Aristotle discusses four kinds of 
aition: these are listed as: 
1) what it is to be something [to ti en einai]; 
2) if certain things hold it is necessary for this to hold [to tinon 6nton 
anagke tout' einai]; 
3) what initiated the change [he ti proton ekinese]; and 
4) the for the sake of which [to tinos eneka]. 
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Note that here the familiar quartet of 1) formal; 2) material; 3) efficient; and 4) final 
ait{a23 is upset by the substitution in the second position of "necessitating ground" for 
"material cause". The necessitating ground, as Aristotle's remarks make plain here, is the 
link between two premisses which share a middle term, and from which the conclusion 
follows necessarily. There is some debate as to whether this can be identified with a 
material ground, or seen as a special case of material aition. 24 Since Aristotle remarks 
elsewhere that the premisses of a deduction are the matter or material ground of the 
conclusion (Phy: 195a 15-18; Meta: 1013a 15), it seems possible to interpret the phrase 
as material ground. Further, the phrase indicates not simply that a certain X has a 
particular material structure, but rather that the matter of X is the ground for X being a 
certain kind of X. Given the geometrical example Aristotle uses to explain this aition, it 
is clear that material aitia include "intelligible" matter (as described in Meta 1036a 10; 
1045a 34). 
23 Cf.: Phy: 194b 23-195a 3; 198a 14-25; Meta: 983a 24-31. 
24 Ross in his commentary translates the phrase simply as "ground" (whereas he uses 
"cause" for "aition"), arguing that Aristotle is making an epistemological point concerning 
the structure of the syllogism. Citing Phy. 200a 15-30, Ross notes that premisses 
necessitate a conclusion, whereas the material cause is necessitated by and does not 
necessitate that of which it is the aition (Ross 1957: pp 638ff). The material wood, for 
example, does not necessitate something being a house in the same way that premisses 
necessitate a conclusion. Barnes 1993, (citing PA 677a 18, where Aristotle clearly uses 
the phrase to indicate material necessity) argues against Ross, saying that the phrase 
indicates a "special case of material explanation- viz. the case in which the fact that the 
matter of Xis such and such does necessitate p" (Barnes 1993: pp. 226 ). Aristotle is not, 
in the passage from the Analytics giving a list of epistemic causes, but rather showing the 
types of ontic grounds for something being what it is. Matter can be shown to be a 
definitive ground in this sense. (See my example below). 
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Each of these four aitfa work as a middle term in a syllogism, (though Aristotle's 
examples are notoriously sketchy),25 such that they ground the relationship between 
subject and predicate in a concluding proposition. But we saw that all the questions ask 
about grounds refer to the essence of something. How does this square with there being 
four ait{a? I will put each of the four into a demonstration to show how they work. 
Again, this is only a formal mechanism to describe and distinguish the ait{a, which of 
course are not limited to demonstrations. 
1) In the first case,26 the middle term expresses the essence of the major term. Thus 
if the fact to be grounded is that the moon undergoes eclipse, the middle term will give 
an explanatory definition of lunar eclipse. Let's say the definition of eclipse is "screening 
by the earth", then we get: 
Prl: 
Pr2: 
Cone: 
Everything screened by the earth is eclipsed. 
The moon is screened by the earth. 
The moon is eclipsed. 
Such a demonstration proves the fact, that the moon is eclipsed, by giving the reason why 
the moon is eclipsed. But the reason why is a definition of "eclipse". The definition states 
the essence, or the tot{ esti of "eclipse".27 Note that the essence is not being demonstrated 
25 This is one reason why chapter 11 of the second book of the Posterior Analytics, 
discussed here, is considered so difficult and obscure by commentators. Ross calls it "one 
of the most difficult chapters in the whole of Aristotle" (1949; p.78). Because this chapter 
is, more than others, definitely unfinished, the examples I employ to illustrate the function 
of the four ait{a are not pure Aristotle. 
26 For the "demonstration of essence", Aristotle refers us back to his discussion at 
93a-94a 20. 
27 I use "essence" to translate both to t{ esti and to tf en einai, though I mention the 
Greek in all cases. The first of these terms refers to the essence of the complete 
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here, but it is being used as an ground.28 In the demonstration that answers the question 
of essence, the middle term must be a (pre-established) definition of the major term: "this 
is the reason why all sciences are based upon definitions" (99a 22-4).29 The formal aftion 
is the ideal type, since it gives the why in terms of the what; it shows why something is 
by reference to what it is. 
2) The "necessitating grounds" occurs as a middle term in a demonstration that, in 
Aristotle's example, gives material grounds for the relation of the major and minor terms. 
Thus, to adapt Barnes' example30 we might concoct the syllogism: 
Prl: 
Pr2: 
Cone: 
All humans are made of flesh and bones. 
Flesh and bones are subject to destruction. 
Humans are subject to destruction. 
The middle term here, "flesh and bones" is the necessitating material ground for the truth 
of the concluding proposition. This demonstration gives the material reason why it is that 
the conclusion, as the fact to be grounded, is true. But notice that there is implicit here 
individual, as a combination of matter and form, thus to the individual construed as 
particular. The latter refers to the form of the individual, and thus to the universal 
character of the individual. Ultimately these are identical, since the individual form of 
something is always universalizable. Form manifests itself in a particular individual, but 
it is common to many individuals. See chapter two. 
28 On the complex relation between definition, essence and demonstration see section 
three below. 
29 More on definitions in the section on archaf below. 
30 I use a contrived material example (suggested by Barnes 1993, p. 226) rather than 
Aristotle's own geometrical example for the sake of a clarity not evident in Aristotle's 
unfinished text. As noted, this chapter (book two, 11) of the Analytics seems to be rather 
notes and ideas than fully explained doctrines. 
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a definition, a statement of the "what" of human beings as composed of flesh and bones. 
The material aftion is dependent on an essential or formal aftion. 
3) The third aftion is commonly called the efficient cause, here "that which initiated 
the change". Again, in the demonstration, it is by means of a middle term that this form 
of ground works as a means of showing how the subject and predicate of a predication 
hold. The example Aristotle gives (94ba 1-8; modified here) is: 
Prl: 
Pr2: 
Cone.: 
Those who are first to attack are attacked. 
The Athenians first attacked Sardis. 
The Athenians are attacked by the people of Sardis. 
Here the reason why the Athenians are attacked is explained by means of the middle 
term, an aftion of the change, "first to attack". But again, the ground of change, the 
efficient aftion, is dependent on a "what": a definition of Athenians as "those first to 
attack". 
4) Lastly, the final aftion, or the "for the sake of which" is also used as a means of 
explaining or grounding the truth of a proposition. Again, Aristotle's own examples here 
are much criticized, but following Barnes,31 I adapt Aristotle's example at 94b 10 to: 
Prl: 
Pr2: 
Cone.: 
Shelters for belongings are roofed. 
Houses are shelters for belongings. 
Houses are roofed. 
The fact that houses are roofed is here grounded by reference to the purpose. What is the 
purpose of roofing houses? They shelter belongings (the middle term). This demonstration 
provides a final aftion, but again by means of a formal aftion or an essential ground: the 
definition of houses as "shelters for belongings". 
31 Barnes, 1992, p. 231. 
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These then are the four senses of aitfa that Aristotle discusses as the goal of science 
to make clear, and which can be formally revealed in the demonstration. All four aitfa 
are dependent on the understanding of the essence of that which is to be grounded. 32 And 
what something is, is for Aristotle the primary question for a science to address: knowing 
the why means knowing the what. But how do we get to know grounds? 
For any knowledge of grounds to be possible, indemonstrable principles are 
required. In science in general, universal archaf provide grounds for the particular or less 
universal thing or fact that is to be explained. In a demonstration, archaf provide the 
middle term that grounds the relation between the major and minor terms in a conclusion; 
they thereby provide the aftion sought by science. Again, grounds and principles are 
nominally the same, but they are different in function and definition. An aftion is an 
application of a universal arche to a particular proposition. Without some notion of what 
archaf are and how they are apprehended, then, whatever episteme means for Aristotle 
is obscure. 
32 Any formal ground shows an essential, and thus indubitable, connection between 
subject and predicate. The other aitfa do not necessarily do this, (e.g. an efficient 
explanation is not in itself indubitable) although in my examples above, they do in fact 
do so. But this is only because the examples all incorporate some kind of formal 
explanation, giving a definition by making a universal statement, and then a statement 
about a particular that belongs to the universal class. See Barnes: "demonstration reveals 
the formal explanation, and this in turn will reveal one or more of the other three types 
of explanation" (Barnes, 1993, p.226). 
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III 
The Types and Function of Archai 
I will look at archa{ first in the context of demonstration. Scientific deductions must 
be both valid and sound. Demonstration follows one of the valid forms of syllogistic 
reasoning laid out in the Prior Analytics, such that the conclusion does indeed follow 
from the premises by the rules of inference. But also, the premisses must be known to be 
true. In the first Analytics, a premise is defined as "an affirmative or negative statement 
of something about some subject [logos kataphantikos he apophantikos tinos kata tinos]" 
(APr: 24a 16). A premise is an apophantic statement, a proposition that affirms or denies 
that something is true of something. Now scientific demonstration proceeds from "things 
[premisses] that are true, primary, immediate, better known than [gn6rimon], prior to, and 
explanatory of the conclusion" (APo:71 b 20-4). Let's look at this statement piece by 
piece. 
First, why must the premisses of a scientific demonstration be primary and 
immediate or indemonstrable, and must all such premisses be primary? If all premisses 
were demonstrable, then there would always be prior premisses required to prove their 
veracity, and there is no infinite regress of demonstration possible (72b 19-25). 
Demonstration chains can be formed such that the conclusion of one demonstration is 
used as a premise in another subsequent demonstration, so that not all premisses are 
"directly" primary. But ultimately all conclusions refer back to some ultimate and 
immediate primary premises, which Aristotle calls archa{ (72a 25-8). It is these 
indemonstrable archa{ upon which each particular science is based. Each science has a 
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set of unproved principles, appropriate to the genus it studies, which it uses to draw 
inferences.33 But all sciences use certain common principles, ones that are not specific to 
any particular subject matter, but which rather concern the nature of demonstration itself 
(77a 27-30). These, as we will see, are the concern of the first science, that which is 
studied in the Metaphysics. Principles are necessary to a science even if it is not 
demonstrative. 
Secondly, what does it mean that primary premisses are prior to and more knowable 
than the conclusion, which they work to ground? That which is prior and more knowable 
[gn6rimon] can either be more knowable for us, or more knowable in itself [kath 'haut6]. 
In sense perception we have immediate knowledge of a certain object or event; things we 
know through the senses are more knowable to us in that they are more familiar. But 
archa[ are more knowable in themselves: they are universals that we know not directly 
thorough sense perception, but through an act of intellection. As universals, they are not 
subject to destruction as is the particular that is accessible to sense perception, and are 
thus better known in themselves. This needs clarification. 
33 Thus geometrical questions will not be medical, etc. Nor is the geometnc1an 
expected to give an account of the principles that she uses, since the first principles of 
geometry are accepted as indemonstrable. A doctor arguing with a geometer about 
geometry must be clear on the first principles geometry uses, but this is not commonly 
the case. Therefore, writes Aristotle, foreshadowing today's over-specialization, "one 
should not discuss geometry among people who are not geometricians, because they will 
not recognize an unsound argument" (APo: 77b 12-15). 
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a) Archat as universals 
Aristotle says that "scientific knowledge cannot be acquired by sense-
perception"(APo:87b 28-9). This is somewhat misleading, because sense perception is a 
necessary step towards knowing universals; but it is not in itself apprehension of the 
universal. Sense perception is of the particular, but archa{ are universals, and episteme 
is dependent on recognition of the universal. 
The archa{ used as premises in a demonstration are universal statements; otherwise, 
there could be no universal term, and thus no middle term, and no a{tion (77a 7). This 
does not mean that knowledge is uniquely of universal objects, but rather that episteme 
treats universal propositions that concern real objects, or relations between objects or facts 
about real objects, taken universally.34 We can have universal knowledge of particular 
things when we are able to apprehend that the particular participates in a species. To see 
an individual material horse that has four legs, and to see that horse as a particular 
instantiation of horseness, which is characterized by four-leggedness, are two different 
intellectual activities. The first is immediately dependent on sense-perception; the second 
begins with sense perception, but involves an act of the intellect that permits us to see the 
particular horse as belonging to a species about which we already have certain 
information. This is the universal, which though "furthest from the senses", is better 
known kath 'haut6, in itself, without direct reference to the immediacy of perception. 
Though a conclusion that is a particular can be known to be true through the senses, 
the reason why it is true is not known through the senses. Thus, for example, the reason 
34 On this point see Barnes (1993), p. 145. 
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that this horse has four legs is because all horses have four legs. We saw that the formal 
aitfa is primary. This can be grasped only by an act of the intellect that relates the 
particular to be grounded, to a species that defines it. In the demonstration, this 
connection is brought out through a universal middle term, that shows the relation 
between major and minor terms in the conclusion (that which is to be grounded). In order 
for this connection to hold, the premisses of the demonstration, the archa{ in which the 
middle term appears, must be understood to be true. The apprehension of an attribute of 
a particular subject as belonging to a class, or as a universal attribute, is thus explanatory 
of the relationship between the attribute and the particular to which it pertains (71 a 16-
29).35 
Ross sketches the relation between the particular and the universal in the context of 
aitfa in this concise but dense passage: 
... Aristotle is convinced that if a particular subject Chas an attribute A, it has 
it not as being that particular subject, but in virtue of some attribute B which 
it shares with other subjects, and that it is more really intelligible that all B is 
A than that C, a particular instance of B, is A. To pass from the particular fact 
that C is A to the general fact that all B is A is not to understand why all B is 
A; but to pass, as we may proceed to do, from knowing that all B is A to 
35 Not all conclusions are particular propositions: indeed a universal demonstration, 
one that in its strictest form consists of three universal statements, is superior to a 
demonstration that has a particular as a conclusion (APo:85a 20-86a 30). (A "universal" 
as opposed to a "particular'' demonstration is one in which 1) the premises are more 
universal, that is, they are a and e propositions as opposed to i and o propositions ("All 
S are P" or "No S is P'', as opposed to "Some S is P" or Some S is not P"); or 2) the 
conclusion is more universal, whether as an a or e proposition or as a more general a or 
e proposition. Aristotle uses sometimes one and sometimes the other of these meanings 
(See Barnes, 1993 p. 183).) Nonetheless, since in a demonstration the ground of the 
conclusion is being sought, and since ait{a involve the relation of the major and minor 
terms through a middle term, the archa{ that contain the middle term must still be more 
universal, and thus better known, than the conclusion. 
knowing that C, a particular B, is A, is to understand why C is A .... (Ross: 
1949, p.51). 
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Though perceived as a particular, a subject and its attribute is not known 
scientifically until it is understood in relation to the universal. This horse here can only 
be understood in its "reason why" by referring to its essence, that which makes it what 
it is. Any scientific explanatory judgment about this horse must be in terms of it as an 
example of horse, not as a particular individual horse. Scientific knowledge, knowledge 
of grounds, then has to do with knowledge of universals and essences, and the archa{ that 
reveal grounds, whether in the context of demonstration or not, must be universals.36 
Note that principles and grounds again seem identical: but in function they are not. 
The arche is not the formal ground as such, but as a universal that states the essence, is 
able to reveal the grounds. Archa{ are universals that state the essence, and thus, in given 
applications, provide the formal grounds of what is to be grounded. Are all archa{ then 
just definitions? 
b) The types of archai 
In the first book of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle lists two major kinds of 
principles (72a 15-25): 1) "axioms", also called "common principles" [axi6mata or koinai 
36 The problem of universals, viz., how we get from knowledge of a particular to 
knowledge of the class to which that particular can be said to belong, is treated below in 
the section on induction. The problem is solved in large measure by the notion of efdos, 
or form, (see chapter two, esp. section III). 
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archai1, and 2) "theses" [theseis].31 1) An axiom is an immediate indemonstrable principle 
common to all sciences, that be must grasped in order for any knowledge whatsoever to 
be gleaned. Axioms are the rules of logical thought that govern the formation of any 
correct syllogism, such as the law of non-contradiction, the law of the excluded middle, 
and the principle that if equals are subtracted from equals, the remainders are equal. 38 
These axioms are necessary to any scientific understanding whatsoever, and are studied 
in the first science. 
2) A thesis on the other hand is an immediate indemonstrable first principle peculiar 
to a particular science, and thus to the particular content of a demonstration. There are 
two kinds of thesis: 2a) the hypothesis [hupothesis]; and 2b) the definition [horism6s]. 
Briefly, an hypothesis comprises a judgment of existence about the subjects that a 
particular science treats, whereas definitions define the subjects and attributes peculiar to 
a science (72a 22-5; 76b 35-6).39 
37 The language here is deceptive, as it seems to imply that the function of archai is 
primarily to provide epistemic explanations, as if there were a distinction between how 
we understand the world, and how the world is. In fact, archa[, even though in the form 
of propositions, reflect what is truly the case in the world: there is no distinction in 
Aristotle between "subjective" and "objective" truth, or between knowledge of 
explanations, and knowledge of what is the case. This becomes clear in an analysis of 
existential propositions (see this section below); and in the discussion of episteme and 
nous as hexeis (section v below). 
38 These are the only three specific examples that Aristotle gives of axioms in the 
Posterior Analytics; See 77a 10-35. 
39 In a sense then, Aristotle here anticipates the distinction between e[ esti and ti estin 
questions posed at 89b 23-25, (discussed above). 
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2a) What Aristotle says about hypotheses is somewhat sketchy. Some commentators 
find that Aristotle uses the word both to refer to subjects within a science that require 
existence claims (for instance units in arithmetic; 76b 5), and subjects that need only a 
meaning or nominal definition (as for example triangles in geometry; 7la 14).40 I have 
argued that for Aristotle to say that something is, is to claim that a name corresponds to 
something real. This applies equally to the objects of mathematics, which are related to 
the material world in being abstractions from it, one step further away than the objects 
of physics. The geometer, for example, considers the objects of his science as attributes 
of solids or accidents of bodies.41 
It should be emphasized that any notion of "existence" is Aristotle is carried by the 
verb efnai: there is no separate verb "to exist" in Greek.42 To speak of "existence" in 
Aristotle as a feature of things separable from their essence is already to distort the Greek 
notion of being. Existence for Aristotle is a reference to the real, to what is truly the case 
in the world. "There is an x" means that "it is the case that in the world there is found 
40 See Mckirahan (1992) p. 49; Ross (1949) p. 55. 
41 We can see this view expressed in book Mu of the Metaphysics: "the objects of 
geometry really are [estin]. For things can exist in two ways, whether in entelechy or as 
matter" (Meta: 1078a 30). Geometrical objects exist as intelligible objects, separated from 
the material substances in which they inhere by means of thought. As non-material, 
intelligible objects, they are more universal, and thus in a sense have more reality or are 
more fully apprehended as what they are, or as having filled their telos, than material 
things. Thus whereas the geometer studies this "intelligible matter" without reference to 
the material world that inspires abstraction, the "physicist, for example, is concerned with 
material objects, and the first philosopher with both intelligible and material reality. 
42 See Charles Kahn's extensive writings on this subject, some of which are listed in 
the bibliography below. 
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an x", or "there is something that corresponds to the name x'. But in order to know if 
there is such a thing in the world (whether materially or intelligibly as an abstraction from 
matter), we must know what x is. And we cannot know what x is if there are no particular 
x's (material or intelligible) about which we can form universal statements that describe 
x as a certain type of thing. Nor can we "prove" that there is an x by means of 
demonstration without using true universal propositions that describe x as a certain kind 
of something through use of a middle term. And this is impossible if we do not know 
whether there are any x' s.43 An hypothesis breaks this cycle by positing that there are x' s, 
that there is something that corresponds to a particular name. This permits knowledge of 
the essence, because it makes it possible that there is a ground.44 
2b) Definitions are the third kind of arche (the second type of thesis) that Aristotle 
mentions at 72a 19, and are treated extensively in book two of the second Analytics. In 
general, definitions are statements of essence or of what something is. Now Aristotle 
writes that to know what something is, is the same as knowing why it is (90a 31): thus 
the formal a[tion, that of essence, is prior to the other ait[a. The formal a[tion is carried 
by a middle term in a demonstration. The middle term appears in primary premisses, 
which are definitions of that which is to be grounded. In short, to be able to find a ground 
for something, we must know its definition. 
43 See APo: 92b 12-20. 
44 As S. Mansion writes, "le role de jugement d'existence dans la science est ... 
nettement determine par Aristotle: c'est de rendre possible la connaissance de !'essence" 
(S. Mansion, 1976, p.260). 
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There are four kinds of definition given in the Analytics at 93b 29-94a 10:45 1) a 
nominal definition, that is, an account of the meaning of the name of something. Thus we 
might give a simple meaning of the word "thunder", as "a noise in the clouds". Nominal 
definitions do not solve the difficulty of knowing whether or not there is something that 
corresponds to the nomination, since they do not give a ground in universal terms. 
Another type of definition is 2) the explanatory definition, which defines what 
something is in terms of why it is. Thus "thunder" is defined as "the noise of fire being 
extinguished in the clouds". This kind of definition has the same result as a demonstration 
that provides a ground of why thunder is, but it does not prove anything. Third, there is 
3) the conclusion of a demonstration; and lastly, there is 4) the indemonstrable definition 
of immediate or primary terms, or definitions of concepts or things, known through 
induction and nous (intuition). 
We have episteme if we have knowledge of the ground. This can be revealed 
through demonstration, or given in a definition. But Aristotle writes that nothing can be 
both demonstrated and defined. Definitions show what something is, whereas 
demonstration show that some attribute is true or not true of something (9 la 1). 
Definition, in other words, is of the essence, whereas demonstrations assume essence as 
a given (90b 31) and use it to ground a relation between a subject and a predicate. 
Demonstrations do not prove the essence, then, but rather reveal it (93b 15-17), and this 
by showing why it is that some attribute is true of some subject, through an appeal to 
45 There is considerable controversy surrounding the number and types of definition 
(three or four?). See Deslauriers (1990) for an account of four types, and a discussion of 
the controversy. 
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what that subject is. Thus what the subject is, is assumed in the demonstration, and is 
indemonstrable. Following these criteria, only definition types two and four are true or 
scientific definitions: indemonstrable and explanatory. Types one and three do not provide 
grounds, but they make it possible to arrive at a ground through the role they play in the 
demonstration. 
The second and fourth type of definition are clearly not demonstrable. Type four 
definitions express the essence of a thing or concept, they say what something is, are self-
explanatory, and are thus indemonstrable. They are used as primary premisses in 
demonstrations. Type two are abbreviated forms of demonstrations that ground what and 
why something is. Since they already give some explanatory account, they, like type four, 
are not demonstrable. These are the definitions that we need in order for scientific 
knowledge to be possible. 
The third type of definition (a conclusion) is obviously always demonstrable. But 
as the fact to be explained, it does not itself give us episteme. The conclusion of a 
demonstration states a relationship between two terms, but does not provide a ground of 
why the relationship holds. This relationship can be explained by seeking premisses from 
which the conclusion can be logically inferred. The third type of definition is then the 
demonstrative form of the second type, the explanatory definition. It occurs as the 
conclusion of a demonstration that grounds the essence. Thus, a syllogism could be 
constructed: 
Prl: 
Pr2: 
Cone: 
Noise in the clouds is extinction of fire. 
Extinction of fire is thunder. 
Thunder is noise in the clouds. 
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This demonstration is a syllogism that answers the question tf esti, as discussed above, 
and gives a ground. 
This demonstration, however, also proves the nominal definition of thunder 
("thunder in the clouds") by means of a middle term that displays the essence of thunder. 
Nominal definitions (type one) then are also demonstrable, which means that they do not 
themselves give us episteme. But nominal definitions are not always conclusions of 
demonstrations. We have seen that hypotheses, for instance, can be nominal definitions. 
However, since nominal definitions do not give an account both of the essence and the 
aftion of something, these are not true, but preliminary or pre-scientific definitions. They 
are in fact preliminary to knowledge of type four definitions. 
I have argued that to know what something is scientifically- that is, in relation to 
grounds- we must already know that it is. But nor is it possible to say we know that 
something is, without having some primitive notion of what it is.46 The nominal definition 
breaks this cycle by giving some account of what something is. From here, we can build 
inductively towards a definition. Obviously, the initial account, since it is non-
explanatory, can apply equally to non-beings and to beings, unicorns and tables. How can 
we prevent nominal definitions of unicorns being used as archaf in demonstrations? How 
can we distinguish between a nominal definition and one that is clearly of the essence of 
46 We are talking about scientific knowledge here, and thus knowledge of universal 
grounds. We might well have a perception of something of which we have no knowledge 
(e.g. some unknown animal that we come across). But in order to begin the process of 
explaining why this animal is as it is, we must at least have a name for it, or some 
nominal description ("four legged mammal"). 
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something? This can only be answered by showing how it is that we know type four 
definitions, or first principles. 
The first line of the Posterior Analytics reads: "All teaching and all learning of an 
intellectual kind [dianoetike1 proceeds from pre-existent knowledge" (APo: 7la 1). This 
is true, as Aristotle notes, both of deduction and induction. For scientific deduction, 
indeed for any scientific knowledge, we must know the archa{. And archa{ can be known 
through induction. But to know inductively, we must first know particulars. Even if 
archa{ are known by means other than induction, knowledge of them depends on 
perception of particulars. 
IV 
Epagoge and Nous 
In a discussion of why it is impossible to have knowledge of particulars without 
sense-perception, Aristotle makes four points: 1) demonstration depends on universals; 2) 
it is impossible to study universals except through induction [epagoge]; 3) induction 
depends on particulars; 4) sense perception apprehends particulars (APo: 8la 38- 8lb 5). 
Let's pan this out. 
Some scientific syllogisms use premisses that have been conclusions of other 
demonstrations. But since there is no infinite series of demonstration, we must begin 
somewhere with first premisses. We have seen that in the particular sciences, these archa{ 
are theses that are definitions, or universal statements of essence. 
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The universal is known through the process of induction [epagoge], which results 
in nous, or intuition.47 Just as episteme indicates the scientist's understanding of grounds, 
which can be the outcome of demonstration, so nous is the grasp of universal principles, 
which can be the outcome of induction. Induction begins with sense perception of 
particulars. The problem of how we know archaf then is the problem of how we go from 
knowledge of the particular to knowledge of the universal. 
For Aristotle all knowledge begins with sense perception. Ross writes, "all 
knowledge starts with the apprehension of particular facts, which are the most obvious 
objects of knowledge" (Ross, 1949, p. 50-51). More accurately, all knowledge begins with 
the perception of certain particular things, ousfai or relations between or within ous[ai. 
As De Interpretatione makes clear, these perceptions are "affections" or impressions on 
the soul, which are symbolized by words, and put into apophantic form, "for combination 
and division [sunthesis kai diairesis] are essential before you can have truth and falsity" 
(De Int: 16a 12). In the Posterior Analytics, as elsewhere, Aristotle is concerned with 
propositional or apophantic truth, the kind of truth that is susceptible to true and false 
47 Barnes, in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics argues for a translation of 
nous by "comprehension" (1994, pp.267-270), saying that nous stands to induction as 
episteme, understanding, stands to demonstration. "Comprehension" however, has a ring 
of epistemic conceptuality, which nous manifestly is not. It indicates rather an "intuitive" 
insight or "flash" of understanding. Thomas Upton (1984) takes this a step further, 
seeming to argue back downwards again from nous, and claiming that archaf are only 
understood as first principles once they have been tested in dialectical practice. There are 
two forms of nous, or rather two levels, according to Upton: immediate intuition, which 
by direct appeal can lead to "knowledge", and systematic intuition, which can lead to 
"understanding". He calls both of these nous (p.252). But this second form of "nous" is 
no longer nous at all; it should more properly called episteme. This kind of understanding 
should be reserved for the end product of demonstration, that is episteme, scientific 
knowledge. 
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judgement.48 Perception is not a judgement of truth; such a judgement can only be made 
of an apophantic statement. The judgement consists of whether or not the statement is in 
accordance with the perception.49 To perceive what is, and to perceive what is truly are 
identical. Truth, in other words, is the truth of being. Scientific knowledge, the 
explanatory grounds of what is truly, is founded on the apprehension of facts, but begins 
with simple perception. But is there such a thing as simple perception in Aristotle? 
At 79b 29-31, Aristotle discusses a phenomenon of perception: "even if perception 
is of what is such-and-such, and not of what is a this so-and-so, nevertheless what you 
perceive must be a this so-and-so at a place and at a time". This obscure passage seems 
to say that although what we perceive directly is colour, shape, sound, size, odour, etc., 
our perception is of (for instance) a neighing horse. We see perceived sensible qualities 
as a certain something. This is not, Aristotle is quick to point out, a sensible perception 
of the universal, for we are still only perceiving a particular thing. 
As I discussed in the context of archai above, universals cannot be sensibly 
perceived. However, in the last chapter of the Analytics, Aristotle writes, "there is a 
48 See Chapter four, in the section on the meaning of "phenomeno-logy", for a 
discussion and Heideggerian interpretation of apophantic discourse as Aristotle describes 
it in De Interpretatione. 
49 Aristotle says that the capacity [dunamis] of sense perception discriminates 
[kritik6s] (99b 35); this seems to mean that perception distinguishes between things it 
perceives, not that it judges, since judgement would require some conceptual apparatus 
not apparent at this stage. Again, since Aristotle discusses perception as common to all 
animals, and animals do not have a conceptual capacity, perception is not a capacity of 
judgement. 
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primitive universal in the soul; for although you perceive particulars, perception is of 
universals,-e.g. of man, not of Callias the man" (100a 17-18). This implies that for 
Aristotle, not only do we already see sense impressions as particulars, but we always 
already see a particular as a certain kind of thing. It is not that we actually "see" the 
universal, but rather that in perceiving a particular, we already have a primitive 
understanding of it as certain kind of thing.50 Let's see how this works. 
Knowledge then begins with perception of particulars. The second stage is memory, 
which is the retention of perceptions in the mind. Repeated memories of the same thing 
lead to the third stage of knowledge, experience [empeir{a]. Experience gives one the 
ability to say that, for instance, "all the B's I've ever seen have been A's", but is limited 
to past observed cases of this relationship.51 Experience is the beginning of propositional 
knowledge, and the starting point of the fourth and final stage of knowledge, which is 
grasping the universal principle, i.e. "all B's are A's". This principle can either be used 
to ground what things are (episteme); or to show how things are made (techne). Techne 
or know-how concerns application of the principle; science uses the principle to ground 
what is. This four step process from perception to principle describes induction, or 
epagoge.52 
50 In Metaphysics book Mu (1087a 10-25) Aristotle argues that we have actual 
knowledge of the particular sensible individual, a combination of this matter and this 
form, and we have potential knowledge of the universal. See chapter two section III 
below. 
51 See Barnes, 1993, p.264 
52 This account of the stages of knowledge (APo: 1 OOa 3-9) is very similar to that in 
the Metaphysics Alpha, 980a 28-981a 12. 
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Induction works, then, by grasping the universalizable element in a perceived object 
or event, what is,53 linking it to like elements in other perceived events or objects through 
memory and experience, and then coming up with a general universal principle that 
applies equally to the original particular and to other members of its genus. 
We can also relate genera to larger classes that gather together genera according to 
an essential quality or attribute common to each genus member. Thus we can build from 
particulars to universals, and from these to wider universals, proceeding ultimately to the 
primary, most universal principles. Universal principles are not then known by 
demonstration, but through induction. 
Nous is the primary source of scientific knowledge, the starting point of episteme. 
The term describes the way the mind is disposed after having grasped a principle. 
Perception being fallible, induction can be flawed, but nous itself is infallible (100b 12). 
Either we grasp the principle or we do not; nous describes the activity of intuitively 
grasping the principle, and not the steps leading to the possibility of making the intuitive 
leap. Nous is then a possible end result of induction: the inductive procedure must be 
accurate, and the person applying the inductive method must be astute enough to see 
through to the universal. Nous properly refers to the disposition (hexis) that follows the 
application of the inductive method: it does not describe a method, but a disposition of 
the soul.54 
53 As we will see in the context of the Metaphysics, this is the efdos or form. 
54 See Lesher (1973, p.58): "There is one activity, grasping the universal principle, but 
it admits of various descriptions; to speak of it as an act of n6esis is to give an epistemol-
ogical characterization, while to characterize it as epagoge is to speak of methodology." 
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Having said this, we can see how it is possible that there are some principles that 
though noetically comprehended, are not attained through inductive means.55 As episteme 
results from demonstration, but is not achieved solely through demonstration, so nous can 
be attained by induction, but not solely through induction. It will emerge that the first 
principle of first philosophy, non-sensible ous{a or God, is a definition apprehended by 
the active intellect. But God cannot be known by induction, since he is not perceptible; 
nor does Aristotle offer deductive "proofs" of his existence. God's effects are perceptible, 
but these cannot be used inductively to apprehend God, nor can God be known to be 
through deduction, since he is a first principle. As we will see in chapter three, the 
arguments that lead to the first mover are transcendental. They are based on the 
perception of sensible phenomena, known according to the universal by induction. The 
arguments then seek the condition of the possibility of the these phenomena. The prime 
mover is then apprehended by nous as the first principle and a{tion of sensible 
phenomena. We come to comprehend the first principle of the science of the Metaphysics 
by means that are not strictly inductive or deductive. 
There are no formal demonstrations or formal presentations of inductive arguments 
in the Metaphysics, but Aristotle himself obviously believes that the work describes a 
science: this has led to difficulties in the scholarship over what constitutes the "science" 
of being qua being. I argue in the next chapter that the study of being qua being is a 
55 Though this point is not made in the Posterior Analytics. There Aristotle discusses 
nous as the apprehension of first principles, and induction as the method that prepares us 
to make the leap. However, it seems that there are other possible methods of disposing 
the mind such that nous is possible. See NE: 1098b 3: some principles are known by 
perception, others by induction, some by habituation, and others "otherwise". 
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science. It is an aetiological study that begins with what is apparent to perception, ousfai, 
and seeks an aftion for the being of these ousfa on the basis of principles comprehended 
by nous. Episteme is gained when grounds are understood, and we come to know grounds 
through the use of first principles comprehended by nous. If a discourse on a subject 
seeks grounds in this way, and thus leads to understanding of the phenomena appropriate 
to that subject, it can be called a science. 
Whether a science uses formal demonstration or not is less significant than whether 
it seeks explanatory grounds on the basis of its primary definitions. The formal 
demonstration is a paradigm example of how aitfa can be known certainly to hold, such 
that scientific understanding is assured. The exploration of demonstration above was thus 
a convenient means of explaining the constellation of terms and concepts that are related 
to scientific understanding (aitfa, archaf, horism6s, nous). But episteme and nous refer 
to qualities of knowing, not the method of achieving such understanding. 
Nous and episteme are both dianoetic dispositions, or potentialities of the mind to 
know truth. How these dispositions relate to the study of being as being remains to be 
seen. 
v 
Episteme and Nous as Hexeis 
Aristotle recognized that there are different ways in which we come to truth. In 
discussing the "16gos" of the human psyche in book six of the Nichomachean Ethics, he 
writes: 
... Let it be assumed that there are five [dispositions; hexeis] through which 
the [rational, l6gon] psyche comes to truth by way of affirmation and denial, 
namely art [techne], scientific knowledge [episteme], practical wisdom 
[phr6nesis], theoretical wisdom [sophfa], and nous. Judgement and opinion are 
capable of error [and are therefore excluded from the list] ... (NE 1139b). 
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Hexis cannot be translated as "state" (as it so often is): it is a form of potentiality 
[dunamis] (1143a 28). Let's see what this involves for episteme and nous. 
For Aristotle there are three forms of affectivity in the soul: emotions [pathe], 
capacities [dunameis] and dispositions [hexeis](l l05b 20ff). The capacity to feel emotion 
and the natural capacities of the senses (1103a 27) are both dunameis, potentialities given 
to us naturally [phusei]. We have these capacities even if we are not engaged in 
exercising them; thus we are capable of seeing, even if our eyes are closed; we are 
capable of anger even if we are calm. 
The same is not true of a hexis. Moral and intellectual virtues are hexeis. Moral 
disposition56 is the way that we ordinarily choose or are formed to act in relation to the 
emotion that we naturally feel. Moral virtues are not mere potentialities; they only come 
to be actual through use (i.e. we become just by doing just acts, etc), and are not given 
by nature (1103a 32). Likewise with dianoetic ("intellectual") virtues. The soul has a 
natural capacity for logos. The customary way that we express this rationality is through 
the intellectual virtues. But it is the specific exercise of the dianoetic hexeis51 that makes 
them come to be actual (i.e. we are not "naturally" wise, but become wise through the 
practice of wisdom). Disposition is a form of actualized (but not yet) potential that is 
56 Ross: "states of character". 
57 Ross: "states of capacity". 
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strictly tied to its manifestation in action: in order to fulfill this potential, we must act in 
a particular way that is not given by phusis but comes about through desire, and activity. 
In other words, in order to achieve knowledge, we must want to seek truth, and then 
do something about it. 58 The first line of the Metaphysics tells us that "all people desire 
knowledge by nature" [phusei] (Meta: 980a 22). To seek knowledge is the natural telos 
of human being, and the soul has a natural capacity for truth. But to fulfill this capacity 
needs ergon, literally work, or fulfillment of the potential. 
Episteme and nous are ways of knowing that are product of an intellectual process, 
respectively deduction and induction. Understanding and intuition are not given to us by 
phusis, but come to be through [intellectual] action on the basis of what is given to us by 
phusis- in this context, the capacity to be rational. We want to attain knowledge, 
understanding and nous, and this we can do through the practice of deduction and 
induction. But what is the work of episteme and nous? 
In Aristotle's conception, the rational soul has two given capacities (l 139a 5-12): 
1) the scientific capacity [ epistemikon] permits contemplation of necessary, non-contingent 
objects. The dispositions of episteme, nous and sophfa (as the unity of these two) are 
based on this natural capacity; and 2) the calculative capacity [logistik6n] permits 
knowledge of contingent things. Techne and phr6nesis are the corresponding dispositions. 
The work or fulfillment [ergon] of each of these capacities is to attain truth. 
58 Aristotle's remarks that "pursuit and avoidance in the sphere of desire [6rexis] 
correspond to affirmation and denial in the sphere of the intellect [dianofa]" (NE: 1139a 
22). To desire knowledge is to desire truth. 
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There is also an activity [energefa] specific to each disposition, since dispositions 
are potentialities [dunameis]. The activity associated with the dispositions of (1) the 
scientific capacity is theorfa. This is the activity that fulfills the potential to contemplate 
eternal things: sophfa, the unity of understanding and nous is that potential. It is also the 
name for the excellence of the activity of theorfa. Each of the two dispositions of (2) the 
calculative capacity have different activities. Pofesis is the energefa of techne. It aims at 
a goal distinct from the action involved in achieving that goal; pofesis is the production 
of things for some purpose (use or beauty). Praxis is the energefa of phr6nesis. It is an 
activity engaged in for its own sake, with the goal of acting well [eupraxfa]. 
There are then in Aristotle three fundamental modes of activity, or energefa, 
corresponding to the three fundamental modes of acquired dunamis or disposition: theorfa, 
pofesis, and praxis, corresponding to sophfa, techne, and phr6nesis. These are all ways 
in which the human being modifies its approach to beings in attaining truth, or different 
ways in which truth is attained. Aristotle sets theoretical apprehension above all other 
modes of human comportment (NE: 1177a 11- 1179a 31). Sophfa is the most perfect 
mode of knowledge since it concerns the highest objects, or those of the highest, 
unchanging nature (NE 1141a 16).59 Episteme and nous are then human capacities, 
capacities that come to be through activity, and which have as their object the 
understanding and intuition of eternal things. 
59 Phr6nesis, as knowledge of the affairs of humans, and thus things that vary, is less 
high: it is concerned with action and particular things. Nor is the soph6s necessarily 
prudent. (NE 1141b 7-22). Techne, the knowledge of principles of production, is lowest 
of all, as it not only deals with things that vary, and is not a virtue, but may result in 
something either good or bad (NE 1140b 22). 
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We have seen that episteme and nous are differing forms of universal knowledge: 
one of universal grounds, the other of universal principles that reveal grounds. We will 
see in the next chapter that universal knowledge is knowledge of form; and form in its 
universal aspect is, in an eternal universe, itself eternal. Sophia is the knowledge of form, 
and first philosophia will be the study of eternal form, whether in sensible or non-sensible 
ousia. First philosophy is the science that describes the primary subjects susceptible to 
understanding of aitia, ousiai; it also seeks the first principles that permit this 
understanding. Sophia is the unity of episteme and nous, as ways that human beings come 
to know eternal truth. Thus first philosophia is the pursuit of this kind of truth in relation 
to ousiai. I will turn to that subject now. 
But first, since we are on the topic of the forms of knowledge, some foreshadowing. 
We will see that Heidegger emphasizes the practical and historical over the theoretical. 
I argue that his concentration on human involvement in a world is an interpretation of 
Aristotle's poiesis (and not praxis) as the originary mode from which theoria arises. 
Heidegger's goal, furthermore, is to find the unity in the three modes of energefa and 
dunamis that Aristotle laid out. This he finds in what I will argue is a ''praxis" defined 
not by energeia but by kinesis, or access to the world. Praxis emerges as authentic 
comportment, expressed in care. The shift from theorfa to praxis, and from energefa to 
kinesis permeates Heidegger's thinking on all levels, as I will discuss in chapters four to 
six below. 
CHAPTER TWO 
The Science of First Principles and Grounds 
What is the subject of Aristotle's Metaphysics? In book Alpha, the topic is wisdom, 
sophfa, which Aristotle describes as a science [episteme] concerned with the primary 
[prota] aitfa and archaf (981 b 28- 982a 3). In book Gamma, Aristotle introduces a 
science which, unlike any of the particular sciences that study some portion of being, 
studies being qua being and the attributes that belong to being (1003a 23-5). The primary 
sense of being is the "what" [to tf estin] that denotes ousfa, according to book Zeta 
(1028a 14). Thus the man of wisdom must grasp the primary archai kai aftia of primary 
being, ousfa (1003b17-20). In Epsilon, the science of being qua being is named theology 
(1026a 19), as it is also in Kappa (1064b 3). 
There is clearly at issue a science that, like all sciences, concerns grounds and 
principles, but it is particular in that it treats first grounds and principles. In the 
Metaphysics, Aristotle is looking for a fundamental science, one that grounds what is in 
the most universal terms, and the archaf of which could apply to all possible particular 
sciences. This science is named alternately wisdom, (or philosophy or truth), the science 
of being qua being, the study of ousfa, and theology. 
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The science in the Metaphysics has not yet determined its first principles; indeed the 
determination of principles is the subject of the book. 1 The presentation of this science 
cannot then, strictly speaking, be demonstrative, since demonstrations are deductions from 
first principles. If the Metaphysics is the study of first principles, and principles are self-
explanatory and cannot be demonstrated, it is clear that there can be no demonstrations 
that "prove" or ground the prime subject matter of the work. 
I will argue that the first ait{a and archa{ apply to being qua being, and specifically, 
to the form of ous{a. Such principles include the axioms, but the primary principle, which 
is also, I argue, a ground of a rationally comprehensible cosmos, is God. Ontology and 
theology are inextricably united in the universal science of the Metaphysics. 
The relation between theology and ontology in Aristotle's Metaphysics is 
controversial. Among modern commentators, Aubenque (1962) argues that the science of 
being qua being is the study of what is later called metaphysics, distinct from and 
irreconcilable to first philosophy or theology. Aubenque maintains that neither 
metaphysics nor first philosophy can reach their object: there is no possible logos of the 
6n, nor is a conceptual determination of God possible. Natorp (1888) famously rejects the 
theological components of the Metaphysics, so that only ontology remains as the subject 
of the work. Owens (1951) argues that the theological and ontological dimensions of 
Aristotle's thought are inextricably linked, that they are different perspectives of the 
1 Aristotle in book Alpha talks of "the science which we are seeking" (983a 21-3), 
in Beta of "the science we are investigating", in Epsilon of the grounds and principles we 
are seeking (1025b -23) and of what the province of the science we are studying is (1026a 
22ff); in Lamba he is again discussing the terms of inquiry to arrive at principles. 
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subject of first philosophy, and that theology plays the primary role. Giovanni Reale 
(1980) describes four aspects of the task of the Metaphysics: aetiology, ontology, 
ousiology and theology. These are related in a dialectical unity that centres on the 
theological component. This latter view is closest to the one I defend below. 
In sorting out the different statements of what the subject of the Metaphysics is, my 
attempt is to find some coherent pattern or configuration that makes these various 
statements consistent. I work on the hypothesis that there is a unity of doctrine in the 
Metaphysics, even if the literary unity of the work is uncertain. The hypothesis should 
find support in the following two chapters, in which I expose a unity of theme throughout 
the books of the Metaphysics. 2 The Metaphysics can be read as a sustained argument with 
many tangents for the necessity of a God as a ground for why what is, is as it is. 
In this chapter, I will argue (in section one) that aetiology, the search for grounds, 
is the methodological core of Aristotle's work, and leads him to the exposition of the bare 
bones of ontology. In laying out the issue of first aitfa, Aristotle asks the question of what 
these are the first aitfa of; the answer is being qua being, and more specifically, ous[a. 
In the second section, I will discuss being as a multivocal term, with four senses. The 
primary meaning of being, which I will discuss in section three, is ous[a. Ousfa is found 
to be primarily form. Seeking the grounds of form in sensible and destructible ous[a leads 
to the issue of non-sensible eternal ous[a. Theology and its consequences for the notion 
of being that emerges from the Metaphysics, and will be the subject of chapter three. 
2 I adopt the broad lines of Giovanni Reale's position on this issue (1980). The 
thematic unity of the Metaphysics is a central thesis of his book, defended in every 
chapter. See Reale pp.1-17 for a general statement of the argument. 
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However, as I will try to show, theology is the glue cementing together the other aspects 
of the Metaphysics, the climax and the sine qua non of Aristotelian ontology. 
The general aim of this chapter then is to show that the search for the most 
universal aitia must begin with the form of sensible ousia. But grounds for this can only 
be found by reference to non-sensible ousia- God. 
I 
Aetiology 
The primary goal of a science is to establish grounds for phenomena that fall within 
its purview, on the basis of pre-established first principles. If there is a first science, it 
will be that which deals with first principles and grounds. But is it possible that there be 
one science with so general a field of inquiry? According to the Posterior Analytics, a 
science must have its own particular subject-genus, and it uses definitions and principles 
appropriate to the genus. These definitions are not transferable to other particular sciences 
(APo: 75a 38ff). Particular sciences are distinguished according to the portion of being 
they study (Meta: 1003a 25). But being itself is not a genus (APo: 92b 14; Meta: 998b 
22-27), therefore how those grounds and principles common to all genera can be gathered 
together in one science of being poses a difficulty. Being is not a genus because it has 
no single determination; it is not a definition, and therefore not a principle. But beings 
can be studied with regard to universal archai kai aitia. 
In resolution of this difficulty, I will begin with the general conception of first 
philosophy as the search for universal primary grounds. The formal aition here, as in the 
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Posterior Analytics, is primary. Then I will argue that the science sought in the 
Metaphysics is a universal science of being qua being, unified by the way that the 
meanings of "being" relate to ous[a. Since the formal a[tion is primary, it is the form of 
ous[a that must be grounded. 
a) The general conception of the primary science 
Wisdom [sophfa], posed in book Alpha as the science under consideration, is the 
unity of episteme and nous. It is thus a universal form of knowledge, an understanding 
of grounds and comprehension of principles. The wise man "knows all things as far as 
it is possible, without knowing each one individually" (Meta: 982a8-10); in other words, 
he knows the universal. He knows difficult things, for the universal as farthest from the 
senses is hardest to grasp, but with a more exact knowledge, since universals are 
definable. A person is wise insofar as he can teach, and it is knowledge of grounds that 
allows him to do so. Wisdom is the knowledge of that which is most knowable, and that 
which is most knowable are the first principles and grounds, "for it is through these and 
from these that other things come to be known" (Meta. 982b 3).3 
Wisdom is not a productive science: it is knowledge for the sake of knowledge and 
not for any practical utility. One who loves wisdom, a philosopher, begins with wonder, 
with being perplexed: he does not understand the ground of something being as it is. He 
then asks questions about why things are as they are, for the simple sake of knowing why 
they are and escaping ignorance, but not for any extrinsic advantage (982b 11-21). 
3 Knowledge of ait[a and universal knowledge are equated here. 
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Since philosophy exists for its own sake, it is an independent science. Inasmuch as 
the science of wisdom knows the universal ground, it will know the aitfa particular to 
each science, since these fall under the universal (982b 5-10). It is thus supreme over the 
other sciences because it knows the end of each of the sciences: the end is the good of 
a thing, and this is one of the primary aitfa. 
We saw that sophfa is the disposition and excellence associated with theorfa; theorfa 
is the energefa of contemplating eternal, non-contingent things: forms and pure form. 
Wisdom is then a divine science, because 1) it is concerned with divine matters and God, 
pure form, is one of the grounds and a principle, and since 2) God is the sole or chief 
possessor of wisdom (983a 6-11), since humans can probably not know all the forms.4 
Wisdom is a disposition to theorfa, and the object of theorfa is truth (as opposed 
to the object of practical knowledge which is action). Thus Alpha Elatton says that 
"philosophy is rightly called a knowledge of truth" (993b 20-21).5 But we cannot know 
truth if we do not know the ground (993b 24). The first principles are explanatory of the 
truth of everything that follows from them. Now since what gives something a certain 
4 This seems to contradict the traditional characterization of God in book Lambda as 
self-thinking thought, concerned then only with his own being. But as the first principle 
and universal ground that knows itself, God is the primary formal aftion. In this sense 
only does God "know" the forms. 
5 Book Alpha Elatton is often considered to be external to the structural unity of the 
Metaphysics. In particular, the concluding lines of the book (995a 14-9) imply that it is 
an introduction to natural science. But there is ample evidence supporting both the 
authenticity of the book and its essential role as a part of the Metaphysics. As far as 
content goes, it is consistent with the doctrines found elsewhere in the Metaphysics. On 
this view, the reference to natural science at the end of the book is given by way of 
example and not as an indication of the subject matter at hand. (See Reale 1980, pp 43-
45.) 
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character has that character in a higher degree, the principles are the most true. They are 
always true, and the source of truth in other things. There is no ground of their being, but 
they have the most being, and therefore the most truth, since "as each thing is in respect 
of being [elnai], so it is in respect of truth" (993b 30-32). 
This passage identifies the being of things and the truth of things: to know the truth 
of something is to know what it is.6 This means knowing why it is. Soph[a is a way that 
the mind achieves truth, and as the combination of nous and episteme, the truth it 
achieves is knowledge of the archai kai a[tia of something. To seek truth is to seek the 
grounds for the being of something. Thus from the first books of the Metaphysics, we can 
conclude that wisdom, philosophy and the search for truth are identical, and they are all 
further identical with knowledge of first principles and aitfa. This kind of knowledge is 
universal, because knowing the ground means knowing universally. Knowing the universal 
a[tion means knowing the particulars that fall under the universal. 
The science of wisdom conforms to the notion of science as outlined in the 
Posterior Analytics in that it is a search for grounds and principles. However, Aristotle 
does not discuss demonstration of the primary archa[ or ait[a, nor does he formally 
engage in their demonstration. Again this is consistent with the Posterior Analytics, since 
1) the a[tion of something must be demonstrated on the basis of principles; and 2) first 
principles are not demonstrable. If we do not know the first principles, we cannot 
6 The truth Aristotle speaks of here is clearly ontological truth, the truth of things and 
ait[a of things; this is not the predicative truth he discusses in book Epsilon when he 
discounts being in the sense of being true from consideration by the primary science.(See 
section II below.) 
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demonstrate first ait{a. In fact we will see that the primary arche, God, is itself an a{tion, 
so that no demonstration is possible. I turn now to the ait{a in the context of the 
Metaphysics. Since wisdom is looking for the truth of what things are, the formal ground 
will be primary. 
b) The aitfa 
In the third chapter of book Alpha, Aristotle discusses the four kinds of ait{a (983a 
25- 83b 1 ). These are those I have discussed above in the context of the Posterior 
Analytics (the formal, the material, the efficient and the final). As in the Analytics, in 
book Alpha, the emphasis is on the formal a{tion, here called the ous{a1 or the to t{ en 
efnai. Not only is it mentioned first, countering the order of their listing in the Physics 
(to which Aristotle makes specific reference), where the material precedes the formal, but 
Aristotle gives it explicit preeminence.8 He writes that "the reason why" of a thing is 
ultimately reducible to the formula of the definition, and the ultimate "reason why" is an 
ground and a "principle" (983a 28-30). The definition is a statement of the essence of 
something in universal terms. The formal a{tion, which provides a definition or statement 
7 This is the first occurrence in the Metaphysics of the word ous{a (983a 28). 
8 We saw in the previous chapter that in the Posterior Analytics, all grounds are 
ultimately dependent on the formal ground. Also in the passage of the Physics to which 
Aristotle refers, Aristotle writes that three of the four ait{a in many cases reduce to one 
(Phy.II l 98a 24-7): what something is formally or essentially is ultimately identical with 
the final and the efficient ground of that thing. I discuss this passage in the first section 
of chapter three below. 
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of essence, shows why something is as it is in all respects. The ultimate "reason why", 
the first aition, is also a principle, that is an essence: it must then be a formal ground. 
The other types of aitfa use the formal definition to provide grounds with regard to: 
that from which something came to be (material ground); the source of a thing's kinetic 
being (efficient ground); and that for the sake of which something is (final ground). These 
three aitfa are dependent on a prior definition of the essence of a thing. Let me explain. 
To know the essence, the what it is, one must grasp the form or the efdos (981a10), "the 
unchanging element in the individual thing".9 Particulars are defined by reference to the 
universal; the form of a particular is shown to be identical to that of many other 
individuals. Relating the particular to the universal is achieved by reference to the identity 
of form in this individual and many other individuals (though the form of a particular is 
this form in this matter). What links them is the form, which can be seen as particular to 
an individual, or expressed as a universal, the common element in a class of things. 10 The 
formal aftion reveals the relation of the particular to the universal by defining the 
particular as a member of a class of things which have the identical form. The definition 
of something is then a universal, as is the ground. 11 
9 Owens, (1978) p. 179. For a further discussion on this point, see Owens (1978), 
pp.177-180. 
10 The notion of efdos "form" will receive more detailed treatment below in the 
context of ous{a. In Alpha, Aristotle's critique of the positions of previous philosophers' 
views of the aitfa, clarifies his own view of the meaning of eidos. Particularly he 
criticizes Plato for separating the idea from the real thing and postulating a separate 
world, instead of seeing it as immanent form. 
11 We saw how this is true in the context of demonstration in the previous chapter. 
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Now efficient, final and material aitfa can ground the particularity of a thing, 
without grounding the universal aspect, or without recourse to the form. Thus an efficient 
aftion can show how some individual acts or changes, the final can show the end of a 
given particular, and the material refers exactly to the particular physical make up of 
something. In fact matter cannot even be entered into the definition of the essence of 
something (1037a 24-5). But Aristotle insists in the previous sections of book Alpha that 
the knowledge sought by wisdom is universal. In order for the other aitfa to be universal, 
they must have recourse to the universal expression of the essence of something: it 
follows that the formal aftion is primary amongst the first aitfa. 
It is important that the essence, in the passage treating the four aitfa, is identified 
with ousfa (983a 28). Ousfa is principally determined by the immanent efdos. To 
understand an ousfa, we must know the efdos. This understanding of the form of a 
particular ousfa allows us to formally ground it. But since there is no demonstration of 
essence possible, and since the essence of what is, is that to be grounded (through the 
formal aitfa), no demonstration of ousfa will be possible.12 Grasping the universal essence 
of ousfa and grasping the ground are one and the same activity. 
It seems then that aitfa and archaf coincide in the first science. The four aitfa are 
universal, and they must apply universally to all beings. They are not physical principles 
of material things, since they apply as well to the form, or universal aspect of things, and 
since God, who is not material, is posited as one of the aitfa. The four aitfa are universals 
12 So called "demonstrations of essence" do not in fact demonstrate the essence, but 
reveal it; the essence is not the conclusion, it is the middle term. See chapter one. 
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in that they are principles of everything that is sensible, or that becomes sensible: through 
grounding the sensible, the nonsensible is posited.13 
In Alpha Elatton, Aristotle again discusses the number and nature of aitfa. Aristotle 
argues here against the notion of an infinite chain of any of the aitfa. If there were an 
infinite number of grounds, then it would be impossible to know anything, since 
knowledge depends on understanding grounds, and since we have a finite amount of time 
to seek them (994b 29-32). There is a serial arrangement within each type of aftion, such 
that A grounds B and B explains C, but the intermediate term must always be in reference 
to a final term, whether we go through the series forwards or backwards. If there were 
no first or no ultimate ground, the series itself could not exist, and there would be no 
ground at all. 
Moving forwards in the series of aitfa, Aristotle notes that there are two ways of 
something being derived from something else: 1) something develops into another thing, 
as when a child becomes a man. Here there is an obvious terminus of the series in the 
result. The second is when 2) there is a transformation that involves the destruction of the 
preceding term in the series, as when air is destroyed in the formation of water. In this 
latter reversible process, there are no intermediate terms, and thus again, no infinite series 
possible (994a 1-994b 7). 
Aristotle here enters into an appeal to the nature of the first aftion to show the 
impossibility of an infinite series of grounds. The first aftion, he notes, (moving in the 
13 Owens treats the "causes" as physical principles. See Reale pp. 31-34, for a full 
refutation of this conception, summarized here in my text. 
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backwards in the series) is not subject to destruction and transformation because it is 
eternal and independent of any other ground (994b 7-9). Because there is no infinite series 
possible, any appeal to grounds for Aristotle is always and at the same time a reference 
to a first and a final ground. 
This being so, in all processes of becoming and acting there must always be a final 
a{tion, an end, a 'for the sake of which'. The good is the end of all things, and in this 
sense it is a final ground. If we were to admit an infinite series of final ait{a, there could 
be no telos as such, and hence no such thing as the good, or an ultimate final ground. 
Nor, without a terminal final a{tion could there be any such thing as rationally 
comprehensible action, since those who act rationally act for some end (994b 10-17). 
The formal a{tion must also have a terminus. It is impossible that the formal ground 
be seen as an infinite expansion of the definition. For although a complex definition may 
contain more detail, it is always only an elaboration of the definition that preceded it in 
a series, and is thus dependent upon that one for its veracity. (Thus as a definition for 
human being, "bipedal, sensible, featherless rational animal" can only be understood if 
the more concise "rational animal" is intelligible.) If the formal ground were infinitely 
analyzable through the definition, scientific knowledge would be impossible, since it is 
dependent upon reaching ultimately analyzable terms (994b 17-27). 
There must then be a first formal and final a{tion. We have seen that the formal 
a{tion is primary14: we will see that the first final ground, characterized as the good, will 
coincide with the primary formal ground. 
14 I will add substance to this argument in the last section on ous{a below. 
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Since the formal aition is primary, definition is an essential part of science. This 
means that we must for each science know first what the subject matter is. Thus, writes 
Aristotle, in the case of natural sciences, for example, we should know what nature is 
before proceeding (995a 18-20). 15 In the science of wisdom, we must ascertain the subject 
matter before we can define it. We can do this by looking for a science that can treat all 
of the first aitia and principles. The first four aporiae of book Beta (repeated in shorter 
form in book Kappa I and II) which I now turn to, are particularly pertinent to this topic. 
c) The aporiae 
Briefly stated, the first four aporiae are: 1) does the study of all the aitia belong to 
one science or several?; 2) is there one science that treats both the principles of 
demonstration and those of ousia, or is there a science of each?; 3) is there one science 
of all ousiai, or more than one?; and 4) does the science of ousia also treat the attributes 
of ousia or are these separate sciences? Aristotle indirectly answers these aporia in book 
Gamma. I will present each aporia followed by its (partial) solution in turn. 
The first aporia (996a l 8-996b 26) arises because it seems that all four types of 
ground would have to belong to one genus in order for them to be the object of one 
science. But they seem not to belong to the same science, since first of all, different 
things can only belong to the same science if they are contraries, which the aitia 
manifestly are not. Secondly, there are things to which all four aitia cannot apply: for 
example immovable things cannot have a source of motion or a final ground. They are 
15 I take the last two lines of little Alpha to be authentic. See Reale (1980), p.45. 
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in themselves good, and cannot thus tend towards a good. But if there are different 
sciences for the different grounds, then which one is the science of wisdom? 
In the first chapter of Gamma, Aristotle says that there is a science that studies 
being qua being, and that it is of being qua being that we must grasp the first aitia and 
archa{, and more specifically, of ous{a. The highest principles and grounds "clearly must 
belong to some nature in virtue of itself [delon hos phuseos tinos autas anagka'ion efnai 
kath'hauten]" (1003a 28-9). The science of being qua being treats all beings universally. 
Any particular instance of a ground of being qua being will involve being itself. The ait{a 
then pertain to being as being, that is to one single nature, and this assures their unity. 
The grounds that pertain to that science are different and not contraries, but they are 
studied in relation to one same thing that unifies them non-generically. 
Highest principles and grounds are thus principles and grounds of being qua being: 
this is then our subject matter. But being has several meanings, and it is not a genus; nor 
can the ait{a, which are not contraries, belong to a genus. This is resolved when we see 
that the grounds and principles apply to ous{a. All significations of being relate to ous{a, 
but not generically. In fact, the ait{a relate to the efdos of ous{a, and are unified through 
this relation. Ous{a, and more specifically the form of ous{a, is the prime focus of the 
study of being qua being. 16 
The second aspect of this aporia is that all four ait{a are not present in all instances 
of being. Aristotle does not formally answer this difficulty posed by the aporia. However, 
this problem can be solved through the recognition that although all ous{ai are not 
16 This leads us to pros hen relatedness, which I shall treat in the next section. 
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identical, and though all the aitfa do not pertain to all ous[a (non-sensible ous[a, for 
instance, does not have a material ground), all ous[ai belong to a single science. Thus the 
four aitfa can belong to the same science even if not present in every individual subject 
of that science. 17 
The science that studies first principles and aitfa then is being qua being. But the 
study of ousfa is primary in the science of being. The first aitfa and archaf thus relate to 
ous[a (1003b 15-19). 
The second aporia (996b 26-997a 15) treats whether the principles of 
demonstration, such as the law of non-contradiction and excluded middle, belong to one 
science, and if so, whether this science is the same as the one that studies ous[a. Since 
all the sciences use the axioms it seems impossible that there could be one science, that 
which studies ous[a, which studies them. On the other hand, if all sciences studied the 
axioms, then all sciences would have the same object, which is absurd. A second related 
problem is that it is impossible to have a demonstrable science of such axioms, for they 
are known immediately and not defined by any science. If they were demonstrable, there 
would have to be a genus of which they were attributes, in order to prove them, and this 
would itself demand unproven axioms, since every science is based on something 
indemonstrable. Yet every science uses the axioms as premisses, and since each science 
treats a particular subject-genus to which its conclusions and premisses belong, then if 
axioms were demonstrable, every demonstrative science would treat the same genus, and 
this is absurd. Yet again, since "the axioms are the most universal and the principles of 
17 I am indebted here to Reale: 1980, p.135; see also Owens, 1978, p.221. 
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everything" (997a 12), how can the science of ousfa be separate? If the two are not the 
same, how can we decide which is more authoritative? 
The first question of the second aporia is taken up again and resolved in book 
Gamma (1005a l 9ff). Axioms hold for all kinds of being, not just a particular class of 
being. This implies that they are axioms of being qua being, and so of course belong to 
the same science as ousfa. Thus "the investigation of these axioms ... will belong to the 
universal thinker who studies the primary reality" (1005a 34- 1005b 2). The philosopher 
will study the whole of reality, and the principles of syllogistic reasoning, since in order 
to have scientific knowledge [episteme] of the nature of being qua being, (now clearly 
emerging as a name for the fundamental science), primary archai kai aftia must be 
known. Thus "one who understands the modes of being qua being should be able to state 
[tegein] the most certain principles of all things" (1005b 12). 
In Gamma four, Aristotle resolves the problem of the indemonstrability of axioms, 
reaffirming that it is impossible that everything be demonstrated, since such an attempt 
would enter us upon an infinite process, "so that even so there would be no proof' ( 1006a 
10). But some axioms can be proved by the impossibility of refuting them, since one who 
tries to refute such axioms must use these very axioms in the refutation, and would thus 
beg the question. 
First philosophy then treats the axioms as well as the principles of being qua being. 
I will argue in chapter three that the first principle of being qua being, God, is higher 
than the principles of the axioms, since he is the principle of rationality. 
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The third aporia (997a 15-25) treats the question of whether there is one science 
of all ousfai. If more than one science, how do we know which kind of ous{a the primary 
science studies? But if only one science studied all ous{ai, there would only be one 
possible science. Here is why: a science studies a particular subject matter, starting with 
accepted beliefs and inquiring into the essential properties and accidents of that subject.18 
Hence if one science studied all ous{ai, there would be one subject matter, and all 
properties and accidents would be studied by the same science. Whether there is one 
science of axioms and one of ous{a or whether these are compounded and form one 
science, (i.e. whatever the solution to the second aporia) still, all attributes will be lumped 
together for study by either one or two sciences. 
The solution to this problem is again found in book Gamma, with more detail 
provided in Epsilon. In Gamma two, Aristotle writes that "there are just as many divisions 
of philosophy as there are kinds of ous{a" (1004a 2): but among these, one is primary. 
Being is divided into genera, and different parts of philosophy correspond to these genera, 
yet they are arranged successively such that one is more universal than the next. In the 
first chapter of Epsilon ( 1025bff), Aristotle specifies that there are three theoretical 
sciences that study the three sorts of ous{a: physics studies sensible kinetic ousfa; 
mathematics studies non-kinetic ous{a present in matter;19 and theology studies 
18 This characterization of scientific methodology suggests that we start with accepted 
facts and use them as conclusions in demonstrations, seeking premisses from which the 
conclusion can be deduced. 
19 Aristotle claims uncertainty here about whether the objects of mathematics are 
separable from matter and non-kinetic, and ends up saying that some branches of 
mathematics study objects as separable and some as present in matter. He argues in the 
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discussed in this section are properties or determinations of being.23 All determinations 
and meanings of being are understood according and in relation to one central meaning, 
however, (pros hen) and this central meaning is ous{a. And there is no demonstration of 
ous{a. 
Here we have the final argument of why the science of the Metaphysics is not 
demonstrable. That science seeks principles of being qua being, and particularly of ous{a. 
There are no demonstrations of ous{a, since 1) ous{ai are understood in terms of their 
efdos, or their indemonstrable essence, that which grounds what they are; and 2) attributes 
of ous{a are determinations of the essence of ous{a, and thus cannot be demonstrated. Not 
only has the Metaphysics not established first principles (which are always 
indemonstrable) from which to begin demonstration, but also these first principles are 
themselves aitfa, since the essence of an ous{a is its ground. Demonstration uses 
principles to demonstrate ait{a of phenomena in its purview; but if the phenomena to be 
grounded are ous{a, and the ait{a of ous{a are principles, and if further, principles have 
not been ascertained, then demonstration is clearly impossible. 
From the perspective of aetiology, we can lay out the entire thematic structure of 
the Metaphysics. The Metaphysics constitutes a search for first principles, which are 
identical to first ait{a. The unity of primary ait{a is assured by the fact that each a{tion 
has a relation to being. Being has various meanings, but each meaning relates in some 
way to ous{a. The primary grounds then pertain to ous{a. Ous{ai are conceived in terms 
23 Or of unity. Unity and being are convertible, insofar as they can be predicated in 
identical ways (1105a 1-12). 
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of the eldos, which is universalized in the formal definition or statement of essence. To 
find the ground of an ous{a is to give a statement of the essence, the universalized form. 
The primary study of ous{a is that which studies nonsensible and eternal ousfa, ous{a that, 
as we will see, is pure form. But this study incorporates studies of other types of ousfa, 
since the unity of first ait{a in the primary science demands that all ait{a be studied, and 
non-sensible ous{a does not have a material or efficient ground. 
Although being qua being is that to which the first ait{a and archaf pertain, only in 
books Gamma, Epsilon and Kappa is there explicit discussion of being qua being as the 
subject of the science in the Metaphysics. In Zeta, Eta, Theta, Lambda, and Mu, ous{a is 
taken to be that of which the archai kai aftia are sought. How do being qua being and 
ous{a relate? I have so far only sketched the argument. In the following section, I will 
look at the study of being qua being and the several senses of being showing how it 
focusses on ous{a, before inquiring specifically into ous{a in the final section. 
II 
Being qua Being 
In book Gamma of the Metaphysics, we come to the categorical statement that 
"there is a science [episteme] which studies being qua being [to on he 6n], and the 
properties inherent in it in virtue of its own nature [kath 'haut6]" (1003a 21). What do qua 
[hei auto], and kath 'haut6 (generally translated as per se, or "in virtue of itself') indicate? 
Book Delta defines kath 'haut6 as the essence of a particular; everything contained in the 
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definition; that which is directly attributable to something; and that which belongs to 
something alone and qua alone (1022a 25-35). In the Posterior Analytics we are told that 
an attribute or property that holds of every case and is kath 'hauto and hei auto is 
universal, and that "a kath'hauto attribute is identical with that which belongs to the 
subject hei auto" (APo:73b 29-30). Hei auto, a reflexive term, thus means according to 
the essential nature of something. 24 
The science that studies being qua being and its kath 'hauto attributes, then, 
examines the essential nature and universal attributes of being itself. As a scientific 
endeavour, it seeks the grounds and principles of that nature and those attributes. But 
before we can discuss the essential nature of being, we must know what "being" means. 
Being is said in many ways: this phrase is itself said in many ways throughout the 
text of the Metaphysics, and contains one of the core problems of the work. How is it that 
being can have so many senses and yet be the object of one science? Is there any unity 
possible among the diverse senses of being? 
The various senses of being cannot be unified as particulars to a universal since 
being is not a genus, as Aristotle argues in the context of the seventh aporia in book Beta 
(Meta. 998b 21-27; see also APo:92b 14). This aporia develops one possibility presented 
in the previous aporia, which inquired whether the principles of beings are genera or 
material constituents. Aporia seven asks whether if the genera are principles, they would 
be the highest (summa genera) or lowest genera (infimae species). Aristotle shows that 
both possibilities lead to absurd consequences, such that ultimately we must conclude that 
24 See also the discussion of being as accident below. 
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the first principles of being qua being are not abstract universals at all. I lay out his 
argument below. 
First, if the highest principle were the most universal, then being and unity, as the 
most universal attributes- those predicated of all beings- would be the first principles. But 
a genus encompasses more than one species, and each of these dijferentiae speci.ficae "is". 
Now species cannot be predicated of their differentiae, and nor can a genus, taken apart 
from its species, be predicated of its differentiae. Yet if being were a genus, it would be 
predicated of its differences, since every difference "is". Being is therefore not a genus. 
To make this more concrete, let us take the example "humans are animals that are 
rational beings". "Human" is the species, "animal" the genus, and "rational beings" the 
differentia. We cannot predicate a species of its differentia ("rational beings are human"); 
this would be to make the differentia a sub-species, rational beings a type of human in 
every case (excluding God, angels). Nor- more significant for the argument- can we 
predicate a genus of its differentiae ("rational beings are animals"), which would make 
the differentia a sub-genus, rational beings a kind of animal in every case. In fact both 
the differentia and the genus are wider than the species; they are not sub-species (cf. Top. 
144b 5-11; 144a 36-b3). Rather, the genus is correctly predicated of the species, and the 
differentiae are predicated of the species ("humans are animals"; "humans are rational 
beings"). 25 
25 Let's take a more obvious example: "Porcupines are animals that have quills". 
Now it is incorrect on the basis of this definition to claim either that "having quills is 
being a porcupine" (this excludes, for example, sea urchins and pens); or "having quills 
is being an animal" (again excluding non-animal quilled things, e.g. pens and sea 
urchins). However it is correct to say that "Porcupines have quills", and "Porcupines are 
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Now if being were a genus, its differentia would have being (since every differentia 
is, or has being); and would also not have being (since no genus can be predicated of its 
differentiae). Therefore, being is not a genus, and consequently it is not a first principle.26 
To add to the argument, were genera predicable of differentiae, those intermediate terms 
constituted by the genus combined with successive differentiae would also be genera, 
right down to individual indivisible species; and the differentiae would be more truly 
principles than the genera (as more universal); thus we would have an infinite number of 
principles. 
If the infimae species were principles, there would also be absurd consequences. A 
principle has to exist apart from that of which it is a principle. But nothing exists apart 
from an individual unless it is predicable of many things (999a 18). Yet if this were the 
case, whatever is more universal will be more a principle, and we are led back to 
principles as summa genera, and the consequent absurdities of this thesis. Being, it seems 
then is neither a principle nor a genus; and nor are infimae species first principles. 
We are left with two problems: one is the problem of what the first principles of the 
science of being qua being are. The second arises when we see that the legitimacy of 
discourse about being is jeopardized if being is not a genus. How can we discuss "being" 
if the term does not have one unified subject? In question is the very meaning of "being", 
that is, what "being" signifies: if it does not refer what is common to a stable class of 
animals"; this is in fact what the definition states. 
26 For a highly analytic study of the argument, see Sheldon Wein, (1983). Though 
I omit it here, Aristotle applies a similar argument to unity, as indivisibility. 
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particulars that we can then study universally, what is the subject matter of a study of 
being? If "being" has various significations, how are these related if not through a genus? 
Aristotle writes that being is always said in relation to one thing and a certain 
nature, and not homonymously (1003a 32-3). Homonymy (hom6numa) as defined in the 
Categories is said of things that have a common name, but differing definitions (Cat: 1 a 
1-4). Thus, for example "port" is an homonymous term: "port" refers to a place where 
ships dock, and also to a type of sweet liquor. 27 
But "being" is not an homonymous term. Although the same word "being" is used 
to signify different things, these meanings are related in that they all refer to an identical 
principle. Gamma two introduces the discussion of the focal meaning of "being" [to on], 
wherein Aristotle argues that this meaning is distinguished from and unites other possible 
meanings of being, yet is not a genus.28 The uses of "being" are united pros hen, "towards 
the one", or in reference to one principle to which they all bear some relation. "Pros hen" 
refers to a relation between terms, which, like spokes on a wheel, are tied to one central 
principle to which they all relate. The various senses of being are all related to the single 
term ousfa. 
In the famous discussion at 1103b 35, Aristotle shows how the term "healthy" has 
meanings related pros hen, focussing on the single principle of health. "Healthy" can 
mean something that preserves, produces, indicates or possesses health. Thus, to use my 
examples, eating regularly is healthy (preserves health); taking the right medicine is 
27 See Irwin (1981) on the kinds of homonymy. 
28 See also Zeta four. 
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healthy (produces health); clear eyes and fresh complexion are healthy (indicate health); 
and Socrates is healthy (possesses health). Likewise, things that are said to be are either 
ous[ai, modifications of ous[a, processes towards ous[a, destructions or privations of 
qualities of ous[a, productive or generative of ous[a or of terms relating to it, or negations 
of some of these terms or of ous[a itself (1003b 6-10). All the meanings of being then 
all relate to one principle [arche], and this is ous[a. Terms that relate to one "nature" 
[phusis] in a sense have one common understanding, thus they can form the subject of 
one science (1003b 15). The study of things that are qua being then are the subject of one 
science, and this science is chiefly concerned with ous[a, as that which is primary.29 The 
first principles and grounds of ous[a will then form the study of the science of being. 
The meanings of being relate to ous[a, but it is not yet clear what these meanings 
are. In book Delta and again in Epsilon, Aristotle gives a definition of 'being' that shows 
four senses of the term. It means 1) accidental being as opposed to being in itself 
[kath 'haut6]; 2) being according to the figures of the categories; 3) being in the sense of 
being true; and 4) being as actual being and potential being (1017a 8- 1017b 9; 1026a 33-
1026b 2). In the following pages, in which I will look at each of these four senses of 
being, it will emerge that neither accidental being nor being in the sense of being true are 
the object of the primary science with which the Metaphysics is concerned.30 
29 
" ••• everywhere science deals chiefly with that which is primary, and on which 
other things depend, and in virtue of which they get their names" ( 1003b 17). 
30 As Aristotle clearly specifies in Epsilon (1027b 35): "to men hos sumbebekos kai 
to hos alethes on apheteon" (we may dismiss the senses of being as accidental and as 
truth). 
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First, being as accident [kata sumbebek6s]. In his treatment of being as accident 
(1026a 33-1027a 30), Aristotle presumes but does not specify the distinction developed 
elsewhere between three different kinds of attribute (sumbebek6ta): 1) essential per se 
(kath 'haut6) attributes; 2) non-essential per se attributes; and 3) accidents that are neither 
per se nor essential. In Epsilon, he discusses only the latter two, concluding that there can 
be no science of such accidents, and that therefore the study of them does not belong to 
first philosophy. But without understanding these distinctions, his argument seems forced, 
and it becomes difficult to understand why being according to the categories is included 
in the study of being qua being. 
To start with the third meaning of "accident": 3) "accident" is defined in Delta as 
"that which applies to something and is truly stated, but neither necessarily nor usually" 
(1025a 14-15). Thus a cultured person may be white, but since it is not necessary that he 
be white, we say that being white is accidental to that person. The being white of the 
cultured person is not kath 'haut6; it is not in virtue of being a cultured person that he is 
white; nor is it a part of the essence of a cultured person to be white. Being white is a 
purely contingent feature of a given cultured person. 
Now on the other hand, it is possible that 2) an attribute belongs to something in 
virtue of itself (kath 'haut6 sumbebek6s), yet without being a part of the essence of that 
thing. (Per se attributes are a larger class than essential attributes; the larger class divides 
into essential and non-essential accidents.) Thus, for example, having the sum of its 
angles equal to two right angles is an attribute of the triangle, yet it is not part of the 
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essence of the triangle that it have this attribute (1025a 30-33).31 Such attributes or 
accidents, unlike type three attributes, necessarily apply to that to which they are 
attributed, but they are not part of the definition of that of which they are predicated; in 
other words they are properties, not included in the formula of the definition.32 In Zeta, 
Aristotle gives the example of "snubness" as a per se attribute of the nose (although here 
he calls it here non-accidental), since it belongs necessarily to some nose, and describes 
the nature of the nose (and cannot be understood without reference to the nose), yet it is 
not the essence of "nose" to be snub. Likewise "male" belongs to animal in virtue of the 
animal, but is not part of the essence of animal (since an animal can also be female) 
(1030b 14-28). "Male" and "snubness" cannot be explained apart from the ousfa in which 
they inhere, but nor are they part of the essence of that ousfa. 33 
Finally, proceeding upwards in the list, there is 1) the essential per se attribute. Such 
an attribute is not easily distinguishable from one that is kath 'haut6 sumbebek6s and not 
31 This example is misleading, since it is certainly true of every triangle that the sum 
of its angles is 180 degrees. In Aristotle's conception, a triangle is not defined in this 
way, (a definition being the statement of essence) but it nonetheless flows from the nature 
of a triangle that it has this attribute. 
32 This seems to accord with what Aristotle says in APo 73b 13 in the context of per 
se attributes: "something that happens to something else in virtue of the latter's own 
nature is said to happen to it per se". See also APo 75b 1; 76b 12-15: the demonstration 
discloses kath 'hauta sumbebek6ta; therefore they are "eternal'', that is, not generated or 
destructible and not, therefore, a modification of matter alone. 
33 This is part of a larger argument, by which Aristotle shows that only ousfa is 
definable; definition of per se attributes always involve recourse to that substrate (ousfa) 
in which they inhere (1030b 14-1031 a 5). The difficulty is whether ousfa are definable 
as individuals within a species, or only at the level of species, i.e. whether form is 
individual. See section three below. 
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of the essence of something; Aristotle seems often to ignore a distinction which at other 
times he maintains.34 His equivocation on this leads to difficulties in determining what 
Aristotle considers to be the nature of essence itself. As I discuss below, it is not 
immediately clear whether individuals have their own essence (the essence of Socrates), 
or whether essence is only given at the level of species (the essence of human being). 
In Zeta, Aristotle defines the essence [to tf en einat] as that of which something is 
said to be per se, such that your essence is that which you are said to be of your own 
nature (1029b 14-16). But he is careful to point out that "not all of this is the essence"; 
thus a surface might of its nature be white, but "being a surface" and "being white" are 
not identical. Essence belongs ultimately only to the species of a genus (1030a 12), since 
only in a species is the predicate not related to the subject by participation, affection or 
as an accident. 35 Thus "rational" in the definition or statement of the essence of human 
as "rational animal" is an essential and per se attribute of humans. But there is no essence 
of a compound expression such as "white man", where "white" is not definitive of "man". 
Essential accidents are those that individuate species, or which define species in relation 
to genus; they are not those that individuate on the level of individuals within a species. 
34 Thus at 995b 20, he asks whether the science under investigation is concerned with 
the attributes [ta sumbebek6ta kath 'hauta] of ousfa, and the attributes of "same", "other", 
"like", "unlike", etc. It is hard to understand Aristotle here as referring to non-essential 
attributes; but he is not specific. 
35 Again, Aristotle often uses "accident" in direct contrast to "essence", while in other 
places admits "essential accidents". That essence is not specific to individuals is not 
always clear in the Metaphysics; I discuss the ambiguity of essence, as individualized at 
the level of species, or at the level of individuals within a species, in section three below. 
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It follows that the categories (apart from ousfa) are not necessarily essential 
predications. Since they require a substrate in which to inhere, they necessarily form 
compound expressions (taking quantity and quality, for example, we have "a big man"; 
"a kind man"). In their abstract form (as Locke's primary qualities), clearly they are per 
se attributes, since every (sensible) ous[a must be subject to predication according to the 
categories in some form. But the specific instantiation of the category in an individual is 
not essential to the individual. It is not of the essence of a man that he be big, though it 
is in virtue of being a man that he is of a particular size. Essential accidents then are 
those that provide the definition of species in relation to genus; and the categories are the 
list of possible ways in which this species difference is manifest. 
All this being said, in the discussion of being as accident in Epsilon, Aristotle says 
that to be kata sumbebek6s refers, first of all, to an attribute that is not part of the essence 
of an ousfa- an attribute that is not kath 'haut6- and which is therefore particular and not 
universal. He is referring to type two and three attributes. Now grounds can be given only 
for that which occurs necessarily and always in the same way: they must refer to a 
universal. Type two and three accidental attributes, as non-universal, admit of no grounds, 
and since science is the clarification of grounds, accidents cannot belong to a science.36 
Secondly, a subject can be said to be accidentally, if its ground is also accidental (1027a 
9-10). Clearly, there is no possible ground of the purely accidental event, for example of 
36 The characterization of per se attributes (types two and three above) as eternal, and 
thus universal and demonstrable, assumes greater significance here. It would seem that 
there can be a science of per se attributes, those which belong either to the nature of a 
substrate either as essential to it, or as flowing necessarily from the nature of it. Science 
is of essences; the first science is of the essence of the primary "substrate", ousfa. 
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cold weather during the dog days, or of the purely contingent phenomenon such as the 
whiteness of the cultured person. 
Since "all scientific knowledge is of that which is always or usually so" (1027a 21-
2), then that which is accidentally and contingently and admits of no ground cannot be 
the subject of any science, whether practical, productive or theoretical. Being as type two 
and three accident is therefore not the subject of the primary science. Type one accidents 
do belong to the primary science, inasmuch as they make it possible to define a species. 
The second sense of being is being in the sense of being true [hos alethes]. This is 
also eliminated from the study of the primary science. The recognition of something as 
either true or as false is dependent upon 1) a connection and division (sunthesis and 
diafresis) of concepts in an apophantic statement, and 2) the affirmation or denial of the 
truth of the resultant predication. The judgement of the truth or falsity of the predication 
is itself dependent upon whether or not it mirrors the way that things are in the world. 
In relation to the mental process of sunthesis and diairesis, Aristotle writes "falsity and 
truth are not in things- the good, for example, being true, and the bad false- but in 
thought" (1027b 26-8). Being as truth, since it occurs and exists only in thought, is not 
a real quality intrinsic to the being of things, but a judgement concerning the 
correspondence of a predication to reality. 
In book Theta, where Aristotle treats the same subject, he says: "it is not because 
we are right in thinking that you are- white that you are white; it is because you are white 
that we are right in saying so" (105lb 7-9). This statement, which seems initially to 
contradict the previous one, is in fact clarification of the criteria for a "correspondence" 
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theory of truth: the ultimate justification of the truth of a statement is things; that is, in 
whether the statement reflects how things are. 37 The fact that the criterion is grounded in 
ousiai however, has no bearing on the issue of whether the judgement of truth or falsity 
is essential to the being of ousiai. The judgement is an "affection of thought", and the 
being of such judgement, since it does not exist in things, is not a subject of the primary 
science. There is a logical scientific study of truth possible, but this study is not part of 
the primary science.38 
Aristotle's famous definition of truth and falsehood in book Gamma is as follows: 
"to say of what is, that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false; but to say of what 
is, that it is and of what is not, that it is not, is true" (1011 26-28). Thus, Aristotle 
continues, whenever we say that something is or is not, we say something that is either 
true or false. Book Delta repeats the definition of falsity as it applies to statements ( 1024b 
25-27); but "false" is also here defined in relation to "things" [hos pragma pseudos as 
opposed to the logos pseudes (or alethes)] which is discounted from the science of being 
qua being. 
37 See chapter four section five below for Heidegger's discussion of "correspondence 
theory" in Aristotle. 
38 At 1027b 28 Aristotle says that an inquiry should be made into the nature of being 
in the sense of being true. Truth will be the affair of logical study as in the Prior 
Analytics. As we saw in the first section, Aristotle also uses "alethethia" in the sense of 
ontological truth, as a virtual synonym of being. This different use of the word refers to 
the truth of things, which grounds the truth of statements about things. But this is 
distinguished from to on hos alethes. Clearly, the truth of things is primary, and is exactly 
what the study of being qua being is seeking (cf. Meta: 83b 3). Truth as judgment, 
however, is secondary, and not essential to the being of ous{ai. 
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There are two classes of things, as opposed to judgements, that are false; 1) those 
that are the objects of false opinion, and 2) those that represent themselves as something 
other than what they are. The first class of false things, as Aristotle's examples in Delta 
show, are ultimately nonexistent things. Thus an object S which is such that P applies to 
S, is a false object if there is no such object. Nonexistent things do not belong to any 
science, as we saw in the discussion of ef esti in chapter one. The second class of false 
things includes imaginary objects, dreams, scene-paintings: all those things that show 
themselves as something other than what in they are.39 Such things are, but they are not 
that of which they create the impression (1024b 23).40 Again, these are things that do not 
exist as such, but only in the guise of semblance. There can be no grounds for such things 
qua themselves. Truth as applied to things means simply that grounds can be given for 
things (1024b 17). It is a precondition for, as well as an object of first philosophy. But 
being in the sense of truth as Aristotle formally discusses it applies to judgements, and 
the study of these does not belong to the primary science. 
The remaining two senses of being are intrinsic to the primary science. Third on 
the list in Delta is being according to the figures of the categories, treated in more detail 
in Zeta (1028a 10- 1028b 8). "Being" means first the what of a thing [tf esti], and then 
the quality, quantity, relation, and all the other categories. The "what" or ous[a is the 
39 Compare to Heidegger on seeming [Schein], as discussed in the first section of 
chapter four below. Things that show themselves as other than what they are, are not the 
phenomena to which the logos attains in phenomenology. 
40 This is not to say that the mimetic arts falsify. The purpose of mimesis is· to reveal 
what things are, by revealing the universal in the particular (Poetics: 1448 16-17). Thus 
though mimesis represents by means of false things, its object is to reveal truth. 
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primary sense of being, since none of the other categories can be said to be if ousia is 
not. Thus "it is by reason of ousfa that each of [the other categories] is" (I 028a 28). 
Opinions differ on whether the categories describe real concepts, real divisions in 
being as present in beings, or whether they are merely a function of language representing 
possible ways of describing reality.41 If the latter were true, then being according to the 
categories would fall from inclusion in the primary science, for the same reasons that 
being as truth is not included: they would describe "affections of thought" and not what 
is. The modes of necessary predication are dependent upon the categories of being, as real 
divisions in the nature of ousfa, and not the other way around. This is supported by the 
fact that Aristotle includes being according to the categories as an appropriate subject for 
the primary science. 
41 Brentano (1975 trans.) sees them as real concepts, not just as a framework for 
concepts (p.56); S. Mansion (1976) writes that they are "les classes de realites obtenues 
en examinant ce qui signifient les differents attributs possibles des choses (p.221); 
O'Farrell (1982) argues that the categories of being ground the modes of predication, and 
not vice versa (p.130). Aubenque (1966) famously sees them as reducible to the different 
modes of predication (p.170). In his typically aporetic manner, he sides both with 
Heidegger and Brentano on the relation of logical and ontological truth in Aristotle. On 
the one hand, he agrees with Heidegger whom he characterizes as maintaining that logical 
truth is a "pale reflet" or "forgetting" of ontological truth; on the other hand, he thinks 
Brentano is right in seeing ontological truth as a "retrospective projection" into being of 
the truth of discourse (p.168). The truth of things is given through discourse, and only 
comes to light through discourse (p.167). The categories then, potentially infinite in 
number, are ultimately modes of predication that have their ground in the being of things; 
but the being of things, Aubenque seems to argue, is not without predicative expression. 
This is easily refuted by APo 83b 13-32, where Aristotle explicitly argues that the 
categories are limited in number; there is thus no infinite series of predication upwards 
or downwards. There must be a first subject of predication (a downwards limit); and there 
is a highest genus of predication (the upwards limit). 
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The categories describe ousfa as the hupokefmenon or substrate, which is susceptible 
to real conceptualization dependent on the way in which ousfa manifests itself. However, 
the secondary categories (quality, quantity and the like) can be studied only in relation 
to the primary category, ousfa, since their existence, separate from ousfa, is accidental. 
Here "accidental" is clearly used in the sense of type one per se essential accidents. To 
understand an ousfa in its individual character, we must have recourse to the categories 
in their particular manifestations (big, white, last year). But to understand an ousfa even 
according to its species and genus, we rely on the categories in their formal character 
(quantity, quality, time), as well as specifically or genetically applicable instantiations of 
their formal character (two-legged, rational, oviparous). The categories are essential 
predications, in that they are part of the account of what something is, in the formula of 
the definition. Being according to the categories is primarily ousfa, the prime focus of the 
science of being qua being. However, the other categories, as essential attributes of ousfa, 
are necessary to the study of being qua being, insofar as they define ousfa on the level 
of species. 
The fourth sense of being is being as potential and actual [on dynamei kai 
energefai]. Theta treats the subject of the meaning of potentiality and actuality 
specifically, and there (as in Delta 1019b 35-1020a 6) Aristotle describes the primary 
sense of potency as the principle of change, which is either in the thing that changes, or 
in some other thing (1046a 10). However, "potentiality and actuality extend beyond the 
sphere of terms which refer only to motion" (1046a 2). Motion is defined in Kappa as the 
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actualization of the potential as such (1065b 16; also Physics III 20la).42 But it is potency 
and actuality not as such, but in regard to ous[a that is the study of the primary science. 
Throughout book Eta, Aristotle clearly discusses potentiality and actuality in relation 
to matter [hule] and form [eidos] in an ousia. Matter is potentiality, whereas form is the 
actualization of matter, or in the case of pure form, pure actuality. The distinction 
between matter and form as potency and actuality plays a large role in the distinction of 
the primary object of philosophical study, nonsensible ous[a, from sensible ous[a. A short 
discussion of the meaning of potentiality and actuality will clarify why this is so. It will 
also begin to clarify why the primary principle and ground of being is nonsensible ous[a. 
The two questions that arise in regard to being as potential and actual then are 1) whether 
being as actuality and potentiality is a subject of the primary science; and 2) the relation 
of act\potency to the matter\form distinction, and to the difference between sensible and 
nonsensible ous[ai, and whether the study of both these belongs to first philosophy. I 
begin with the former. 
Potentiality [dunamis] is a given capacity within beings to be other than they are. 
Potential being is that which is susceptible to change, whether the source of change is in 
the thing itself, or comes from something other than itself or from a part of itself. 
Actualization is the process of bringing the potentiality of a being into entelecheia, that 
is, bringing a being to fulfillment of its telos through realization of its potential. Actuality 
[energeia] is a concept so basic, writes Aristotle, that it can be understood only 
42 Though even here, motion is studied in relation to ta phusei, that is, ous[a that 
have a principle of motion. See chapter three below. 
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ousfa, as in movement, or on the way towards actualization, has an already given telos, 
or terminus of the movement from potentiality to actuality. 
But all ousfai do not have a principle of movement: the first aitfa, as the unmoved 
mover, does not admit of potency. The ous[a that is pure act is not a coming to be, but 
is already fully itself. The primary science, which studies the causes and principles of 
being qua being, studies act and potency in relation to ous[a, and it also studies the ous[a 
that is pure act. 
The second question at issue in the discussion of being as actuality and potentiality 
concerns the relationship between act\potency and matter\form, as well as the distinction 
between sensible and nonsensible ousfa. Are all ousfai studied by the primary science? 
This question takes us to the heart of an issue that troubles readers of the Metaphysics 
(and which I take up in the third chapter below)- that is how ontology and theology relate 
in first philosophy. 
Actuality is determined as form, and ous[a is primarily form (1050b 2; also Eta 
1042b lOff; and my next section). Matter, on the other hand, is conceived as potential 
(1042a 28; 1042b 10), and as that which is subject to change. As potency and actuality, 
the matter and form of a particular sensible ousfa are not separable (1045b 17-19). 
However, it is the form of an ous[a that is what ousfa actually is [tf esti]; the unchanging 
essence of ousfa [to tf en efnai]. Because Aristotle identifies potency with matter, and 
actuality with form, and because actuality is prior to potency, an individual sensible ous[a 
as a combination of matter and form must be posterior to ous[a as form. Form as actual 
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is prior to any of its individual material instantiations. Individual things come to be and 
pass away, but the form that an individual instantiates is eternal. The form defines that 
which a sensible (hylomorphic) ousfa is en route to becoming; it thus defines the actuality 
of ousfa. As I discuss in the context of ousfa below, an individual ousfa that admits of 
potential (is material) is the coming to be of a given actual form; and any given 
individual within a species is the coming to be of one and the same species form. 
There is one type of ousfa that has form but no matter, nonsensible ousfa. Since it 
is matter that is potential, ousfa as pure form is clearly the ous{a identified in the Physics 
as pure actuality without potentiality. Form is the essence of an ousfa, thus the primary 
aitfa, pure form, is pure essence. As such, it is a primary focus of first philosophy. The 
relation of theology and ontology is determined on the basis of form. 
The division of ousfai into primary classes of sensible and non-sensible is itself 
sustainable on the basis of form: though they do not all have matter, all classes of ousfai 
have form. Since knowledge is acquired on the basis of perception, however, the inquiry 
into ousfa as form begins with a discussion of sensible ousfa. But the inquiry concentrates 
on the form of sensible ousfai, as that which defines them. The study of ontology, 
focussed on ousfa, and beginning with the study of sensible ousfa, leads to the 
determination of nonsensible ousfa as its aitfa and arche. Otherwise stated, the study of 
hylomorphic ousfai leads to the examination of pure form as its ground. The study of 
actuality and potentiality, approached from Aristotle's aetiological perspective, must 
include both matter and form, sensible and nonsensible ousfai. 
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The study of being qua being leads implacably to the study of ousfa. The various 
meanings of being are related through reference to ousfa: accidental being and being as 
truth through their ontological dependence on it; being according to the categories as 
ousfa itself and its primary determinations; and being as actuality and potentiality as 
essential characteristics of its nature. In the next section, I will tum to the study of ousfa 
itself, as that of which Aristotle is seeking the primary archai kai aftia in the science of 
the Metaphysics. 
III 
Ousia 
I begin with the word itself. There are several translations in circulation for the word 
"ousfa". To choose a translation, or to invent a new one, is to make an important 
conceptual decision. In deciding to use the Greek term, I do not mean to shirk the 
responsibility of the conceptual decision. It is rather that the term is complex, and the 
possible translations so misleading, that to translate ousfa is only to seriously distort its 
meaning. 
"Ousfa" is a noun, formed from ousa, the feminine singular participial form of "to 
be", einai. Etymologically speaking, then, the correct translation of the word should be 
"beingness", giving us efnai: to be; on (m) or ousa (f): being; and ousfa: beingness. This 
would preserve the correct etymology of the word; but apart from being awkward, it is 
too abstract to carry the way in which ousfa is often used to refer to a concrete thing. 
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"Ousfa" was used popularly in Aristotle's time to mean something of one's own, 
one's property or possessions; Owens suggests that Aristotle may have preserved some 
of the popular meaning in his technical use of ous[a, such that the ous[a of something 
must be its own, as if its own property (Owens, 1978, p.152). But "property" does not fit 
Aristotle's philosophical meaning. 
The traditional translation of ousfa in English is "substance", a carry-over from the 
Latin "substantia".43 Etymologically, "substance" signifies "that which stands under'', 
which is appropriate since ousfa is a "hupokefmenon" of sorts, as "subject" of qualities 
and attributes, or as that in which the categories inhere. But ous[a is also used to refer to 
a concrete being complete with attributes. Furthermore, the material associations of 
substance are misleading, and Aristotle himself abandons "hupokefmenon" as a misleading 
characterization of ous[a (1029a 7-30); nor is "substance" related to the verb "to be", and 
thus carries no hint of the ontological significance of ous[a. 
"Essence" is a frequent choice of translation, and as a carry-over from the Latin 
"essentia", it is more faithful to the etymology of ous[a.44 Although it does allow for the 
abstractive sense of the beingness of the object in question, "essence" does not capture 
the meaning of ousfa as a concrete thing, combination of matter and form, and makes it 
43 Among those who use "substance", or its equivalent in another language, are 
Cooke, Tredennick, Ross, Suzanne Mansion, Reale, and Le Blond. 
44 Among major commentators, Aubenque uses "essence". 
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difficult to understand ousia in the context of the categories. To choose essence for ousia 
would also complicate the translation of to ti en efnai and t6 ti estin.45 
Joseph Owens presents an etymological argument for the use of "entity" to translate 
"ousia" (Owens 1978, pp.137-154). But etymological considerations aside, the material 
connotations of "entity" make it hard to read the word as referring to anything other than 
the materially present concrete object, a combination of form and matter.46 The formal 
signification of "ousia'', primary in the Metaphysics, is obscured here. 
In the end, I have chosen to leave ousia as ousia, which allows me to employ the 
same term for the several senses in which Aristotle uses it. Enough, then, on the 
translation of the term. Now for the meaning. 
In book Delta, Aristotle defines ousia as: 1) individual things not predicated of 
anything else, (e.g. simple bodies, such as the elements, plants and animals; but also he 
lists the divine); 2) the internal ground of the being of things; 3) the essential component 
of a thing; and 4) the to t{ en efnai, the essence ( 10 l 7b 10-23 ). These last three are virtual 
equivalents, since the ground of the being of something is its essence (and since to know 
45 
"To ti en einai" with its peculiar use of the past tense of "to be", translates literally 
as "the what it was to be" and refers to the formal and enduring character of an object, 
as opposed to the t6 t{ estin, which can denote the matter, or the composite of form and 
matter. Though I use "essence" for both these phrases, I also supply the Greek where 
confusion might arise. 
46 Owens' argument is in part etymological: "entitas" is a Latin participial noun 
formed on the basis of the participle ens, and the infinitive esse (corresponding then to 
e'inai; ousa; ous{a). He argues that "entity'', with its abstractive suffix "ia" preserves the 
abstractive derivation of ous{a. 
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what something is, is to know why it is). Aristotle summarizes by saying there are two 
principal meanings of ousia: the ultimate hupokeimenon, which cannot be further 
predicated of something else (the first definition above); and the shape and form (he 
morphe kai to e1dos) of each particular thing (1017b 24-5). This latter determination 
seems to identify form, essence and ground of ousia. In book Zeta this constellation of 
concepts becomes clearer. 
In Zeta 2 (1028b 8-20), Aristotle says that ousia is most obviously present in bodies, 
this time listing only sensible and natural bodies (animals, plants, fire, water, the visible 
universe, the stars). But he raises the question of whether these are the only kinds of 
ousia, noting that many believe that there are eternal beings. It is in part towards 
resolution of this question that Aristotle in Zeta 3 lists the four senses in which ousia is 
generally used: as 1) the substrate [to hupokeimenon]; 2) the essence (to ti en e1nai); 3) 
the universal; and 4) the genus (1028b 34-36). 
The central problem in determining what "ousfa" means is that Aristotle describes 
ousia both as individual (as t6de ti), and as universal (as species). The problem is 
particularly focussed around the question of essence, which is identified as the form of 
ousia. Aristotle uses "form" as peculiar to an individual (such that Socrates' form is 
unique to Socrates); and as common to all individuals in the same species (such that 
Socrates and all other human beings have the same form). The difficult is not easily 
resolved. But I will lay out the ambiguity through discussion of the senses of "ousia" 
mentioned in Zeta: first I will look at ous[a as substrate; and then as essence. Ousia 
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considered as universal and as genus are treated as problems within these determinations; 
just as in Delta, the four meanings of ous{a are reducible to two. 
1) Is ous{a a substrate [hupokefmenon]? Now substrate can be understood as matter, 
form, or a combination of both (1029a 3-4). If we think of ous{a as a substrate, then 
matter first seems to fit, since ous{a is the primary category, that in which attributes 
inhere. If by a mental process we take away all the attributes of a concrete thing one by 
one, then all that remains is matter. An account of this kind of substrate as ous{a would 
not, however, allow for the individuality of a concrete ous{a. Matter is in itself 
undifferentiated, but ous{a refers to the separability (to choriston) and individuality (to 
t6de ti) of an ous{a (1029a 27). Therefore, form is more truly said to be ous{a than matter 
(or than the combination of form and matter). Aristotle concentrates his inquiry into ous{a 
on form, though he seems to abandon the attempt to qualify form as a substrate.47 I will 
look therefore at the possibility that ous{a is form, before continuing with the discussion 
of essence. 
The above passage, in which matter is eliminated as substrate, clearly implies that 
1) ous{a refers primarily to an individual, or to the "thisness" of something (t6de ti); and 
2) the form of an ous{a is that which gives it its individual character. That form is the 
principle of individuation clearly goes against the "traditional" view that it is matter that 
makes any one individual different from any other within a species. Form, on this 
47 Aristotle equivocates on whether ous{a can be understood as substrate. He does not 
entirely reject the notion of ous{a as substrate; it is rather that "hupoke{menon", as a 
multivocal and ambiguous term, is a confusing characterization, so he abandons it. On this 
point see Gerard (1992), pp.451-454. 
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traditional view, is that which differentiates between species, but it is matter that 
differentiates on the level of individuals within a species. If individual ousfai have 
individual forms, it is only because they express the species form, but somehow 
individuate this form by instantiating it materially. 
Form is the unchangeable element in changeable sensible ousfai. As we saw, in 
book Theta, form is plainly described as actuality (entelecheia, energefa)(I043a 28), and 
matter as potentiality (dunamis )( 1042a 28). Form actualizes matter, or determines it as an 
individual thing. It is thus form which most describes the essence of an individual ous{a, 
what it is in virtue of itself, but it is matter (in sensible ousfa) that lends it its character 
as something becoming its (species) form. Aristotle does write that form is "prior" to the 
matter and "more truly existent" (1029a 7); if form is seen as differentiated on the level 
of species, this makes sense. The species "man" is prior to any material instantiation of 
this form, given that individual men and women come to be and pass away. Actuality is 
prior to potentiality; the form, as the active principle in an individual thing, is prior to the 
coming to be or attainment to form, of its matter. However, if an individual has its own 
form, which would then pass away with the destruction of the individual, it is more 
difficult to see how form is prior. 
Whiting's article (1986) is significant in arguing that matter cannot be used to 
distinguish between individuals of a same species synchronically and diachronically; I will 
thus use her article as a way of presenting the issue. Form, she argues, is the principle 
of unity of matter at and across time. Individuation presupposes unity, and it is form that 
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provides unity to matter. Form is then a necessary condition for individuation.48 Whiting 
argues against the view that spatio-temporal continuity of matter can account for the unity 
of an individual: continuity of matter in an individual is always that of informed matter. 
Spatio-temporal unity of matter is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
individuation. By unifying matter, form individuates matter (p.372). 
But "form" (efdos) is used to apply both to individual and species forms (e.g. 103lb 
7 equates knowledge of form or essence with knowledge of the individual; 1030a 11-13 
refers to essence as species; 1071 a 26-29 admits both). Aristotle is clear that two 
individuals embody the same form, and that form is one and indivisible. Referring to Iota 
1058a 29- 1058b 27, Whiting argues that at the level of species, form is one and 
indivisible because "there is no contrariety in its account". In this passage, Aristotle is 
answering the question of why "woman" is not different in species from "man". "Male" 
and "female", he replies, are attributes of an animal that apply not in virtue of its ousia, 
but in virtue of matter. Thus though "male" and "female" are contraries in respect of 
matter, they are not contraries in respect of definition (which is a statement of essence). 
Form can be said to be the principle of individuation on the level of species. 
Now on the level of individuals within a species, Whiting argues on the basis of 
1052a 25-26 that form is one and indivisible, but in respect of place and time. This 
passage gives a definition of "one", as a thing that is whole and that has a definite form. 
If its motion is one and indivisible in respect of place and time, such a thing can be called 
a unit. Now motion is not in the form, but in the thing being moved (Phys: 224b 25): this 
48 See Whiting pp. 362-364. 
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would seem to indicate that an individual is called "one" not because of its form, but 
because of its matter. The argument would go like this: matter is moved, movement is 
one and indivisible, therefore an individual is one and indivisible by reference to its 
matter. Whiting's argument becomes rather obscure at this point: she seems to say that 
the individual form of sensible ous[a cannot exist apart from some matter, but that it is 
nonetheless the individual form that is one in movement and indivisible in space and time. 
Spatio-temporal continuity is dependent on the unity of form; thus it is this form in this 
matter that is responsible for individuation on the level of individuals within species. 
Accepting form both as individual and as species solves a lot of problems in 
interpreting what Aristotle says about ousia, since he himself seems to characterize it in 
both ways. But how it can be argued coherently that the form of Socrates is both 
individual and universal, without appealing to language as universalizing what is ontically 
individual (which Aristotle does not do) is troubling. I will return to the difficulty in 
examining essence as the meaning of ousfa. For now, it is clear that Aristotle eliminates 
the possibility of matter being a substrate that would capture the meaning of ousia. 
2) The essence, to ti en einai, is, according to book Zeta, what each thing is said to 
be of its own nature [kath 'haut6], or in itself [hei auto]. Accidental predications do not 
describe the essence of something. At 1030a 4-5, Aristotle writes that the essence is an 
) 
individual type [t6de ti], but if a subject has something else predicated of it, it is not a 
t6de ti. Thus "white man" is not an individual type [ho leukos anthropos auk estin hoper 
t6de ti] ( 1030a 5). "White" does not describe what a man is according to his nature, since 
a man could be not white and still be a man. Nor do per se attributes or per se 
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composites (like snub nose) have essences. The "thisness" of something is not defined at 
the level of individuals within a species, but at the level of species. This is rather 
confusing, since it would seem that "Socrates" (this white man) should be construed as 
an individual. But Aristotle's point in this difficult passage seems to be that the form of 
man is not further individuated than at the level of species. This promotes the view that 
matter is the individualizing factor in a given individual. 
Further evidence that essence is specific to an individual (as opposed to being 
universal) is found in the passage immediately following. There, Aristotle writes that 
"definition is the account [logos] of the essence" (1031a 13).49 Something is a definition 
when it gives an account of something primary, such that the predicate is related to the 
subject kath 'haut6 and not kata sumbebek6s. Of course the "what" can refer to each of 
the categories, but primarily, and in an unqualified sense, it refers to ous[a. Thus 
definition in the primary sense applies to ous[a. Essence, then, belongs primarily to ous[a 
(1030a 30). 
Now essential definition can only be of the species of a genus, since only in 
defining species do we use kath 'haut6 predication. "Female", for example, cannot be 
explained without reference to "animal", and thus is only secondarily an essence. Thus 
essence, to tf en efnai, is primarily ousfa, and ousfa refers to species. Essence, writes 
Aristotle famously, belongs to nothing that is not a species of a genus (1030a 11-13). 
49 See my discussion of definition in the context of the Posterior Analytics (chapter 
one above). 
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In another telling passage in book Zeta (1035b 28-32), Aristotle writes that terms 
like "man" and "horse" that are predicated universally of individuals are not ousfai. 
Socrates, as a combination of this matter and this form is "a kind of concrete whole"; as 
composed of "universal" matter and form, an individual is not properly speaking an ous[a. 
The concrete individual is not definable, but can be known only by nous (in the case of 
intelligible individuals like this circle) or perception (in the case of sensible individuals 
like Socrates). It is only the form (and Aristotle writes here that "by form I mean 
essence")50 that is included in the formula of the definition of something, "and the 
formula refers to the universal". 
Halper (1987) suggests that all that Aristotle has shown in these passages is that 
essence must be one in formula, and not that essence is universal. Species, he argues, is 
ous[a because since it has no material or formal parts, it is one in formula; parent and 
child are one in formula and are thus are one in species. On the other hand, Aristotle also 
argues that form must be one in number. This has been used as evidence that form or 
essence is individual, or that individuals have individual forms. The confusion arises when 
we understand Aristotle to be saying both that form is universal (father and son have the 
same form); and that form is individual (Socrates has his own form). In fact, Halper 
contends, Aristotle argues that the form of Socrates is numerically one; and the form of 
father and son is one in formula, as it expresses the definition. Form is then in a sense 
both "universal" and "individual". But Halper argues that rather than as universal and 
individual, Aristotle conceives form as one in number and one in formula. 
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" ••• eldos de tego to tf en elnai" (1035b 34-5). 
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In sensible things, Halper says, "form is one nature inevitably manifested in a 
plurality" (p.672). He defends his thesis on the basis of form construed as actuality. 
Actuality is the function that makes something what it is. In sensible things, form 
necessarily occurs in matter; more, "form inevitably individuates itself in matter" (671). 
Matter decays and must thus reproduce itself, hence there must be a plurality of 
manifestations of the same form if it is to continue to be actual. The first mover, on the 
other hand, lacking matter, and thus fully actual must be one in number and in formula. 
Before pursuing this line of thought, which requires some re-thinking of the meaning 
of "form", I will look at some passages that seem to imply that there are individual forms. 
At 1042a28-29, Aristotle refers to a hylomorphic individual as a t6de ti; at 1017b25-26 
he discusses the form as t6de ti; likewise at 1049a 35-36. But that a form is a "thisness" 
does not mean that the "thisness" is determined at the level of individuals within species, 
as we saw above. Rather, the thisness of the individual could be determined by it being 
this species form, but one that is present in this matter. 
At 1031b 19-22, Aristotle says that a thing is the same as its essence, because "to 
have knowledge [episteme] of the individual is to have knowledge of the essence" (1031 b 
19-22). This is ambiguous, since "thing" [hekaston] could refer either to the composite 
of matter and form, or to the form of the composite.51 But essence clearly cannot refer 
to matter, since essence refers to what is per se and primary. Essence then seems here to 
refer to the form of an individual ousia. However, we must be careful not to identify two 
51 It also brings in epistemological rather than purely ontic considerations; and the 
determination of form as individual or as species does not depend on our understanding, 
as I develop below. 
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distinct notions: "the form of an individual ous[a", which does not specify that an ousfa 
has its own individual form, and "the individual form of an ousfa", which does admit 
individual form in ousfai. 
In another passage, Aristotle says that ousfa is that which is peculiar to each thing, 
and which does not apply to anything else. On the other hand, the universal, he says, is 
common to many things. It could not then be predicated of an individual ous[a, unless it 
were predicated of them all, and this would be to reduce all ous[a that fall under the 
universal to one, (since all things that have the same ousfa are identical) which is absurd 
(1038a 2-8). Further, ousfa cannot be predicated of a subject, whereas the universal can 
be. Universals describe a "such" [toi6nde], (i.e. that something is of such a kind) whereas 
an ousfa is a "this" [t6de ti]. Universals are composite; they encompass particulars. Form, 
on the other hand, is one; it cannot encompass any divisions or parts. 
This argument seems to determine that ousfa is primarily construed as an individual, 
and this on the basis of its individual form or essence, which cannot be shared by any 
other individual. However, it can equally be construed as arguing that the form of an 
ous[a as a concrete individual is one: it is the same form, numerically one, that is 
manifest in several individuals at the same time. The concrete ous[a cannot be put into 
a universal class, or predicated of anything, precisely because it is a concrete individual, 
that manifests, in different matter, the same form, and not an "instantiation" of form. How 
can we understand this? How does it solve the problem of Socrates being Socrates and 
not any other man? 
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Although knowledge begins with perception of the concrete individual, and builds 
from knowledge of the particular to knowledge of the universal, it is not at all clear that 
Aristotle defends a purely inductive theory on the level of individuals relation to species. 
By this, I mean that it is not evident that we have at the outset knowledge of individual 
forms, and then understand these as belonging to a universal class, that of species. Rather, 
knowledge of universals, which is as we saw is acquired on the basis of nous, is 
knowledge of the individual as a member of a species, and this species as belonging to 
a larger genus. But understanding this individual as a member of a species is to perceive 
the form as already the same as in other members of the same species, and not as one 
manifestation that is equally instantiated in other individuals. Since form is individuated 
at the latest on the level of species (as opposed to on the level of genus or some wider 
class), a more strictly inductive theory works for the relation of species to genus.52 
On this view, the form of Socrates is one and the same as that of Callias. The form 
of Socrates is one numerically, but also one in formula. The "thisness" of Socrates is not 
52 Aristotle never completely resolves the difficulties of individual versus species 
form. He does acknowledges them, however, and offers a partial epistemological solution 
in book Mu (1087a 10-25): "the doctrine that all knowledge is of the universal, so that 
the principles of existing things must also be universal and not separate ousfai presents 
the greatest difficulty that we have discussed." He suggests that "knowledge" can mean 
either potential or actual knowledge. Potential knowledge is of the universal, whereas we 
actually know the individual. Thus, to use his example, although we actually see an 
individual colour, say green, in seeing green, we "accidentally" see the universal "colour''. 
How "accidental" relates to "potential" here is not clear, though it seems a non-technical 
usage. Perhaps he means that we always only actually perceive individuals, but we are 
at the same time indirectly perceiving a given individual in relation to others. To 
extrapolate: the point seems to be that the form of an individual thing is this definite 
form, that we know actually. But we can potentially see this form as belonging also to 
other individuals. 
106 
strictly determined by his matter, but by the way in which the species form actualizes this 
matter. Form is the manifestation of itself in a plurality of material instances. The material 
instances, the combination of this matter with this species form, exhibit the characteristics 
of the form in a variety of material ways, but always in the same formal way. Thus 
although Socrates has a snub nose and Callias has a roman nose, both individuals have 
noses, both grow from baby to adult, both are rational beings, and both die. The formal 
characteristics of Socrates and Callias are those which are identical to both. The way in 
which the potential of form to realize itself is carried out (e.g. the shape of their noses, 
the specific path which growth towards adulthood takes, the way rationality is developed 
in both, the age each live to) is a function not of the "individuality" of their forms, but 
rather of the material possibility of form to actualize itself in any individual instance. 
In the case of the nonmaterial ousia, form has no need to manifest itself as process, 
which is purely an effect of its material instantiation. As fully actual, non-material form 
is what it is at all times. This would seem to render impossible the plural expression of 
a given non-material form. 
The above is an attempt to reconcile two seemingly contradictory theses found 
particularly in book Zeta. Whether or not the reconciliation works, it is important for my 
larger purpose to understand that ousia is primarily understood as form or essence. 
However form is construed, as species or as individual to members of a species, or 
somehow as both, it is nonetheless clear that form describes what ousia primarily is. 
The four ways of looking at ousia all bring us to the conclusion that ousia is 
primarily form. The question now will be, what is the primary ground of the being of 
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sensible things? More specifically, what is the ground of the form of sensible ous[ai? 
Sensible things are changeable, and the unchangeable form is found in sensible things, 
and is identical to them. Yet as unchangeable it has somehow to be prior to its appearance 
in sensible things. How can form subsist when sensible things pass away? 
The last chapter of book Zeta begins with a "fresh start" to the question of what 
ous[a is, from the perspective of the archai kai a[tia of ous[a. This was to be the primary 
inquiry of the Metaphysics. He reminds us that when we are asking "why" something is, 
we are not asking, for instance, "why a man is a man", a clearly pointless question. 
Rather, to ask why is to seek a ground, as in the question "why does it thunder?" (or in 
other words "why is a noise produced in the clouds?") The essence or the formal ground 
is the true reason why things are, and the other ait[a can be understood in consequence. 
If we ask why these materials make a house, the answer is because they form the 
essence of a house. "Thus what we are seeking is the ground (that is, the form) in virtue 
of which the matter is a definite thing" (1041 b 8). The form then is the primary ground 
of the being of a material thing. Form is the a[tion of the determination of matter, such 
that this matter is flesh, and that other matter is wood. 
Likewise with the other aitfa. The final and the efficient ait[a must be understood 
in relation to form. 53 The formal ground is primary. The essence of ous[a, as efdos, is thus 
53 See 1041a 28-33: "Clearly then, we are inquiring for the ground (logically 
speaking, this is the essence), which is some cases is the final ground (as in the case of 
a house or a bed), and in the others, the prime mover. We look for the latter kind of 
ground in the case of generation and destruction, but the former also in the case of 
existence." Here we have a hint of the prime mover as the formal a[tion of sensible 
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a ground of why sensible things are. Ous[a is the primary ground of being [aftion proton 
tou elnai], and as such, it is a primary arche (1041b 28-32). The answer to why form 
subsists in sensible things, that which grounds the form of sensible ousfa, cannot then be 
a "higher'' arche than that of ousfa. It must be found in ous[a itself; but in a type of ous[a 
that is free of matter, free of potentiality, and thus not subject to generation and 
corruption, or to any other kind of material change. 
There must be a first and a final aftion, since, as we saw, Aristotle does not permit 
an infinite concatenation of grounds. The individual ous[a, that to be grounded, is the 
terminus of the forwards concatenation of grounds; as pure form, we will see that the 
prime mover, that which grounds, is the terminus in the series backwards. The study of 
the archai kai aftia of ous[a, the forwards terminus, leads us to a study of theology, with 
God as the backwards terminus. 
The discussion so far has brought us from the search for the meaning of science to 
the discussion of the science that is under examination in the Metaphysics. We found that 
Aristotle is looking for the first science, and thus for the first archai kai aftia. This 
science is not demonstrative, since first principles cannot be demonstrated, and primary 
grounds are themselves principles. However, the Metaphysics remains an attempt to 
identify principles and grounds of the primary subject of study. Being qua being is the 
most fundamental study, and the subject of the first principles and grounds. The primary 
form of being to be investigated is ousfa; and ous[a is, in the most primary sense, form. 
In the following chapter, I will study the nature of the primary manifestation of form, and 
ousfai, a formal aftion that is identified with a final aftion. 
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relate it again to the study of first aitfa. It will then become clear how the ousfa named 
God is the first archai kai aftia of being qua being focussed on ousfa. Theology will 
finally be shown to be inextricably linked to ontology in Aristotle, because of his 
methodological search for grounds. 
CHAPTER THREE 
Theology in Aristotle 
To set up the discussion of Aristotle's theology, I will review the argument so far. 
In the Metaphysics, Aristotle is seeking the first principles and grounds of being qua 
being. Since all senses of being are unified in a pros hen relation that centres on ous[a, 
the study of these first principles focusses on ous[a. Knowledge begins with perception, 
so Aristotle begins his study with an analysis of sensible ous[a, and seeking the essence 
of ous[a, finds that it is the particular form, eidos. The form, what something is, is at the 
same time a ground of why it is, since the formal ground is primary amongst the aitfa. 
Scientific knowledge, knowledge of grounds, is always universal. We can achieve 
universal knowledge by noting that the form, though particular to the individual in which 
it is originally perceived, can potentially apply to other individuals. Thus we have 
universal knowledge of the form of ous[a as the archai kai aftia of being qua being. 
But the problem of first principles and grounds is not yet solved. The question of 
the persistence of form in sensible ous[a still remains. Form is actuality, and actualizes 
the matter that makes up an individual ousfa. Matter can potentially assume different 
forms; but this matter is formed into this individual. Individuals come to be and pass 
away, and yet the form, understood now universally, continues to be manifest in 
individuals. Form is somehow separable from matter: we understand it apart from matter. 
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Further, form is entelicheia: the achieving of the telos, of the complete reality of an 
individual when the matter attains to the form. What is to explain this shift from 
potentiality to actuality in sensible things? Form is the principle of universality, since 
knowledge of the universal begins with apprehension of form. But what can ground the 
continued manifestation of form? 
The answer to this question will occupy this chapter. God as pure actuality grounds 
the motion from potentiality to actuality, and as pure form provides the solution to the 
comprehensibility of universals, and is thus the first principle of the science of being qua 
being.54 
54 It is interesting to note that nowhere in the Metaphysics does Aristotle explicitly 
characterize God as pure form. However, the prime mover is very clearly described as an 
ous[a (cf. 1069a 30ff; and passages too frequent to mention). The existence of an 
immaterial and eternal ous[a, and its relation to sensible ous[ai confronts us with the 
problem of the relation between ontology and theology. For this reason, I have inquired 
into the characteristics of ous[a, and argued that it is primarily understood as form (cf. 
ch 2, sec. III). (See book Epsilon for further characterization of ous[a as "that which is", 
the essence; see Gamma on the relation of to on to ous[a, and ous[a as the primary object 
of the primary science.) There is no doubt that ous[a must be understood either as 1) 
matter; 2) form (or phusis or entelechy or energefa) or as 3) the combination of these 
(1070a lOft); no alternative is offered anywhere in the text of the Metaphysics. Now since 
the prime mover is an ous[a, is immaterial, and is characterized over and over as pure 
energefa, it clearly follows that God is form. 
The identity relation between form and energefa is drawn out in book Theta, as well 
as Kappa (see chapter 2, sec. II), although this identity is not foreign to other books of 
the Metaphysics. Thus the characterization of God as actuality leads us to suppose that 
God is pure form. (Cf. 1071 b 20-22: The essence of the prime mover is actuality; it is 
immaterial, eternal, actual, an ous[a; cf. also 1072b 14-5: as pure actuality, God has the 
highest activity, thinking. Passages throughout the last chapters of book Lambda 
(particularly 6,7, 9, 10) clearly and explicitly support the characterization of God or the 
prime mover as actual, immobile (and therefore immaterial), as pure act, as an ous[a. See 
also books seven and eight of the Physics, and my discussion of these books in chapter 
three.) 
As we will see, book eight of the Physics establishes that the prime mover is neither 
of finite nor infinite magnitude; it has no magnitude at all, thus it is immaterial and it is 
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In book Epsilon of the Metaphysics, the word theologike is used to describe the 
primary science. This science treats those things that are separable from matter and 
immutable [chorista kai akineta], since "if the divine is present anywhere, it is present 
in this kind of nature" (1026a 20). Only here and in the summary of this chapter in book 
Kappa, (1064b 3) does Aristotle specifically identify the primary science as theology, 
although the references to non-sensible ousia, and the study of such entities, are plentiful. 
It is book Lambda of the Metaphysics that treats non-sensible ousia explicitly and 
in the most detail, and expressly as something divine. But before looking at the prime 
mover as it appears there, I will turn to the Physics. Aristotle writes that unless there is 
an unmovable ousia, physics will be the primary science (Meta: 1026a 29). To understand 
how non-sensible ousia necessarily emerges from the study of sensible ousia, it is 
important to grasp the character of sensible ousia as kinetic, and the prime mover as 
not in space (267b18-27). This argument is repeated in Lambda seven, where apart from 
stating that the primary ousia has no magnitude (and therefore no matter), Aristotle also 
writes that "there is some ousia that is eternal and immovable and separate from sensible 
things" (1073a 4-13). Now this notion of chorism6s (separability) is specifically related 
to form in a passage from chapter five of Book Lambda of the Metaphysics: "actuality 
and potentiality also fall under the causes as already described; for the form exists 
actually if it is separable" (1071a 9). 
As for the way in which God has been characterized as form in the literature, it 
seems that the characterization is so common, that the burden of proof rests rather on one 
who argues that God is not construed as form. None of the authors mentioned in my 
bibliography (nor indeed, any literature of which I am aware) claim anything other than 
that God is pure form. Nonetheless, the fact that Aristotle does not make this claim 
explicitly, at least not in any passage that I have encountered, is worthy of note. 
There is also an argument to be made in support of God as pure form on the basis 
of Aristotle's notion of aitia. In chapter one, I argued at length for the priority of the 
formal aition (see my discussion of aitia in ch. 1, II and ch. 2, I b and of definition ch. 
1, Illb). Characterization of God as form (or as essence) permits the establishment of a 
primary formal aition; this, I argue, is most sought in the determination of the cosmos as 
comprehensible. 
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immobile. The physical background of the necessity of the prime mover in Aristotle's 
metaphysical thought and the meaning of phusis, will then be the subject of the first 
section of this chapter. I will show how Aristotle's conception of kinetic sensible ousia 
necessarily involves recourse to an eternal immobile and non-sensible being, and how this 
entailment is once more established on the basis of aetiology, the search for grounds. 
There are two kinds of "necessity" to the prime mover or (as it is called in Lambda) 
God: logical necessity and metaphysical necessity. Logically, Aristotle argues that given 
certain premisses concerning the nature of the physical world, a prime mover with a 
particular extra-physical nature must exist. These arguments are transcendental in the 
sense I described above, rather than strictly inductive or deductive. Aristotle cannot 
deduce the existence of a prime mover, because the prime mover is an indemonstrable 
principle, and anyway existence cannot be demonstrated. Nor can he use inductive 
argument, since the prime mover is non-sensible, and thus not subject to perception. He 
is transcendent, and thus, unlike abstract geometrical objects which are inductively known 
on the basis of their inherence in matter, is not subject to intellection based on perception. 
The arguments found in books VII and VIII of the Physics and in book Lambda of the 
Metaphysics are dans leurs grandes lignes, transcendental and aetiological. I treat these, 
respectively, in sections two, three and four of this chapter. 
The logical arguments in the eighth book of the Physics, and in book Lambda of the 
Metaphysics rest on premisses that are not simply empirically descriptive of the physical 
world, but which entail metaphysical postulates. That there is movement in the world, for 
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instance, is not merely an empirical observation, but also a metaphysical postulate that 
the being of ous{ai is describable as an eternal shift from potentiality to actuality.1 
My argument here is that given Aristotle's method of seeking explanatory grounds, 
and given his metaphysical postulates, God is a necessary part of his ontology. His 
ontology begins with the sensible world, the subject of the Physics: we find that also there 
a first ait{a, divinized in the Metaphysics, is necessary. 
I 
Ph us is 
The emergence of the prime mover in the Physics is dependent on Aristotle's notion 
of movement in the physical cosmos. There is no general discussion of ousfa in the 
Physics: that work is specifically concerned with sensible moved ous{a and the internal 
principle of movement- phusis. Since the Physics treats the physical realm, the work does 
not discuss the non-sensible unmoved mover in detail, but only insofar as it is a ground 
of the principle of movement. 
Although usually translated as "nature", we must be careful not to understand 
"phusis" in the static sense in which the Latin word is used today, indicating a world of 
things, animate and inanimate, that exists in contrast to the human world. In Physics Beta, 
the word ''phusis" is defined by reference to things that are "by nature", ta phusei, which 
1 This is argued both in the Physics and the Metaphysics. It does not enter into the 
formal arguments for the logical necessity of a first mover in Physics VII, but plays a role 
in the determination of things that have "natural movement'' in book VIII; and is primary 
in Lambda. 
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are those ous{ai that have within themselves a principle of movement and rest [archen 
kineseos kai staseos] (192b 13).2 Phusis is "an archai kai a{tia of movement and rest in 
that in which it resides primarily, in virtue of itself [kath 'haut6] and not by accident [kata 
sumbebek6s]" (192b 20-22). 
All things that have this principle, or "have a nature" are ous{ai, since phusis inheres 
in a substrate [hupokdmenon], and ous{a is a substrate (192b 33-35).3 Phusis then 
coincides with ous{a, as the principle of change in (sensible) ous{a.4 Natural things are 
such as animals, plants and simple bodies; whereas things that exist as a result of techne, 
such as beds and coats, although made from natural materials which have such a principle 
of change (e.g. the wood from which the bed is made might rot or sprout) do not have 
such a principle in virtue of themselves (e.g. from a wooden bed would sprout a tree, not 
a bed). "According to nature" applies then to ous{ai that have a principle of movement 
and rest, and to their essential attributes (192b 35). The principle of movement and rest 
2 Aristotle says that it would be ridiculous to try to prove that such a thing as phusis 
exists; it is quite obvious that there are many natural things (192b 3). 
3 As we saw in the previous chapter, ous{a is a substrate in that it is the 
hupokdmenon in which inhere the other categories; and in that it is form, the 
unchangeable that persists through its various physical or material manifestations. But in 
the Metaphysics Aristotle seems to abandon this characterization of ous{a (Meta: 1029a 
7-30). 
4 But this does not entail that it is matter (ous{a is not a material substrate: see ch. 
two section III above). Rather, phusis is the coming to be of form that each individual 
sensible ous{a, as a concrete (material) manifestation of an identical form, must go 
through. This process is what it means to be an ous{a as having a given species form, 
while being material. Phusis then describes the form of ous{a coming to be itself, the 
drive of ous{a to become what it already is "naturally" determined to be. 
116 
is a dynamic principle that is operative in the world of natural things, because operative 
in each natural thing. 
The Physics attempts to determine the first principles of all things subject to change. 
Phusis itself is a principle, but it is a principle of change in ous{a; since change occurs 
in sensible ous{a, it is the grounds and principles of change in sensible ous{a we must 
seek.5 Phusis means both "the things of nature", and the "nature of things": both the 
things subject to change, and change as it affects things, are subjects of physics.6 
There are three principles of the science of nature, that is, three principles that relate 
to sensible ous{a: matter, form, and privation (19la 7-21), but form is primary. Aristotle 
writes that the nature (and ous{a) of natural things is not primarily its material substratum 
but "the shape or form that is specified in the definition of the thing" (193a 30). He 
presents four reasons for this. First, just as no one would say that a potential bed is a bed, 
since it is not yet achieved, so no one would say that what is potentially flesh and bones 
has its own nature, until it reaches the form that corresponds to its definition (198 a 28-5). 
Secondly, something is when it exists actually, and it is the form- inseparable except by 
definition- that is actual (192b 5-8). Thirdly, the form is what persists through generation: 
man comes from man, but from a wooden bed (were it to sprout) comes wood (l 93b 8-
12). Fourth, form is that towards which something tends. A seed grows into an oak tree, 
5 See also De Caelo: "We may say that the science of nature is for the most part 
plainly concerned with bodies and magnitudes and with their changing properties and 
motions, as also with the principles which belong to that class of ousfa; for the sum of 
physically constituted entities consists of a) bodies and magnitudes, b) beings possessed 
of bodies and magnitude, c) the principles or grounds of these beings" (268a 1-6). 
6 At 193a 10, Aristotle identifies the ousfa ton phusei and phusis. 
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into its form. Phusis is the process of generation, which tends towards form. Things 
proceed, through growth and generation, to the fulfillment of their form (193b 12-18). 
Privation, the third principle, is also in a way form, since privation describes that 
which an ousfa has not yet become, but is determined to become (191b 15; 193b 18-20).7 
The nature of things is thus expressed primarily in their form, but Physics studies form 
as it is in combination with matter in concrete individuals.8 
The defining principle of natural ousfai (material ousfai subject to phusis) is 
movement. But what is movement? Motion is defined as the actualization of the potential 
as such, or the bringing to entelechy of what was potential (201a 9). Every movement is 
a change (225a 34), and change is from something to something: from a thing to its 
contrary; between one contrary and an intermediate; or between contradictories. 
Movement is not [always] synonymous with change, however: movement is a subset of 
change, since not all change is movement. Change between contradictories, for example, 
is not movement.9 
7 Ex nihilo nihil fit; rather, things come to be from things of like kind; form is 
eternal, and eternally recurring in individuals. Privation is the "yet to be" of physical 
ousfa, the positive absence of the full development of form in entelechy. 
8 This distinguishes physics from mathematics and first philosophy, as is argued in 
193b 22- 194b 15. 
9 The distinction between kfnesis (movement) and metabole (change), is not made 
clear until book five of the Physics, in the passage under discussion here (225a 34-225b 
3). In book three, the two terms seem to be used interchangeably, though in book five it 
is apparent that Aristotle treats movement as a particular species of change. Movement 
takes place between contraries or intermediates between contraries, and not. between 
contradictories. The change implied in generation and destruction is not, properly 
speaking construed as movement, since the two are contradictories. In book Kappa of the 
Metaphysics, the same distinction is made at 1068a 1-5, (extracted from book five of the 
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Something can be said to change i) from a subject into a subject (its contrary); ii) 
from a subject into a non-subject (its contradictory); iii) from a non-subject into a subject 
(its contradictory); or iv) from a non-subject into a non-subject (225a 3-5). The last of 
these is manifestly impossible. The middle two are respectively generation and 
destruction; since they involve the coming to be or passing away of a subject, and thus 
change between contradictories, they cannot properly speaking be called movement. 
Movement then is change from a (potential) subject to an (actual) subject: this is 
what is to be grounded. Movement can exist in respect of only three of the categories: 
quantity (increase and decrease); quality (alteration); and change of place (locomotion) 
(225b 5-7).10 As well as these three kinds of movement, there is a fourth type of change 
which is not movement: generation and destruction. Locomotion, as we will see, is the 
primary kind of change, as implied in all the others. 
Clearly change affects sensible ousfa as a combination of form and matter, and the 
matter is that which undergoes physical change. But the ground of the change is found 
in the form of ousfa, in what an ousfa essentially is. We know that phusis is the principle 
of movement; we know that movement is change from a subject to its contrary; we know 
that sensible ousfai, ta phusei, is what changes; and that it is the form of ta phusei that 
Physics), although again the distinction is not consistently maintained. 
10 There can be no movement in the category of ousfa, since there is no contrary of 
ousfa; nor in the category of relation, as movement of one out of a pair in a relation 
destroys the relation; nor in the category of agent and patient. There cannot be movement 
of the mover and the moved, since there is no movement of movement or becoming of 
becoming. See 225b 1 Off. 
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define them. Now to determine the principles and grounds of change, we need to know 
how form and movement relate. 
In the previous chapter, we saw that in a sensible ous{a, form is actuality, and 
matter is potential. Motion is "the fulfillment of what is potential as potential" (201 b 5); 
that is, motion describes the actualization of possibilities that are already determined to 
unfold towards a given telos. Motion is the shift from a potential that is already present 
in an ous{a towards the realization of that potential in actuality; insofar as an ous{a is in 
motion, its given potentiality is not yet completely actualized, but it is en route to 
actualization. In other words, motion is the process of coming into, or fulfilling the form, 
which is already there, potentially, in an ousfa. The formal and final ground of motion 
are the same here, since tending towards an end or fulfilling potential is fulfillment of 
form. The form, that which determines the essential nature of a thing, is not subject to 
movement in that it comes to be, since it is already present as potential in an ous{a. 
Rather, it is the ground or principle of movement in an ous{a, which tends towards 
fulfillment of potential, towards actualization, towards entelechy. 
Nature, as the internal principle of the shift from potential to actualization, is the 
ground of this movement only in that "phusis" is the word that describes this very 
movement. Why do things move? Because it is their nature to do so. So Aristotle writes 
that "it is plain then that nature is an aftion, and a final aftion" (199b 32). "Phusis" is the 
name for the eternal process that is at work in the world, the process of sensible ousfai 
attaining their form. Processes are ordered to a last term, here the attainment of form. 
Nature is thus teleological: it describes both the process and the telos, and in this sense 
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is a final ground. But the process of nature is describable only in terms of the things that 
undergo this process. Physics is dependent then on a study of the form of ousfa. 
Phusis is descriptive of the movement in ousia: but this movement relates to form, 
and is grounded by the form of an ousia. Nature cannot be defined without reference to 
ousia: thus though phusis is a final aition, this final ground is dependent on the formal 
ground, ousia. Form contains within itself the principle of the motion of ous[a, the 
principle of moving towards what it must become, its telos; at the same time, this telos 
is already given in the form, because it is the very nature of the form to achieve its telos. 
It seems movement is ultimately grounded by the form of ousia: this ground can be 
appealed to by physics, but as itself non-sensible, the study of its grounds is beyond the 
scope of physics. 
What of the other aitia? In the Physics, knowledge is again defined as the 
understanding of the grounds.11 We have seen that the question 'why' has four possible 
answers, listed most famously here: 1) the matter (if the question concerns generation; 
technically this ground applies to metabole and not kinesis); 2) the form; 3) the mover; 
and 4) that for the sake of which (198a 22-25). As we saw in the context of the 
Metaphysics, these last three often coincide. Aristotle writes that, first, the form and the 
"for the sake of which" are the same, since the form of something is that towards which 
it tends. Second, the efficient ground of a thing is the essence, present in another member 
of the same species. Something comes to be from something of the same species, thus, 
11 
" ••• our study has knowledge as its object, and we do not know a thing until we 
have grasped the 'why' of it (that is its proten aitian) ... "(194b 18-21). 
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for example, man generates man (198a 24-27). The form of the parent is responsible for 
the presence of form in the offspring. The efficient ground is therefore the form; but as 
it is the form as present in another member of the same species, the efficient is not 
entirely identifiable with the formal ground. Thus it seems that the answer to the question 
"why is there motion" is found by referring to the matter, the form, and also the moving 
aftion.12 
Aristotle describes two kinds of principles that are explanatory of natural movement. 
The first is in things that move by being moved, that is, physical things that are part of 
a concatenation of aitfa. Such things are the proximate grounds of movement in 
something else, but the movement of these things themselves also needs explanatory 
grounds. (The son might come from the father, but where does the father come from; and 
the father's father ... and so forth.) The other kind of principle is not physical since it has 
no principle of motion in itself. This latter principle is found in 1) the unmoved mover; 
and 2) the formal ground of each natural thing (l 98a 35-b 4). The second of these is the 
immanent ground of movement; as we saw, form is the ground of movement, since it is 
that which an ousfa is, and that towards which it tends. The form is responsible for 
movement in an individual ousfa, without itself moving: as individual, however, it is 
12 The formal aftion may be primary, in that it must be known in order that the other 
aitfa be known, but it does not in itself ground the material and the moving cause. The 
form of an ousfa is that which persists through change from one individual species to 
another of the same species, but what is the ground of this continuous movement? The 
change in matter may be grounded in the process of the form coming to actuality, but 
what grounds this movement? All things tend towards their end, a process called ''phusis", 
but what grounds this drive towards the end? These questions concerning form are not 
physical, but metaphysical questions. Physics asks for the ground of movement in sensible 
things, and is not concerned with whatever might ground sensible ousfa as movemented. 
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subject to destruction. 13 The unmoved mover, on the other hand, is the transcendent aftion 
of movement, since it grounds the shift from potentiality to actuality in all sensible ousfa, 
without itself being sensible. It is the primary aitfa, as first in the concatenation of 
grounds, which puts an end to the series. 
Aristotle mentions that things that cause movement without themselves moving are 
not strictly the subject of physics, since they do not have a principle of movement in 
themselves. 14 The prime mover is thus not properly a part of the physical science. Nor, 
strictly speaking is form, as the unchanging element in sensible things. We will see that 
the arguments for the prime mover in the Physics do not explain the shift from actuality 
to potentiality, but rather explain movement primarily as locomotion. Though form is the 
primary ground of movement in sensible things, it is not itself subject to change, and thus 
not a subject for physical grounding. However, the need for a highest ground of change 
is explicit in the text; in physics, as in all other sciences, we must search for the highest 
aftion, which is the most perfect (195b 21-25). In order to answer the ultimate why of the 
physical world, that is, why there is motion in a sensible ousfa, the prime mover must be 
13 Thus individual form is not subject to movement, but it is subject to change. The 
individual form is the basis for the construction of universals, as I argued in the previous 
chapter. As a universal, form is not subject to destruction. Aristotle does not recognize 
extinction of species, and holds that the cosmos is truly eternal (no beginning or end). 
14 There are three areas of study: the unmoved (theology), the moved but 
indestructible (cosmology), and the destructible (physics) (198a 27-30). This division is 
repeated in book lambda of the Metaphysics, 1069a 30ff, where it is applied specifically 
to the types of ous[a (see section IV below). The study of first philosophy of course is 
concerned with all types of ousfa, but because it looks for the principles of ousfa, it is 
primarily theology. Theology, as the most universal science, incorporates knowledge of 
these other two. 
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brought into the picture. Aetiology drives physics towards theology, but physics does not 
encompass theology. In the following two sections, I will look at the physical arguments 
for the necessity of a prime mover. 
II 
Physics Book Seven 
At the beginning of book seven of the Physics, Aristotle gives a short (and rather 
unsatisfactory) argument for the necessity of a first mover (Phy: 24lb 24- 243a 2). I 
present here the bare bones of the argument, which comes down to this: since everything 
that moves is moved by something, and since no infinite series is possible, there must be 
a first mover. 
The argument begins with the claim that whatever is moved, is moved by 
something. Now movents either do not have a source of movement in themselves, and 
must thus be moved by something; or else they do have a source of movement within 
themselves (animals, for example). In this latter case, however, it must be that one of the 
parts moves another, and movement of a part involves movement of the whole. Since 
everything that is in movement is therefore moved by something else, there must be an 
unmoved mover at the end of the concatenation, or else we would have an infinite series. 
There follows a reductio ad absurdum argument of the thesis that there is no first 
mover, and that there is thus an infinite series. The argument seems to focus on 
locomotion; it is difficult to understand in respect of the other forms of motion. 
Everything is moved by being moved, and the movement of mover and moved is 
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simultaneous (i.e. concentrating on the point of contact, your movement away from me 
and my movement of pushing you happen at the same time). Therefore, in a series of 
movers and movents, all movement will be simultaneous. Nonetheless, each individual 
in the series has an individual movement, since all movement is from something to 
something, and is not infinite in respect of extremes. The movement of a given individual 
being limited, the time in which each movement takes place (even if our movements 
happen in the same time) must also be limited. But we have assumed that there is an 
infinite series. If movement is simultaneous between mover and moved as we have 
assumed, then we will have an infinite movement in a finite amount of time, which is 
impossible. Therefore there must be a first mover. 
Aristotle himself points out that this argument is perhaps not valid, since it may be 
possible for there to be an infinite movement in a finite time if there are a number of 
moving things in the series. The sum of the movements of the different members of the 
series may be infinite, though the movement is in a finite time. This would of course still 
be impossible for one individual. Aristotle therefore looks at the possibility that each 
subject within the series has its own movement. Even so, he points out that the series is 
made up of individuals which form a unity, since the mover and the moved must be 
continuous or in contact. 15 If the sum of the parts of this series when added together are 
infinite, so also must the movement be infinite, over a finite amount of time. This is 
impossible, therefore our hypothesis is impossible, therefore there must be a first mover. 
15 He discusses contact between mover and moved later on in book VII, beginning 
with the statement of the thesis at 243a 3-10, and analyzing its validity for the three kinds 
of movement- local, qualitative and quantitative- in the passages following, to 245b. 
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There is some debate as to the validity of this argument. Ross for example argues 
that this argument is not valid, since there is no such thing as a single movement of the 
series taken as a whole. Even though members of a series are in contact, still, each 
member will play out its own movement (see Ross: 1955, p.670). But logically flawed 
or not, we should note its transcendental (not inductive or deductive) form: it starts with 
an empirical fact (movement; or more specifically, that everything that is moved is moved 
by something), and looks for the condition of the possibility, the ground, of this fact (the 
prime mover). What emerges is a first mover, (not an unmoved mover) which in 
Aristotle's eyes, is a logical necessity. What kind of a[tion this mover is, is uncertain. 
Aristotle calls it a "source whence" of motion [h6then he arche tes kineseos], and not a 
final ground (243a 3), which seems to indicate it is an efficient ground. 
III 
Physics Book Eight 
Book eight of the Physics draws together the theses explored in the first seven books 
of the Physics. On the basis of the sensible natural world, Aristotle offers another 
transcendental argument for the necessity of the prime mover. He also gives some 
characterization of what in the Metaphysics he names God.16 This argument begins with 
16 James McNiff (1992) argues that in this book of the Physics, Aristotle does not 
demonstrate God's existence, but presupposes it. He claims Aristotle's argument is 
ascriptive and not existential, ascribing immobility to the first mover rather than proving 
its existence. I agree that the argument is clearly not a demonstration, nor could it be, 
since God is a principle. But nor does Aristotle explicitly or logically presuppose the 
existence of a mover, except insofar as he does not admit an infinite series, and insofar 
as he posits the eternity of movement. As I will argue, the prime mover (not God) 
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the thesis that movement is eternal: the first mover that emerges from the argument is the 
ultimate reason why motion must be eternal. 
That there is movement is an empirical fact, as self-evident as the existence of 
nature; and movement is once again defined as the coming into actuality of what is 
potentially. The thrust of the argument for eternity of movement is as follows: since there 
is movement, there exist things capable of motion and things capable of being movers. 
Now if we allow that there was a first motion (as opposed to eternal movement), then 
before this change there were things capable of being moved and capable of moving. 
These things themselves must either have been engendered, in which case there must have 
been a prior change to bring them into being; or they pre-existed without change. If the 
latter is true, then a change must have occurred to put them into the condition of changing 
(25la 8-28). 
Another similar argument for the existence of eternal motion is based on the notion 
of the mover and the moved. These must be in a certain condition to be capable of 
movement- that of reciprocal proximity- and something must happen for the condition 
then to be changed in favour of movement. Thus there must be an anterior movement to 
any movement posed as first (25lb 1-9). 
A third argument is based on the eternity of time, time being the measure, or the 
'number' of movement. That time is eternal is clear from the fact that any given moment 
has time preceding and following it (251 b 10-27). 
emerges as a ground of, or condition for the possibility for, physical phenomena given 
these metaphysical constraints. 
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Movement then is eternal: this is the first step of the argument concerning the prime 
mover. In the course of answering certain objections to the thesis of eternal motion, 
Aristotle takes the second step: in the cosmos, some things are always in movement, 
others are always at rest, others are sometimes in movement and sometimes at rest (253a 
22). He then argues at length for the thesis that everything that is moved is moved by 
something. 
Aristotle begins the argument by looking at things that move. Disregarding things 
moved accidentally, he looks at the remaining "essential" kinds of change or movement: 
1) things moved unnaturally or by violence, (such as stones thrown upwards) and 2) those 
moved by nature. This latter group of self-moved things includes: 2a) self-moving things, 
such as animals, and 2b) things that have a natural movement, such as fire moving 
upwards, and earth moving downwards. Self-moving things, as was argued in chapter 
seven, require some part that is moved by another part. But the part that does the moving 
itself requires a mover. For the case of things that have natural movement (2b ), Aristotle 
enters into a discussion of act and potency (254b 33- 255a 29).17 Ultimately, it turns out 
that such things move to fulfill their essence, to actualize their potential. Thus, for 
example, fire moves upwards because it is its nature to do so; and it must do so in order 
to be what it is. But this movement also demands a mover, and that is whatever grounds 
the need for things to become what they are. 
Since a mover is required in all cases of things that move, it transpires that all ta 
phusei are moved by something. In order to avoid an infinite regress (and no infinite 
17 Thus introducing metaphysical postulates into his argument. 
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series is possible, as was established in book seven) a first mover is required. Ultimately, 
the argument then is: since there is movement, there must be a first mover. The next 
question is, what is the character of this mover? 
a) The character of the prime mover 
The first mover must cause movement without itself being moved, since if it were 
moved by something, this would only add to the concatenation: it must therefore either 
be self-moved, or unmoved. If it were self-moved, however, a part of it would have to 
move, acting on an unmoved part. Some unmoved thing must then always be present. 
Thus, the first mover must be unmoved (257a 31-258b 9). 
Aristotle now seeks to prove that the unmoved mover must be eternal, and single. 
Since we showed that there is eternal movement, there must be at least one eternal prime 
mover (258b 10). There may also be more than one, although "we ought ... to suppose 
that there is one rather than many, and a finite rather than an infinite number" (259a 8), 
because of an Aristotelian Ockham' s razor. It is sufficient that there be one. Furthermore, 
it is better for things to be simple and finite, and what is better ought to be present in the 
cosmos. 
But why must the unmoved mover be eternal? There are clearly some non-eternal 
self-movers, and non-eternal unmoved movers. These seem to be, respectively, animals 
and plants, and the vital principle or souls that direct them. 18 Could we not find grounds 
18 See here 258b 20, where he mentions unmoved movers subject to destruction; also 
and more specifically 259b 1 ff. The soul although unmoved itself, moves the body, and 
thus is itself accidentally moved. 
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for the eternity of movement thus, without recourse to an eternal unmoved mover? 
Aristotle argues that non-eternal self- or unmoved movers are not sufficient to ground the 
eternity of movement since they cannot account for the continuity and perpetual 
generation of all things. Since they are themselves subject to generation and destruction, 
they require at one time or another, a ground of their own being. Nor would a succession 
of such movers account for the continuity and eternity of change, but only for a 
successive series of changes (258b 25- 259a 6). 
This latter passage is somewhat obscure, but is key to the understanding of the role 
the unmoved mover plays in the physical universe. Why is it not enough to argue that 
change being eternal, there is an endless concatenation of changes, grounded in the 
succession of non-eternal unmoved movers, the souls of animals and the vital principle 
of plants? Reason enough is found if we look at the consequences of positing an infinite 
series. If there were no first aitfa, then all of our explanations, and all the alleged grounds 
for these explanations, would be groundless. The cosmos would be inexplicable. In a 
methodology that is focussed on seeking grounds, and explanations on the basis of these 
grounds, a first ground is required. The possibility of the cosmos being incomprehensible 
is anathema to Aristotle. Some sort of first mover is required in order to "start the series", 
and to permit that the cosmos is intelligible. 
But also significant here, and revelatory of the nature of the prime mover, is the 
argument (based on observation of the celestial spheres and not on deductive reasoning) 
that the sort of eternal movement that exists must be continuous and in a direct line from 
mover to moved. This characterization of the eternity of movement as continuous has not, 
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up to this point, been proven. Aristotle has only demonstrated that there must be eternal 
motion, in order to avoid an infinite series. There is no reason why eternal motion could 
not, according to this reasoning, be played out through a chain of successive movements. 
However, Aristotle does not permit this, for reasons I explain below. 
Aristotle has argued (at 243a ff) that the mover must be in direct contact with the 
moved, such that there is nothing between them. This is clearly the case between souls 
and bodies, and is also the case between elements in a succession of aitia. However it is 
not the case that successive motion is continuous, according to Aristotle's own definitions 
of succession [ephexes] and continuity [sunexes] (227a 6-17). Something is successive to 
another if it comes after the starting point of the other (this point determined by position 
or form or otherwise), and if there is no intermediary of the same kind separating it from 
that which it succeeds. Successive motion involves a discontinuity at least of subject or 
of kind. On the other hand, something is continuous if the limiting extreme of two things, 
the point at which they touch, are one and the same. Successive motion then involves a 
disjunction between two things; continuous movement requires that if there are two 
things, they be considered the same, or that they share the same boundary. 
Motion that is unqualifiedly one and continuous must have a specific identity, unity 
of subject (in fact it must be the same subject that moves), unity of time; in this way 
there are no lacunae in the movement, and thus no periods of rest (228b 1-11). A series 
of non-eternal unmoved movers does not qualify here: such movement involves various 
subjects, diverse identity, and (possibly) a stop-and-go temporal sequence (because, 
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following Aristotle's notion of succession, there is one subject and then another in 
motion). 
The observable movement of the celestial spheres does however meet this 
description. Furthermore, locomotion is the only continuous motion, and is thus primary 
over movement in respect of quantity and quality. Aristotle gives three arguments for the 
logical, chronological and ontological primacy of locomotion at 260a 26-261a 26. Briefly 
they are these: 1) locomotion is necessary for the existence of growth and change; no 
sensible thing could experience change of quality or quantity were it not for the primary 
local movement caused by the prime mover; 2) eternal things are subject only to 
locomotion; all other movements are related to generation, and the eternal must precede 
that which comes to be and passes away; 3) anything that is in a process of becoming is 
imperfect, since it is a "not yet"; local movement does not involve coming into form. Of 
all movements, locomotion removes the subject least from its essential nature. 
Circular motion is the primary form of locomotion, since it is the only kind that, 
being one and continuous, can be eternal and perfect (262a 27- 266a 10). In the Physics, 
Aristotle argues for the necessary existence of circular motion on the basis of the notion 
of movement. In fact, he seems to prove merely that such motion is possible, and then 
to point to its empirically verifiable existence, in the motion of the heavens. 19 
19 See also the argument in De Caelo, starting with the three premisses that: 1) there 
is such a thing as simple motion; 2) simple motion is circular; and 3) simple motion is 
the motion of a simple body. From these he concludes that there is a simple body that 
moves in a circular motion- the outermost aitherial sphere (De Caelo, 269a 2-7). 
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In book eight of the Physics there are thus three arguments for the necessity of one 
eternal unmoved mover, as opposed to many non-eternal such movers: 1) perishable 
immobile movers cannot ground the continuity of generation of animals and plants; 2) the 
nature of eternal movement, which is continuous and one, demands one mover and one 
moved; 3) non-eternal unmoved movers can move things only in a non-continuous way, 
since they are themselves subject to change, and such movement is not, strictly speaking, 
eternal. 
An eternal unmoved mover could not be said to have direct contact with terrestrial 
things, since terrestrial things are subject to periods of rest. These periods would be 
inexplicable if that which moves them is itself unchanging. Therefore, the unmoved 
mover moves something- the spheres- with a continuous direct movement. These spheres 
in tum are responsible for the movement of terrestrial things; since the spheres are 
physical entities, and themselves subject to movement and therefore change, the stop-and 
go-movement of terrestrial things finds a ground (260a 1- 20). 
In the last chapter of the Physics, Aristotle expands on the character of the first 
mover. It has no parts or magnitude. Nothing finite can account for motion over an 
infinite period of time, and in a finite magnitude there is a finite force, therefore nothing 
infinite can have a finite force (266a 11- 266b 6). Something infinite must thus have an 
infinite force, and a non-finite magnitude. But there is no such thing as an infinite 
magnitude. Therefore, the first mover, which, since it imparts infinite movement over an 
infinite period of time, has infinite force, is without magnitude (267b 18-26). 
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Aristotle repeats that because of the existence of continuous motion, which, as 
continuous, is one motion (as opposed to a consecutive series of motions which are 
several) we can conclude that the mover is one (267a 21-23). It must be unmoved, 
because it should not change with what it changes, otherwise, it will be merely part of 
a series of movers. For the motion to be uniform, the mover must not change position in 
relation to the moved. It must therefore be in one place. Circular movement must 
originate either from the centre or the circumference. Aristotle finds the prime mover 
must be on the circumference of the universe, since whatever is nearer the mover moves 
fastest (the impetus fading with distance) and the outermost sphere moves fastest (267a 
25- 267b 8).20 
So far we have gone from the eternity of movement, and the fact that everything 
that is moved is moved by something, to the necessity of a first mover. This mover must 
be unmoved, eternal and single; it must have no parts or magnitude. Now locomotion is 
the primary type of movement, and the only continuous kind of movement. Only circular 
motion can be continuous and infinite, so the primary kind of locomotion is circular. The 
prime mover moves the spheres, which exhibit this kind of motion. The prime mover is 
then a ground of the eternity of movement. How the mover moves the spheres is not 
discussed (whether it is a final or an efficient ground is unclear); it is in fact not relevant 
to the purpose of the argument here, which seeks only to show how movement is eternal. 
20 It seems strange that something that has no magnitude would actually be in a 
place, given that place is defined as "the first unmoved limit of the container" (Physics 
212a 20), meaning the boundary between a body and that which envelopes it There is 
no hint of God's physical situation in Lambda, where God as pure form appears to be 
transcendent, as well as immanent in the world through the order found there. 
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The argument in its general structure is transcendental, looking for grounds of ascertained 
facts. But not only how, but also what the mover movers is obscure. Some Greek 
cosmology will render this clearer. 
b) Excursus on Aristotelian cosmology: What the prime mover moves 
In order to understand why the mover is said to move the spheres, we must know 
something of Aristotle's cosmology. This is passed over very quickly at Phy: 260a 1-10, 
but without it, Aristotle's argument fails. It is too easy for us post-Copemicans to miss 
his argument. 
Apart from the four earthly elements, earth, water, fire and air, there is a fifth 
element or natural body, aither. Natural bodies must have simple motion, of which there 
are only two: up and down, and circular. The aither, unlike the other elements, moves in 
a circular fashion, and therefore has no contrary, and is unceasing. The body made of 
aither, an element that is neither heavy nor light, and neither generated nor destructible 
(De Caelo 269b 18- 270a 35) forms the outermost boundary of the finite universe, beyond 
which there is no time, body, void or place. If there is anything outside the boundary of 
the universe, or beyond the first aitherial body, it would certainly, notes Aristotle, be the 
highest divinity (De Caelo 279a 11-b 3).21 This latter point is significant, as Aristotle 
21 The existence of a transcendent mover in De Caelo is the subject of much debate. 
There are passages which seem to imply the necessity of such a mover for the heavenly 
system, and other passages which contradict such necessity. For a neat synopsis of these 
passages, see W.K.C. Guthrie's introduction to De Caelo, edition cited in the bibliography 
below. It does seem agreed that this early work is not incompatible with the workings of 
one or more divinities. 
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does, in book eight of the Physics "place" the prime mover on the circumference of the 
universe. 
This outermost sphere contains within it the fixed stars, which are then moved by 
the motion of the aither in rotation. In concentric spheres within the boundary of the first 
heaven are the spheres containing each of the planets, each planet being fixed in a number 
of spheres, which accounts for the irregularity of planetary motion. The planets 
themselves do not move, then, but are subject to the motion of the spheres in which they 
are fixed. These spheres are in tum moved by the more quickly moving outermost sphere. 
From the most outer region, and approaching the centre of the universe, we pass from the 
most unchangeable eternal movement (the sphere containing the stars), to that which has 
irregular movement (the spheres containing the planets and the moon), through the regions 
of the four elements, subject to rectilinear motion, and then to the fixed earth at the 
centre.22 
This being said, it is perhaps clearer what it is that the unmoved mover in fact 
moves. It is responsible for the turning of the outermost sphere, that moves in a regular 
and eternal motion. This in tum moves the outermost spheres of the sun, moon and 
planets. The innermost spheres controlling the motions of these latter are moved by other 
22 There is a neat argument here with a transcendental tum: Everything that rotates 
must have a fixed centre, hence the earth is fixed in the centre of the outermost sphere. 
Earth has a contrary, fire (which moves up in contrast to the earth's downward motion). 
Air and water are intermediaries, and together the four elements are responsible for 
coming to be and passing away, since they have motions that are not circular, and thus 
not eternal. The ultimate explanation of generation is however the secondary motions of 
the inner planets and the sun and moon: which must be since there must be generation-
and generation must be since it is a necessary consequence of the being of the earth, 
which in turn must be, if there is to be eternal motion (De Caelo 286a 3- 286b 9). 
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unmoved movers, which by the movement they inspire are responsible for terrestrial 
changes. The prime mover then excites the primary form of motion, that is, eternal 
circular motion of the outermost sphere, which moves the other outer spheres. The 
planets, sun and moon also have their own eternal unmoved movers, which causes their 
special movements. These movements inspire terrestrial change.23 
The Aristotelian vision of the physical world as a constant process of change is 
powerful. The incessant movement within all natural things, affecting all natural things, 
is an ongoing shift from potentiality to actuality. The implications of this movement for 
theology are drawn out in the Metaphysics, but appear already in the Physics with 
Aristotle's definitions of phusis and kfnesis, and in his use in Physics VIII of the 
act\potency relationship to account for movement in natural bodies. Otherwise, the 
arguments for the prime mover in the Physics are quite independent of metaphysical 
notions. They are focussed on the ground of movement conceived primarily as 
locomotion. 
The continuing cycle of generation and destruction, the eternal movement of ousfai 
reaching entelechy, becoming what they are as dictated by their inherited form, is the true 
23 The existence of a plurality of unmoved movers is taken here from a reading of 
De Caelo (esp. 286a 3- 286 b 9) and Metaphysics Lambda. It is not clear in the Physics 
that there is more than one unmoved mover, although it is certain that there is one 
primary unmoved mover (238 b 10-12). The Physics does not discuss how the unmoved 
mover imparts movement. In De Generatione et Corruptione, it is the annual elliptical 
rotation of the sun that acts as the efficient explanation of terrestrial change. The 
perpetual and uninterrupted coming-to-be of terrestrial change is "the closest 
approximation that God could make to eternal being" (336b 35). Thus God is the 
(efficient?) explanation of change on earth. 
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natural movement of terrestrial beings; but this remams largely unexplained in the 
Physics. Phusis there is a principle that is described as the eternal movement [kfnesis] of 
becoming, a becoming that is what it means for sensible ousfai to be, as natural beings. 
Physics does not need to explain, but only to identify, its principles. Thus it does not 
focus on why there is movement in ousfa, but on why there is movement as such. But the 
essential characterization of ta phusei as kinetic raises the question of the direction 
towards which the process unfolds. 
The response necessitates a step outside the physical processes of becoming, to a 
being that is static. The movement of becoming, a movement that is jagged, interrupted 
as it is by death and reproduction, is maintained by an eternal smooth and continuous 
motion, the movement of the celestial spheres. This latter movement is grounded in the 
Physics by an eternal unmoved mover, situated in a place, yet without magnitude or time. 
The physical realm is, we saw, at its root determined by a non-physical component. This 
non-physical being is shown in the Metaphysics to ground the form of ous[a. The search 
for grounds within the physical realm, the aetiological thrust ever-present in Aristotle's 
writings leads to a being that we will see is developed in the Metaphysics as divine. 24 
Aetiology leads again to theology. 
I will now look at book Lambda of the Metaphysics to see how the non-physical 
being of the Physics is conceived as a part of the metaphysical grounding of the cosmos. 
24 Physics argues from the occurrence of motion to a primary explanation of that 
motion. The prime mover turns out in the science of theology to be God, but the being 
of God cannot be developed within physics. On this point see Lang (1978) p.516: 
"Theology completes physics without destroying the status of physics as an independent 
theoretical science"; also de Corte (1931) p.106 ff. 
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I will argue that as explanatory of ousia, the prime mover or God is essential to 
Aristotle's science of being qua being. 
IV 
God in Book Lambda of the Metaphysics 
The discussion of the Metaphysics in chapter two left us with the question of how 
to find grounds for the continued appearance of form in individual sensible ous{a, a 
question that has recurred in the context of the Physics. I will argue that as the prime 
mover, God, is an aition of the eternal shift from potentiality to actuality, the attainment 
of form, that characterizes sensible ousfa. As pure form, God is the formal ground of the 
continued manifestation of form in the cosmos. As the good, that to which all things tend, 
God is the final ground of movement. Also, as pure actuality, God is in a sense the 
efficient ground of generation. Since knowledge of universals begins with the 
apprehension of form in particulars, God is also explanatory of the possibility of universal 
knowledge. As such, God is the first principle of the science of being qua being, and 
knowledge of God is prior to knowledge of the axioms. 
We have seen that seeking grounds of the physical world leads to the logical 
necessity of a prime mover. The argument in book Lambda is not different in its general 
structure, but it focusses more explicitly on ousia and its attributes, and incorporates 
metaphysical postulates. It grounds the movement of ousia not as locomotion, but as shift 
from potency to actuality. Since the Metaphysics is not restricted to seeking grounds of 
the physical world, it is also able to name the first mover "God". In Book Lambda, the 
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prime mover is no longer conceived only as an abstract a[tion of the workings of the 
physical world on the periphery of the universe. Here it appears explicitly as an ous[a: 
and ous[a and its archai kai a[tia is expressly said to be the subject of the Metaphysics. 
The three kinds of ous[a listed in Lambda are: 1) the eternal sensible; 2) the 
perishable sensible; and 3) the non-sensible and immutable. The first is the subject of 
cosmology, treated in De Caelo; the second is the subject of physics, and the last belongs 
to "some other science'', clearly the first science under study in the Metaphysics (1069a 
30-1069b 8). But the study of being qua being must incorporate a study of all three. And, 
since knowledge begins with perception, we begin with the study of sensible ous[a, and 
looks for its grounds. 
Now sensible ous[a is subject to change [metabole]. As in the Physics (book five), 
change is always between contraries; something changes from one thing into its contrary, 
and some substratum -matter- changes and remains when the contrary remains.25 All 
change is from what is potentially to what is actually. Generation, we saw, is a type of 
change. Ous[ai are generated by something that has the same name, either by nature (as 
the parent begets the offspring and thus is in a sense the same), by chance or 
spontaneously, or by techne. All generation is then the product of a change in something 
25 What Aristotle says about change here is consistent with, and even a repetition of 
what he said about change in Physics five and Kappa. Here, however, he discusses change 
[metabole], and not movement [kfnesis], thus he includes the generation and destruction 
of ous[a in his discussion. 
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that was already there.26 In fact Aristotle does not believe that there was ever a time in 
which all things came to be; apart from his explicit statements to that effect, 27 this is clear 
on the basis of the eternity of movement and time. The prime mover, God, is therefore 
not, for Aristotle, a creator. He is not the proximate cause of generation. However, we 
will see that the prime mover is indirectly an efficient a{tion, a ground of the eternal 
cycle of generation and corruption, by being a final and formal ground. 
At Lambda 1071 b 3, Aristotle begins his argument for the necessity of the eternal 
prime mover as a ground of sensible ous{a. It begins with the eternal cycle of generation 
and corruption. Sensible ous{a are of course perishable, since matter is subject to change. 
But if all ous{ai were perishable, then all things would be perishable, given that ous{a is 
the primary reality. But neither time nor motion can be generated or destroyed. It is 
impossible that time were generated, for then there would have had to be a time before 
time; equally, time cannot be destroyed, for this would involve there being a time after 
time.28 Now time is either the same thing as motion, or an attribute of it; motion must 
therefore be continuous, as is time. The only form of continuous motion is local motion, 
26 This is why at 1069b 35, Aristotle says that neither proximate matter nor proximate 
form is generated. See also Zeta 1033a 24-1034a 2; Eta 1042a 31-2. The concrete thing, 
the combination of matter and form is generated, but not matter or form as such (in the 
individual or as universal). 
27 See for example his argument against the creation of the world in De Caelo 279b 
12ff. 
28 This is clearly a petitio principii argument, since Aristotle argues against the 
possibility of a beginning of tim\e on the basis of time. 
141 
and the only continuous form of local motion is circular.29 There must therefore be an 
eternal circular motion. 
Since there is eternal motion, there must be an eternal ousia that produces motion. 
The Platonic forms, which are eternal ousia, do not work as explanatory of motion since 
they do not have a principle of motion that can ground change. Now the eternal ousia that 
produces motion must do so not only potentially, but actually, since something that has 
potentiality may not exercise it. Also the essence of such an ousia must be actuality, 
because if its essence were potentiality, then it could potentially not be. But there is 
eternal movement, so there must then be something (or some things)30 of which the 
essence is actuality. Such things must be immaterial, since matter is potentiality, and thus 
subject to change; that is, generation and destruction. If eternal ous{a were subject to this 
kind of change, we would have to posit something that is responsible for the change, and 
would then be returned to the beginning. Actuality must precede potentiality, otherwise, 
it would be possible that all things not yet be, whereas it is manifest that there are things. 
There must then be an actual ground prior to potential being, a prime mover whose 
essence is actuality prior to the potentially moved. 
Turning to empirical evidence, we can see by the motion of the celestial objects that 
there is in fact unceasing circular motion. There must therefore be something that moves 
the heavens without itself being moved, something eternal, that is an ousia, and actual 
29 See Phys: 26la 31-263a 3; 264a 7-265a 12. 
30 Aristotle shifts to the plural at this point in the argument, (I 071 b 21) anticipating 
discussion of the movers of the spheres. 
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[energefa] (1072a 25). The prime mover is pure form, pure actuality, non-sensible, 
eternal.31 
Let's analyze the argument. It is transcendental in form, since it starts with that 
which has to be grounded: the eternal cycle of sensible ousfa coming to be and passing 
away. The first question is, how can form persist through generation and destruction? In 
other words, since all sensible beings have the potential not to be, why is this potential 
not realized all at the same time, so that all beings are extinct? The answer is that time 
and motion are eternal; these cannot not be. The eternal form of motion is motion in a 
circle; this requires that there be something eternal that moves in a circle. These are the 
spheres. 
The second step of the argument looks for a ground of eternal motion. This is found 
by positing eternal movers that move the spheres. These movers, to be eternal, must be 
immaterial, since matter is potential, and is potential to not be. The third step of the 
argument looks for a ground of the movement of the movers. The prime mover must be 
pure form, since matter is potential; it must be fully actual, since if it were potentially, 
then it could potentially not be; it must be eternal, in order to ground eternal movement. 
31 Aristotle argues that there is more than one unmoved mover, although there is only 
one prime mover. The prime mover explains the primary form of eternal motion, which 
is one and continuous, that is, the movement of the first heaven containing the fixed stars. 
But every eternal motion requires an eternal explanation, and since the planets also 
revolve in eternal motions, there must be an unmoved mover for each of the simple 
motions that move them. Each of these must be an essential unmovable and eternal ousfa, 
since 1) the heavens are eternal moved ousfa; and since 2) what moves is prior to the 
moved; and since 3) an ous[a must move an ousfa. Astronomical calculations ostensibly 
report there are 55 or 47 of these unmoved movers. 
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And unlike the other movers, it must be unmoved, since otherwise it will require a mover, 
and we will have an infinite series of movers, which is impossible. 
The prime mover, as pure eternal form that grounds the eternity of motion, grounds 
the continued manifestation of form in sensible things, and is thus a formal ground of 
sensible ousfa. The prime mover is also a final ground, explanatory of the shift from 
potentiality to actuality in sensible ousfa. The way in which the first mover moves things 
is by being the object of desire and comprehension [to orekton kai to noeton]. The 
primary objects of desire and comprehension are the same: the real good, object of the 
rational will, as opposed to the apparent good, object of appetite. Desire thus depends on 
thought, and thought is moved by the intelligible. The objects of nous are positive and 
intelligible objects. Primary amongst these is ousfa, and the primary amongst ousfa is that 
which is simple, not combined with matter, but immaterial and actual. Thought is 
primarily moved then by simple and actual ousfa, the telos of desire, and thus good. The 
primary unmoved ous[a as the good is a final ground since it is the object of thought and 
desire, that which moves thought and desire without itself being moved.32 
Things that are moved are subject to potentiality, since they can be otherwise than 
they are. The unmoved mover, on the other hand, cannot be otherwise than as it is. It 
therefore exists necessarily, and as necessary, is good. Since things tend towards the good, 
the good is a principle of movement ( 1072b 10-12). It moves by being the object of love, 
32 The movers of the spheres incite a form of desire in the spheres themselves, since 
they are final explanations of the spheres (1074a 25-8). This seems to imply that the stars 
are capable of desire, and thus have life; this is indeed said to be the case in De Caelo 
292a 21. Amongst the movers, there is one primary unmoved mover, however, that as 
pure form, is the final explanation of the sensible world. 
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unlike other things which cause motion by their own motion. The prime mover is thus 
"the first principle on which depend the sensible universe and the world of nature" ( 1072b 
14). 
In a limited way, the prime mover is also a material ground; not in that it grounds 
the presence of matter in the universe or insensible things, but that as pure form and 
actuality, it grounds the continued presence of matter, potentiality, and prevents, by its 
presence, the unified mass annihilation of all things. It grounds eternal motion, which 
itself means there must always be things that move. These non-sensible movers in turn 
ground the continued cycle of movement of sensible things. 
The prime mover, itself an ous{a, is thus primarily a formal and final ground of 
ous{a. But now let's look at the character of the prime mover, and why Aristotle calls it 
God. 
Aristotle writes that the prime mover, having no matter, is in complete actuality, and 
is therefore one in number and definition. In consequence, there is only one universe, that 
which is eternally in continuous motion. Many universes would involve many moving 
principles, and this is impossible, since they would then have to have matter to be 
distinguished one from the other (1074a 32-38).33 
33 This argument does not hold, since in fact Aristotle has said that there are other 
unmoved movers which are free of matter. However Ross convincingly suggests that we 
can still maintain that there is one universe by recourse to the concept of intelligible 
matter, which is what unites species in a genus. The intelligible forms would, as a 
plurality, contain this form of matter, and thus not be pure forms (Ross: 1970, p.cxi). As 
well, since the intelligences are moved by desire for the first mover- something that is 
other than what they are- they contain potentiality. They are therefore not wholly actual 
as is God. 
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The "course of life" [diagoge] of the prime mover is like ours is at its best, 
perpetual wakefulness and thinking [nous].34 The prime mover is always in the state of 
pleasure that results from engaging in the most perfect activity, since it is always in 
actuality.35 The best or highest form of activity is active contemplation [theorfa], and the 
highest form of thinking is of what is best The prime mover therefore, being pure 
actuality, and thus the highest of all things, engages in thought The best object of thought 
is the prime mover itself, therefore, the prime mover thinks itself: it is its own object of 
thought through participation in the object of thought Thought and object of thought are 
thus one in the prime mover. 
Aristotle names this prime mover which has thought of itself as its eternal activity, 
God (1072b 29), since activity, not potency, is the divine aspect of thought; and God is 
fully active. He also argues that God must also have life [zoe]. The actuality of thought 
is life, and God is that actuality, which has continuous eternal existence, and which is 
separate from sensible things. He has no magnitude: the prime mover cannot have a finite 
magnitude, since it would then not have the infinite power to account for eternal motion, 
nor can it have an infinite magnitude since there is no such thing. It is unalterable and 
impassive, since such change would imply movement, and potentiality. 
34 On diagoge see Brague (1988), pp. 437-446. 
35 Cf: Nichomachean Ethics: The most perfect activity directed to the best of objects 
is always the most perfect and most pleasant (NE. 1174b 15-24); also l 154b 24-8: "If any 
man had a simple nature, the same activity would afford him the greatest pleasure always. 
Hence God enjoys a single simple pleasure perpetually. For there is not only ah activity 
of motion, but also an activity of immobility, and there is essentially a truer pleasure in 
rest than in motion". 
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The supreme intellect that grounds movement is also named nous (1074b 15-16). 
Since it cannot change, or be dependent on anything but itself, the comprehension of this 
supreme nous is directed at itself as thinking. Its thinking is thus a thinking of thinking 
[estin he n6esis noeseos n6esis] (1074b 35). If it thought nothing, it would be no better 
than one asleep. If its thought were determined by something else, then its essence would 
be potentiality, and it could no longer be considered the best reality. If it were 
potentiality, it could equally actualize the worst as the best of things. 
How can it be that the object of thought and the thought itself are one? This strange 
notion becomes clearer if we recall the epistemological theory of De Anima. In his study 
of human psychology, Aristotle notes that passive nous becomes its object in the moment 
of knowing. The agent intellect grasps the form of the object of cognition, and in a sense 
becomes that form, leaving behind the object's matter. Thus actual knowledge and the 
object of knowledge are identical (DA 430a 20). The mind itself has no character of its 
own. Similarly, in the realm of sensation, the activity of the sensation and the sensible 
object are one and the same (though their essence is not); thus the sound heard and the 
actual sound are the same (DA 425b 27). 
With regard to the prime mover, the activity of thought and the thought that is 
thought is identical, although in this case the essence of both, actuality, is also the same. 
There is only one thought: it is both the thought being thought, and the thinking of the 
thought: thinking constitutes its own object. "Thought thinking itself' does not mean that 
there is a split between subject and object, as in self-reflection "f' think about "me". It 
means rather that there is only thinking about the highest and most perfect principle and 
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the good. But since God is the most universal principle, and most perfect, then for him 
knowing himself as principle means knowing what comes under the principle.36 The 
thinking proceeds through eternity. 
As the supreme good, God exists both separate from the universe, and as the 
immanent pervading order in the universe. 1) His separateness is similar to the way that 
the good of an army depends on the general, and not vice versa, the general himself being 
separate and independent, and of a greater order of good than the army (1075a 12-17). 
2) God's immanence in the world is possible only in the sense that the working of the 
cosmos, the order found there, is in some way effectuated, or at least maintained, by his 
being as telos. Because God is, the cosmos is rationally comprehensible to human beings; 
as first cause, God prevents the disaster of the infinite series, which would result in an 
incomprehensible universe. On the other hand, since Aristotle has effectively argued that 
God is an ous[a, God cannot be "present" in the world as an abstraction. Order in the 
world can be traced back to him as actuality and object of desire and emulation, but 
cannot be identified with him. As pure form and telos, God is transcendent to the world. 
36 See De Koninck, 1994: De Koninck argues that as perfect, where perfect is defined 
as "that from which nothing is wanting", the thinking of thinking must be not merely 
knowledge of the good, but of all the effects of the good also. God, he argues, is not a 
"heavenly Narcissus", but is aware of his own effects. This notion of perfection, however, 
has scant grounds in Aristotle's text, (actuality involves perfection in kind rather than 
perfection per se) but is a graft from Medieval thought. Given Aristotle's characterization 
of the prime mover\God, the question of whether God can be passive with respect to his 
finite and material effects is uppermost in deciding his relation to material beings. God 
cannot be aware of change (and thus of finite beings) without undergoing some change 
in himself, which is impossible; this has always been a troubling aspect of Aristotle's God 
for Christian theologians. 
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Aristotle's metaphysical grounding of the physical world demands a non-physical 
being, and is in fact permeated through and through with this requirement. Though this 
God might be rather disappointing from a religious standpoint, it is entirely satisfactory 
from the standpoint of ontotheology. In the preceding pages, I have argued that God is 
an essential part of Aristotle's ontology by drawing out the ways in which ontology 
necessarily involves theology at every step. Because ontology is focussed on ousiology, 
and because of Aristotle's method of episteme as aetiology, I was led to the study of the 
grounds of ousfa. This in tum led to the primary ground of ous{a, which is the unmoved 
mover, or God. God is an ous{a, and thus belongs to the study of being. Ontology, unlike 
physics, does not need to step outside of itself in order to ground its archai kai aftia. 
Rather, God is brought into ontology, or is an essential part of ontology. Aristotle's 
ontology is ontotheology, because it requires a notion of an eternal, non-sensible, 
immutable, transcendent being to ground its subject matter. The study of ontology and 
theology in Aristotle are unified. 
For Aristotle, God is the ground, aftion, of the workings of the physical universe, 
but he is also an indemonstrable principle, an arche. Principles relate to scientific and 
universal knowledge; they make possible knowledge of universal grounds. God is an 
arche since the existence of pure form makes universal knowledge of form possible. 
Universal knowledge is based on the apprehension of form in an individual ous{a, which 
we then relate to its potential occurrence in other ousfai. As the primary formal ground, 
God is responsible for the continued presence of form in sensible ousfa, and consequently 
for the possibility of universal knowledge. As the supreme object of thought, and the 
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ultimate final ground, God attracts us towards our rational telos of understanding. God 
is thus the principle of comprehensibility of the rational cosmos. Therefore, the axioms, 
those archa{ common to all sciences and which make scientific reasoning possible, are 
subservient to the supreme principle of God. If universal knowledge were not possible, 
then nor would demonstration, which requires the axioms, be possible. 
We know God not through induction or deduction, but by a noetic leap from his 
effects that we see in the world, to God as the ground of these effects. We comprehend 
him, as we comprehend any principle, that is, we have some grasp of his necessity, given 
the existence of observable ousfa. But we cannot explain him, or have knowledge of his 
grounds. As a supreme arche that is itself an a{tion, God does not admit of grounds, since 
then that ground would require ground. As the ultimate ground, and as that which makes 
grounding possible, God is both primary a{tion and arche of being qua being. 
In the second division of my dissertation, I will discuss Heidegger's ontology, an 
ontology that, though it has drawn from Aristotle, no longer has recourse to a God. I will 
argue that Heidegger's ontology is godless because of his method, which no longer seeks 
explanatory grounds. In the place of the eternity of movement, which as that to be 
grounded, drives Aristotle's arguments, we will discover radical finitude- and its 
consequences for Heidegger's conception of human being. 
PART TWO 
HEIDEGGER 
The Why has a primordially practical sense. 1 
Throughout part one of this dissertation, I argued that the search for grounds, and 
primarily the search for the formal ground or essential nature of ous{a, drives the science 
of being qua being and unifies Aristotle's ontology by unifying the various ways in which 
being is said. The structure of the cosmos as Aristotle sees it requires a primary ground, 
which emerges as the necessary outcome of a scientific, transcendental questioning of the 
being of entities. The discussion of Aristotle's methodology in chapter one was aimed at 
demonstrating the importance of theoretical episteme for Aristotle's conception of 
ontology. In chapter two, I argued that it is Aristotle's preoccupation with the search for 
grounds that leads him to describe the many ways in which being is said as gathered in 
a pros hen unity focussed on ous{a. Chapter three focussed on how the kinetic structure 
of sensible ous{a, its presence as movement and change, is itself grounded in immobile 
ous{a, a prime mover, a first cause, God. 
In this second part, I turn to Heidegger's attempt to find some kind of unity in the 
meaning of being. The question of the unity of modes of being took hold of Heidegger 
1 Heidegger: Phenomenological Investigations with Respect to Aristotle 1922 (PIA): 
40\385. 
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through his famous reading in 1907 of Brentano's dissertation on the several senses of 
being in Aristotle. Heidegger gives a phenomenological tum to the Greek question of 
beingness, a turn he claims was already there, though not thematized, in Aristotle. On this 
view, Aristotle focussed on the ways of manifestation of phainomena, ta onta, and 
interpreted these according to the ways in which they are seen to appear: as being true, 
as act: and potency, as according to the categories, as accidental. They manifest 
themselves to human being through the modes of logos, which is thus the letting-be-seen 
of phainomena. To on legetai pollachos: by this phrase, Aristotle concentrates on the 
diverse modes of being, and seeks their unity through the expression of theoretical logos: 
epistenie, nous, and ultimately sophfa, as the unity of these two. 
According to Heidegger, Aristotle's error, which prevented him from asking the 
question of being in a radical way, was that he did not think outside the bounds of 
categories of being and the totality of beings, this latter gathered through the logical-
conceptual and actual existence of God. And the reason for this is that he did not examine 
the unity of the understanding of being, that is the unity of the modes of logos as 
involved in the revealing of what entities are. The complex linkage between the revealing 
of entities and entities as revealed is grounded, for Heidegger, in a kinetic understanding 
of being, that complements the kinetic presence that (sensible) ousia in Aristotle implies. 
In Being and Time Heidegger translates the Greek phrase to on tegetai pollachos 
thus: ' ... an entity can show itself from itself in many ways, depending in each case on the 
kind of access we have to it" (SZ 28/51). The second part of the sentence is key for an 
unders. tanding of how Heidegger transforms Aristotle's project, by transforming his very 
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approach to the question of being. Heidegger's question is no longer simply, "what is the 
unity of these ways that being (to on) is "said"?, or "what are the grounds of ousfa?". The 
question for Heidegger concerns rather what ous(a, as the analogical unity of all ways of 
being means. Since logos is a reading of phain6mena, and since it is human beings who 
do the reading, the question is, "what does the being of beings mean for human beings?" 
Since for Heidegger, being is the meaning or intelligibility of the unity of beingness, in 
questioning being, we must ask about the structure of human access to being. 
For Aristotle, to seek the condition of possibility of being is to look for a ground 
of beings as eternally in movement. Aristotle's primary ground, which serves also as a 
principle of universal knowledge, is God. For Heidegger, on the other hand, the question 
is not why we understand beings or why beings are as they are. Rather, to look for the 
condition of the possibility of being is to find how it is that we understand beings. He 
seeks the possible horizon for the understanding of being, and his answer is time: human 
beings' kinetic access to beings as kinetic. 
Heidegger's transformation of Aristotle's question provokes the thematization of a 
form of truth that, though present in Aristotle, was not developed in his thinking of being: 
it invokes both sides of the equation entities and access, and unifies them. At the same 
time, it is the thematization of disclosure, or aletheia, that guides Heidegger's inquiry, and 
opens the way to an understanding of being that permits justification of Heidegger's bold 
assertion that the question of [the meaning of] being has long been forgotten. Perhaps it 
is not so much that Heidegger's question has been forgotten, as that it has never before 
been asked. 
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The main thrust of this second part of the dissertation is not Heidegger's 
interpretation of Aristotle. However, certain aspects of it will necessarily emerge, 
particularly as I want to show how much of Heidegger's thinking in the period that I treat 
here is a "destructive retrieve" of Aristotle. My aim, however, is not to show what 
Heidegger thinks about Aristotle, so much as to show how the two thinkers compare on 
the question of being and the relation of being to a notion of God. I argue that the 
difference in outcome is largely a product of a different methodological approach to the 
question of being. Method transforms the question itself, from one of grounds of the unity 
of ways that being can be said; to one of description of how human discourse about being 
is possible. 
The three chapters of this second part thus follow the structure of the first chapters: 
they deal respectively with method, being and God. In chapter four, I discuss Heidegger's 
phenomenological method and its essential relation to his conception of ontology. 
Phenomenological method in Heidegger's conception necessarily involves thematization 
of the one who is questioning. In chapter five, I look at the structures of human being that 
reveal its radical finitude. I show how Heidegger, because of his thematization of the role 
of finite human being in disclosing the truth of being, transforms certain of Aristotle's 
notions. For Heidegger possibility has primacy over actuality, the finite over the eternal, 
and praxis over theory. In my final chapter, six, I argue that the "metaphysical" God, an 
eternal pure actuality, has no place in Heidegger's ontology. But in the final section of 
that chapter, I explore possible directions for a re-integration of the concept of God into 
phenomenology through a revised notion of the infinite. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
Heidegger's Method 
Phenomenology as Ontology 
My main topic in this chapter is how Heidegger's methodological approach to the 
question of being affects the outcome of his research. This question must be asked in 
order to contrast his ontology with that of Aristotle from an external point of view. 
Answering such a question involves discussion of what Heidegger means by 
"phenomenology", and in particular, what the application of this way of thinking means 
for his area of study. 2 
Since Heidegger identifies ontology and phenomenology, this chapter cannot be 
concerned with methodology without at the same time exposing the outlines of 
Heidegger's understanding of ontology. Heidegger starts Being and Time with the 
assertion that we must ask the question of the meaning of being. The reason why the 
question is necessary can be seen to emerge from a hard look at the meaning of 
phenomenology. The relationship between phenomenology and ontology will necessarily 
lead me to outline the general task of the analytic of Dasein. Such an inquiry will also 
2 I restrict myself here as elsewhere to Heidegger's published works and courses up 
to the early 1930' s. His summer course of 1925, published now as the Prolegomena to 
the History of the Concept of Time [GA20] is where the most explicit outline of the sense 
and task of phenomenology is to be found; this is treated also in Being and Time (1927). 
Some other courses from around this period also reveal the link between phenomenology 
and ontology. 
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make it clear that "being" in Heidegger is neither hypostatized nor seen as teleologically 
dependent on a supreme instantiation. 
I begin the chapter then with a discussion of the meaning of the term 
"phenomenology" and how it relates to apophansis; I follow in section two with a short 
expose of basic concepts of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. This will make it easier 
to understand what Heidegger means by "hermeneutic", the topic of section three. A 
resume of what Heidegger calls the three major discoveries of phenomenology follows 
in section four. Finally, in section five, I close with a discussion of truth, aletheia. 
Throughout the chapter, I will attempt to show how Heidegger's thematization of 
the human pre-understanding of being and the pre-predicative comportment related to it 
represents a shift from Aristotle's privileging of the theoretical understanding towards a 
privileging of practical comportment. This will clear the way for a discussion in the next 
chapter of the way in which the theory\practice distinction finds a unified ground in the 
authentic praxis of finite kinetic transcendence. The finite field of transcendence will 
explain why Heidegger's ontology is no longer ontotheology, as we will see in chapter 
six. 
I 
Phenomenology 
In his course of summer 1925, Heidegger writes that phenomenology itself has 
become unphenomenological, remaining within the limitations of the old tradition, and 
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therefore not following its own maxim, "to the things themselves" (GA20: 178\128). 3 It 
has suffered from two fundamental neglects: that of the question of being as such; and 
that of the being of the intentional. This does not mean that there has been some chance 
blindness on the part of thinkers throughout history. It is rather the case that the omission 
of these questions is a result of the very constitution of human Dasein, through the mode 
of being of falling [Verfallen]. It is, in other words, quite natural to us to be absorbed in 
the traditions that we inherit, to be a product of our times and our historical roots, and 
thus to no longer be able to see outside the paradigm that has been handed down to us. 
The only way of escape, if indeed there is one,4 is by rebelling against the tendency to 
fallenness. 
Such a rebellion does not consist in throwing away the tradition, a move that is 
certainly impossible, since "wir sind diese Vergangenheit selbst" (Sophistes GA19: 10) 
but in approaching it again, seeking to find the possibilities within the "matters 
themselves" (including ourselves) that have been obscured by the tradition (and by 
received opinion). Keeping these possibilities open constitutes the work of 
phenomenology. The radical work of phenomenology involves then a repetition of the 
ancient questions, in particular a "retaking of the beginning of our scientific philosophy" 
in Plato and Aristotle (GA20: 184\136). The reason to ask the question of being is not 
3 Cited pagination of Heidegger's texts give the German page number first, followed 
by the corresponding page in the English translation. A single cited number refers to the 
German text. 
4 Heidegger writes that the alternative to being condemned to, or called by, the power 
of the historical Dasein is "perhaps even ... no longer a genuine one" (GA20: 182\131). 
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just because the Greeks asked it, or because it opens a new path for phenomenology, 
however. It must be asked because it is a possibility of our own being, one that 
phenomenology, as a methodological concept (GA20: 185\136), as "the name for the 
method of ontology" (Basic Problems of Phenomenology, GA24: 27\20), opens up by 
opening up our awareness of the pre-understanding of being that is foundational to our 
being what we are. The question of being arises not as "an optional and merely possible 
question, but the most urgent question inherent in the very sense of phenomenology 
itself'(GA20: 158\115). Heidegger writes that there is no ontology awngside a 
phenomenology. Rather "scientific ontology is nothing but phenomenology"(GA20: 
98\72).5 
Reduction, construction and destruction constitute the three essential and inseparable 
components of phenomenological method (GA24 29-32\21-23). Reduction in the 
Heideggerian sense is the movement back from the original apprehension of a being to 
the understanding of the being of this being: unlike Husserl's reduction, it does not 
involve retreat to an ego removed from the practical world. Like Husserl's, however, it 
requires a step back from the "natural attitude", in this case the received tradition, towards 
meaning discovered on the basis of the phenomena themselves. Construction is the work 
of bringing being to view from the entities in which it is manifest; but it is at the same 
time a de-construction of the traditional concepts that block our view. Destruction is the 
name for this critical process of finding the original sources of concepts handed down by 
the tradition. Heidegger's task is "to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology" 
5 CF. SZ: 35\60: "Only as phenomenology is ontology possible." 
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(SZ: 22\44). This destruction is not a wholesale burning of the tradition, but an attempt 
to get to the original experiences that set the tradition in motion.6 So let us look at what 
the word "phenomenology" means when we follow Heidegger in retrieving it from its 
Greek origins. 
Discussion of the two parts of the word "phenomeno-logy" and its composite 
meaning refers us to section seven of Being and Time as well as section nine of the 1925 
course. The Greek word phain6menon is a participle of phafnesthai, meaning, in the 
middle voice, to show itself, make itself manifest, be visible in itself. This word has its 
root in the noun phos, light. Phain6menon can therefore be said to mean what shows 
itself; the Greeks called the totality of such things ta 6nta, beings or entities. The way in 
which something shows itself is dependent on our access to it; phenomenology is thus "a 
mode of encounter of entities in themselves such that they show themselves"(GA20: 
112\81). Now an entity can either show itself as it is, or else it can show itself as 
something it is not. This second way of showing, which is a privative modification of the 
authentic meaning of phenomenon, we call semblance or seeming [Schein], as a 
pretension to be manifest without really being so. There is a structural interconnection 
between these two, since clearly in order for something to be identified as seeming to be 
something, it must also be seen that it merely seems to be: its very showing itself as what 
it is not includes a reference to what it is. Semblance refers to a double-layered perception 
6 Cf. PIA: 21\371. See also Courtine (1988) p.86: " ... se mettre a l'ecoute du grec, 
c'est deja pour Heidegger s'engager phenomenologiquement dans l'affaire de la 
phenomenologie." 
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of a single phenomenon that does reveal itself, but under a different aspect than what it 
in fact is. 
This is not the case in appearance [Erscheinung]. Appearance indicates a reference 
relation within an entity, and not the entity showing itself as itself or as what it is not. 
Except in the very special and exclusive sense that indicates something showing itself 
through its appearance, an appearance is not a genuine phenomenon. We can distinguish 
several senses of appearance to demonstrate this: 1) the manifestation of something which 
refers to something else which does not itself appear, as for example a symptom indicates 
a disease; 2) the means through which something that does not show itself as it is, is 
announced, such as for example the disease showing itself only through its symptoms; 3) 
mere appearance in the Kantian contrast between the phenomenal and the noumenal. Here, 
the noumenal does not show itself, but is only announced through the phenomenal. 
Appearance in this case refers to a visible aspect "bringing forth" some underlying real 
entity-in-itself that cannot itself be made manifest, and which one thinks of as in some 
way essentially other, more complete, than its "mere appearance" (SZ: 30-31\ 53-4). 
There are then two levels of being implied in "appearance": there is 1) the "real" 
truly ontological but unknowable entity, which lies behind 2) the experientially 
encountered appearance. To concentrate on appearance in the three senses listed above 
is to avoid the "matters themselves", the phenomena, das Sich-an-ihm-selbst-zeigende, 
which are the subject of phenomenology. Appearance paradoxically indicates an entity 
that does not show itself in the sense of phain6menon- that is, from itself- but that merely 
announces itself through something else. But what is interesting is that phenomena even 
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in these "hidden" modes still manifest themselves in some way. The phenomena to be 
studied in phenomenology are often in some way hidden: it is rather the exception that 
the things to be analyzed are there before us simply to be encountered. Our way of access 
to the phenomena is a struggle involving thinking that attempts not only to free itself 
from preconceptions but to penetrate the layers that obscure the free manifestation of 
entities. 
This process or access is described in the second component of the word 
phenomenology, logos. The Greek word springs from the verb legein, "to bind together", 
which acquires the meaning of "to discourse". This does not for the Greeks mean simply 
to express or exchange words. There is a very strict relationship (a binding) between 
logos and what is the case in the world; between discourse and truth; between what is 
said and what is. The function of discourse is- as Plato says- to make manifest, [deloun] 
what is being talked about. Logos is always logos ... tinos: discourse is always about 
something, but it is guided by its subject, which gives the words that make up the 
ensemble of a discourse their unity (Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, GA21: p.142). 
In De Interpretatione, Aristotle calls this apophainesthai. Taking this in its component 
parts, we find apo, "out of' or "drawn from", and the familiar phainesthai, "to make 
seen"; thus apophainesthai is to make seen from out of what is.7 Let's see how this 
relates to language. 
7 Cf. the Latin demonstratio: to show from, [mostrare de]. By convention, the 
German word Aussage, English "assertion" is used to translate the Greek apophansis. The 
latter gives us the sense of joining to, ad serere, which is useful, as we will see, in 
understanding apophansis as synthesis and diairesis. 
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In De Interpretatione, Aristotle writes that a simple assertion is a statement that has 
a meaning, and that affirms or denies that something belongs to another thing in some 
temporal mode (De Int: l 7a 23-5). Spoken words are signs of affects in the soul 
fpathemata tes psuches], and these affects are likenesses [homiOmata] of objects 
fpragmata] (De Int: 16a 5-8). As Heidegger reads this, words are expressions not of 
interior states, but of the way in which human being is in relation to the world. 
Referential talk [phone semantike] does not necessarily have the structure of apophansis. 
Simple utterance fphasis], mere spoken words on their own such as single nouns or verbs, 
are signs and refer to something but do not express truth or falsity, since they do not by 
themselves combine or separate, and "combination and separation [sunthesin kai 
dia{res{n], are essential before you can have truth and falsity" (De Int: 16a 12). A noun 
by itself has no reference to time; a verb has a time-reference, and does assert something 
of something, and thus implies a synthesis, but it remains a mere sign when used by 
itself. 
Furthermore, not all complex referential talk [logos] is presentative, or apophantic. 
Though every statement has meaning, not all statements are assertions, that is, they do 
not all admit of truth and falsity. Thus prayers for example, or exhortations, questions and 
commands do not affirm or deny anything, but simply express something; they belong to 
the study of rhetoric and poetics. Such statements signify [logos semantikos] but they do 
not make something manifest by pointing it out; they do not involve the theoretical 
apprehension of anything; they do not belong to the smaller class of logos apophantikos. 
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So what is the character of assertion, logos apophantikos? The synthesis and 
separation involved in apophantic speech are not the expression respectively of 
affirmation and negation. They are intrinsic to every assertion, whether negative or 
positive. Every tying together of a subject and predicate is at the same time a 
differentiation of the two. Applying a predicate to a subject is a specific limitation of that 
predicate, but not a universal limitation. To say that "the kettle is black" is not to limit 
blackness to its specific occurrence in the kettle. There is diafresis even in the case of 
affirmation. At the same time, to say that "the kettle is not black" is still to link a subject 
and its predicate. There must therefore be synthesis even in the case of negation. 
Synthesis in an assertion does not mean the linking of a subject and a predicate as these 
reflect some sort of psychical phenomena which must then be checked against the "real" 
state of affairs in order to establish if the combination is correct (correspondence). Rather, 
in Heidegger's reading, the bringing together in synthesis reflects the way in which what 
is, is let seen as something (SZ: 33\56). This "as" we can call the "apophantic as". The 
structure of synthesis\diairesis in every assertion is that upon which affirmation and denial 
is based. Presenting something as something, makes it possible to affirm or deny 
something of something, and therefore for this affirmation or denial to be correct or 
incorrect. 8 
Any predication, any assertion, is a letting-be-seen of a phenomenon. In this sense, 
apophantic discourse cannot be false. It always dis-closes something: this is the meaning 
8 See chapter one, section vi on Aristotle's discussion of a "primitive universal in the 
soul", which allows us to see an individual as a certain kind of individual (as a universal). 
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of a-letheia, to bring forth out of hiddenness. The primary mode of disclosure is noesis, 
pure noetic perception, as Aristotle discusses it, and a(sthesis, sensuous intuition. These 
denote an immediate apprehending of the givenness of an entity. They cannot be false, 
but only perhaps insufficient, a non-perceiving [agnoein] leaving the phenomena hidden 
[lanthanomein]. 9 This pre-predicative and non-synthetic form of disclosure is the ground 
of any assertion whatsoever, as is the givenness of entities themselves. 
On another level, however, in its synthetic structure, assertion can be false when the 
synthesis does not uncover the phenomenon such as it is. The assertion affirms or denies 
something that we can then judge as correct or incorrect. We can read this clearly in De 
Anima: 
... Assertion fphasis], like affirmation, states something about something, and 
is always either true or false; but this is not always so in the case of nous: the 
what it is [tf esti] in the sense of the essence [to t( en einazl is always true and 
is not a saying of something about something [tf kata tinos]; but just as while 
the seeing of a proper object is always true, the judgement whether a white 
object is a man or not is not always true ... (DA 430b 25-30). 
Pre-predicative apprehension of phenomena is primary; it is the condition for the 
possibility of the work of synthesis and diairesis, that is, the taking of a phenomenon as 
a certain thing, or as not a certain thing. L6gos which permits of synthesis and diairesis 
is drawn from the phenomenon to show it as it is: apo- pha(nesthai. 10 Whether an 
9 See chapter one vi, on the infallibility of nous. 
'
0 Heidegger adds that three of the translations commonly applied to the word logos 
have some ground once we understand logos as apophantical discourse. L6gos can mean 
1) "reason" [Vernunft], because it has the function of letting something be seen., as does 
the working of reason. 2) As legomenon, it can mean "ground", "ratio", or hupoke(menon, 
because it refers to what is shown as the ultimate matter to which one is referring. And 
3) it can mean relation or relationship, because it denotes that which becomes visible in 
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assertion is correct or incorrect will depend directly on the synthesis made. But this latter 
kind of truth, the truth of judgement, is "a secondary phenomenon" (SZ 34\57). 
Aristotle's apophantic understanding of logos thus works on two levels. Aristotle did 
not discuss the primordial level of disclosure in apophansis in connection with that term, 
however, because he did not delve deeply enough into the structure of synthesis and 
diairesis and inquire about their unity. In Heidegger's view, Aristotle was never able to 
escape his orientation to language to look at the pre-predicative structure on which 
language is based (GA21: 141-2).11 
To sum up: synthesis and diairesis are the conditions of the possibility of attribution 
and denial. The condition of the possibility of synthesis and diairesis is pre-predicative 
apprehension of phenomena. Since they belong together in every assertion, synthesis and 
diairesis point to a phenomenon that is the ground of their unity, and as such, necessarily 
prior to predicative expression (GA21: 140). 
Underlying and preceding the synthetic apophantic as-structure as the condition of 
its possibility is another as-structure, intrinsic to the way in which human beings relate 
to the world. The hermeneutical as is grounded in the various modes of perception, 
understanding, interpretation- in short being- of the one who discloses as she relates to 
things in the world: it denotes a mode of comportment. The predicative as-structure is 
its relation to something, through being addressed (SZ: 34\58). 
11 Aristotle himself was aware of the two possible levels of truth; even if he does not 
thematize ontological truth, he recognizes it primacy. This was discussed in the context 
of "being in the sense of being true", in chapter two, sec.ii above. Aristotle rejects this 
sense of being from consideration in the primary science, since it deals with an "affection 
of thought" and not being as such. 
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derived from the hermeneutical as. Thus we arrive at a conception not only of a 
phenomenon that grounds assertion, but of a mode of comportment that grounds the logos 
of apophansis. As we will see in section three, this means that for Heidegger, theory is 
derived from an originary praxis. 
Before proceeding on that topic, which will involve a look at the way Heidegger 
describes the structure of human being, we should tie together the meanings of 
phainomenon and logos. Legein ta phainomena means apophafnesthai ta phainomena: "to 
let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way that it shows itself from 
itself'(SZ:34\58). This is to repeat in other words the maxim "to the matters themselves". 
Phenomenology as so described clearly denotes a "how'', a method of approach, a way 
of encountering. It indicates the sort of work that has to be done to let things be seen as 
they are, that is, in their being, and from themselves. It is not particular entities, but 
precisely the being of entities, the meaning of entities, that is covered up, and that 
phenomenology has as its task to uncover. We experience beings always as something, 
but always as different things depending on the way that we approach them: the way of 
approach constitutes what shows itself as manifest. 
Heidegger writes: "when something no longer takes the form of just letting 
something be seen, but is always harking back to something else to which it points, so 
that it lets something be seen as something, it thus acquires a synthesis-structure, and with 
this it takes over the possibility of covering up" (SZ: 34\57). The original "as" of our 
apprehension- letting something be seen- is transformed through the assertion that 
phenomenology must use, into seeing something as something. Phenomenology therefore 
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means "the methodological mediation of the immediacy of the truth of the phenomena". 12 
L6gos in its conjunction with phenomenon in the word "phenomenology" is being used 
in the sense of ap6phansis as theorefn, "discoursing in the sense of communicating the 
apprehension of a subject matter and only such a communication" (GA20: 116\85). But 
to have a "science" of phenomena means "to grasp its objects in such a way that 
everything about them which is up for discussion must be treated by exhibiting it directly 
and demonstrating it directly" (SZ: 35\59): phenomenology must be rooted in original 
experience. 
Phenomena are grasped in various ways of being as: the unity of these ways of 
being would give us something like the pros hen unity of being. But this being-as also 
indicates the various ways of human access to these beings. The unity of those ways 
would give us the a priori structure of human being as revealing logos. Thus 1) the unity 
of logos, and 2) the way in which being [to on] appears as the unity of ways of 
appearance of beings, together give for an ontology that grows directly out of 
phenomenology.13 It is the is-ness, the being of entities, that we are first looking for in 
ontology in order to determine the meaning of the unity of being: being is always the 
being of entities, therefore to get at being, we must go through entities. But even more, 
12 Cf. Kockelmans: (1989): p.84. 
13 See Sheehan (1983): p.141: " ... since the modes of logos are correlative to the 
modes of the appearance of entities, the discovery of the unity of logos would provide the 
philosopher with the a priori horizon for working out the analogical unity of all modes 
of the appearance of entities. This would be the meaning of being itself." 
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because our access to entities is through our own understanding, we must also go through 
an analytic of what we ourselves are. Heidegger writes: 
... entities are, quite independently of the experience by which they are 
disclosed, the acquaintance in which they are discovered, and the grasping in 
which their nature is ascertained. But being is only in the understanding of 
those entities to whose being something like an understanding of being 
belongs ... (SZ: 183\228) 
So far then, we see Heidegger's point that Aristotle did not inquire into the 
conditions and structure of the truth of beings. Aristotle took ontological truth as a given 
basis for predicative truth. He then inquired into the grounds of beings conceived 
according to predication, i.e. ous{a as the unity of the ways in which being is said. 
Heidegger, on the other hand, wants to inquire into the grounds of ontological truth. This 
kind of truth involves inquiry into those for whom truth is manifest: human beings. In the 
next section, then, I will briefly summarize the essentials of the "preparatory" constitution 
of human existence as Heidegger reads it - preparatory to its interpretation in terms of 
temporality. This background does not carry us away from the topic of Heidegger's 
method: I will focus on those structures that must be understood in order to expose the 
disclosedness inherent to Dasein. Disclosedness necessarily plays a decisive role in the 
way in which Heidegger's project is conceived. 
II 
Fundamental Ontology 
We have seen that the way of access to entities, the tegein of phenomeno-logy is 
not a simple intuition, but involves showing entities in themselves from themselves as 
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they are. There are different ways in which we lay out how these things are; the way that 
we look at something, the way in which we understand something, the very asking of the 
question itself all come into play in our discovery of what there is in fact to be 
investigated as being and as being true. Thus, "it is precisely the analysis of the truth 
character of being which shows that being also is ... based in a being, namely in the 
Dasein" (GA24: 19). As beings distinguished by the fact that we ask about being, we 
must interrogate ourselves, and our mode of access to entities, including our own selves 
as existent beings: the analytic of who we are is fundamental to ontology. 
Being and Time, in its incomplete published version, is a "fundamental ontology": 
it is a preparatory study of the a priori existential structures that comport Dasein, and an 
interpretation of these structures in the light of temporality, explaining the role of time 
in human understanding of being. The first division of the work then is an attempt to lay 
out the structures through which being is understood by human being. The second section 
reinterprets these structures as modes of temporality, or as a process of finite kinetic 
transcendence, which reveals the meaning of being to be time. What Dasein essentially 
is, what constitutes its "existentiality", or the modes of being fundamental to it, its 
ontological structure, is approached through an analysis of the factical existence of human 
beings. The existential structure of human being is the condition for the possibility of 
comportments that make up everyday human living and thinking. Phenomenology 
demands that we look to the things themselves; not as appearances, not as semblance, but 
that we pierce through these to "wrest" the phenomena as they are in their being, from 
what seems. This means that we have to look at what first seems, and dig below to the 
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condition of possibility of that seeming. We have to look at how we are in our everyday 
way of being in order to pierce through to see the ontological structures that are at the 
root of that way. 
The first task of ontology therefore is to demonstrate and characterize the ontical 
foundation of ontology, that is, the temporal historical concrete existence that is grounded 
in ontological structures (GA24: 26\20): ourselves. The human pre-predicative under-
standing of being as it plays out in everyday comportment must be brought to the fore, and 
examined as a structure of the being of human beings, a structure that plays an important 
role in understanding the question of the meaning of being. The interpretation of Dasein' s 
ontic being is at the same time a condition for the possibility of any ontological study 
whatsoever. The second task of ontology is to examine the a priori structure of being and 
its determinations, the way in which it precedes and underlies its appearance in beings. 
This involves an analysis of a priority itself as a temporal structure related to human 
understanding of being (GA24: 20\27), which I will pursue in the next chapter. 
Dasein, [literally "there-being"] the common German word for "existence", is the 
name that Heidegger gives to "the entity that each of us is himself and which includes 
inquiring as one of the possibilities of its being" (SZ: 7\27). It refers not to existence as 
understood traditionally in the existence\essence split, but to human being as it relates to 
being. Dasein designates the primordial characteristics of human beings: that they are 
"there'', in a given world of interrelations, with which they are familiar; that they have 
a (vague and general) primordial comprehension of being; and, (taking be-ing in a verbal 
sense) that humans are dynamic potentiality-to-be. It is in this latter sense that the phrase 
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"existence precedes essence" applies to Heidegger's characterization of human being. 
There is clearly an ontological structure that characterizes human existence, but in each 
case existence is my own. The structure of existence is run through with possibility. 
Heidegger emphasizes the finite kinetic structure of Dasein as ek-sistence, standing out 
into possibility. Dasein is possibility: possibility stands higher than actuality (SZ: 38\63).14 
Dasein is primordially being-in-the-world. The world in this context is not simply 
the presence of objects lying about before Dasein, nor is it the being of those objects, nor 
is it something that Dasein is physically and spatially "inside". It is a situation in which 
Dasein is involved, without having asked to be, or without having any choice in the 
matter. The word "world" refers to the existential character of the practical situation in 
which Dasein finds itself. It finds itself "thrown" into a context of relations and inter-
relations; it is not a mere isolated subject, but is always involved with others and with 
entities. Thrownness constitutes "facticity": the way in which Dasein as being-in-the-
world understands itself as intrinsically related to entities that it encounters in the world 
(SZ: 56\82). 
There are different ways in which Dasein's facticity is expressed in being-in-the-
world, through different modes of being-in. Being-in is the formal existential expression 
for the inescapable sine qua non of Dasein's existence as being-in-the world (SZ: 54\80). 
It is a state that is always in some way familiar to Dasein. This familiarity is "being-
alongside" the world, which does not mean somehow living beside it, but living totally 
absorbed in it, often slipping into a state Heidegger calls "fallenness", forgetfulness of the 
14 I will develop the significance of this statement in the next chapter. 
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authentic ontological structures of one's being, and of the being of entities. This is not 
a negative structure to be overcome, but an essential way of being-in-the-world. The 
primordial way in which being-in is concretely, is expressed in "concern", which is an 
ontological term for Dasein as involved in the practical situation. This existential15 
characterizes the way that Dasein is in its everyday dealing with the world, in interacting 
with things, using them, putting them aside, ignoring them, taking a rest from them, in 
discussing, accomplishing, considering, etc. Dasein is primordially occupied and pre-
occupied with things, and sees them "circumspectly", with an eye to what they can be 
used for, or what their "in order to" might be. Things seen in this way are available, or 
"ready-to-hand" [zuhanden]: but each thing, seen now as a tool, refers to other things, 
each "in order to" presupposes a context in which the "in order to" makes sense. This 
context, the referential totality, constitutes the world. The first way in which we encounter 
things is in a practical context.16 The theoretical way of looking at entities, as "present-to-
15 
"Existential" and "existentiell" both apply to the being of Dasein: the term 
"existential" indicates a constitutive element of that being, therefore an ontological 
structure; it is opposed to an "existentiell", as the concrete way in which this element is 
lived out in individual Dasein. "Ontological" inquiry focusses on the meaning of beings 
or on the being of beings (to on he 6n); ontic investigation on the other hand focusses on 
ta 6nta, the beings themselves as such. 
16 Although Dasein does not see others in the practical mode of concern. "Being-
with" and "being-with-others" are structures equiprimordial with being-in-the-world, but 
constituted by the sharing of a world. The existential characteristic associated with the 
way that Dasein interacts with other Dasein is "solicitude", which, like concern, is not to 
be taken in the positive sense the word connotates, but includes also such "negative" 
behaviours as neglect, hatred, etc. Dasein in everyday comportment is caught up in 
dependence on others. The nameless others who direct Dasein's life in the form of norms, 
rules and acceptable comportment is referred to as das Man, the "they". The they-self is 
a mode of being of Dase in: it characterizes being-one's-self ("who") in Dase in' s everyday 
mode, in which it lives for the sake of what they think. This is in contrast to the 
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band" [vorhanden] is derivative, involving a pulling-back from our primordial 
involvement with things in order to address something and discuss it. 17 We see again 
Heidegger's shift to the practical from Aristotle's concentration on the theoretical. 
Heidegger claims, however, that the Greek experience of being was 
practical\productive: 
... in Aristotle's time ... this expression ous{a was still synonymous with 
property, possession, means, wealth. The pre-philosophical proper meaning of 
ous(a carried through to the end. Accordingly, a being is synonymous with an 
at-hand {extant] disposable. Essentia is only the literal translation of ous{a ... 
the basic concept of ous{a in contrast lays more stress on the producedness of 
the produced in the sense of things disposably present at hand .... (GA24: 
153-4\108-9; cf.PIA: 26-7\375). 
Intuitive finding-present, n6esis and a{sthesis are- in Heidegger's Aristotle- modifications 
of seeing in the sense of circumspection. Heidegger thus finds grounds for his practical 
focus in his reappropriation of Aristotle. There is nonetheless no doubt that Aristotle 
privileged soph{a over phr6nesis as the ideal activity [energe{a] of human being: the last 
"authentic self', where authenticity [Eigenlichkeit] means the seizing of one's own self 
in one's own way from what it is in itself, choosing oneself and ones's own possibilities, 
making one's self one's own. This is developed in the next chapter. 
17 As Taminiaux points out, everyday preoccupation with things in terms of their 
means and goals in practical and circumspective concern "hides its own presupposition". 
Preoccupation is preoccupation with handiness, not with existence. The being of handy 
things, zuhandenes, is understood in terms of Vorhandenheit. Therefore concern is a mode 
of falling, obscuring the clear apprehension of the being of beings. Heidegger discusses 
this movement in section 33 of Being and Time (see section three of this chapter). 
Interesting also is Taminiaux' s observation that vorhanden, while a common German 
word, is also an exact translation of the Greek procheir6n, which Aristotle uses to 
describe the first objects of philosophical wonder. (Taminiaux: (1987): p.141). 
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half of book ten of the Nichomachean Ethics is devoted to this theme (NE: 1177a 12ff).18 
Ousia does carry the meaning of "property", as I remarked in the previous chapter. In 
Aristotle, this means not that ousia is "produced", but that it is subject to accusation, 
aition; or in other words, that it must be grounded.19 
Taminiaux argues that there is a more general agreement between Heidegger and 
Aristotle on the priority of praxis over poiesis, which in Heidegger becomes the 
distinction, respectively, between authenticity and inauthenticity. Practical circumspection, 
and noetic apprehension as a modification of this, are forms of poiesis, the activity of 
making or doing aiming at an end distinct from itself. Praxis, we saw, is an activity that 
includes the end in itself, thus phr6nesis, unlike techne, is a praxis, aimed at acting well. 
Aristotle clearly states that praxis rules over poiesis (cf. NE 1140a ff), hence phr6nesis 
certainly rules over techne and, in Heidegger's view, also over noetic apprehension as a 
modification of circumspective sight. Poiesis is thus the fallen mode of concern, and 
praxis the authentic movement of care. 
Of course in Aristotle sophia is something else again, since praxis and poiesis both 
refer to things that vary, and theoria concentrates on unchangeable things; but Taminiaux 
suggests that the separation of praxis and theory in Aristotle is perhaps ill-founded, and 
18 See also Metaphysics Alpha on the "degrees of knowledge"; (980a 22- 982a 2), 
where Aristotle argues that theoretical sciences are higher than the productive sciences; 
Posterior Analytics (1 OOa 5- lOOb 7), where episteme and nous are said to be the most 
infallible kinds of knowledge. Clearly knowledge of ousia begins with the practical 
experience of perception, but the goal is theoretical understanding and comprehension. 
19 Thus one can ask of property: what is it made of, where did it come from, what 
is it, and for the sake of what is it. Ousia is its own property (a particular ousia is proper 
to itself). 
174 
that Heidegger's critique of this distinction has roots in Aristotle's own description of 
• 20 praxis. 
Volpi convincingly argues that Heidegger submits the practico-moral determinations 
of Aristotle's analysis to a ontological absolutization and radicalization, and makes them 
the foundation of the unitary ontological structure of human existence. Volpi draws a 
parallel between zuhandenes and po{esis; vorhandenes and theor{a; and Dasein and praxis. 
Praxis here indicates how Dasein comports itself to its being, i.e., in a practical-moral 
mode, as opposed to theoretical inspectio sui. The structural shift resulting from the 
prioritization of praxis over theory, as well as the ontologization of these modes in 
Heidegger, means that po{esis and theorfa characterize the way that Dasein comports itself 
towards the being of beings that are not Dasein, in the mode of concern. Concern then 
manifests itself in both modes, po{esis (handiness) and theor{a (present-at-hand). Theor{a 
can then emerge as a derivative mode of po{esis, and the shift from theoretical to practical 
mode is explained. 21 
Yet if these commentators are right, what do we do with Heidegger's comment that 
"care ... as concernful solicitude, so primordially and wholly envelopes Dasein's being 
20 Taminiaux (1982): p.151. See also Taminiaux (1991): p.xix ff, where he discusses 
Heidegger's two-fold approach to Aristotle: overtly, Heidegger critically thematizes 
Aristotle for privileging the eternal through privileging theor{a; on the other hand he 
"covertly" transforms and re-appropriates Aristotle, arguing that theor{a originally stems 
from the practical. (This is a general theme in these works.) 
21 Volpi (1994 ): pp. 200\202; also (1988): pp.14-16. Also suggesting a covert 
transformation of Aristotle on the part of Heidegger, Volpi writes: "the fruits of 
Heidegger's easy assimilation of Aristotle often turns up in places where there is no 
mention of Aristotle" ( 1994 p.200). 
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that it must already be presupposed as a whole when we distinguish between theoretical 
and practical behaviour" (SZ: 300\347-348)? Building the theoretical into the practical 
does not solve the existential-ontological problem of the locus of the unity of these two: 
the self (SZ: 320\367 note xix). As Peperzak, supported by these passages, points out, 
Heidegger's philosophical aim was "an investigation of the originary dimension preceding 
the distinction between theory, practice and poetics".22 He sought the unity of theor[a, 
praxis and po[esis: all of which, as we saw above, are energe[ai. But actuality in 
Heidegger is possibility. The unity of theory and practice is founded in an authentic 
kinetic praxis: the understanding of being accomplished through transcendence. 
Authentically lived, projected onto Dasein's own ultimate possibilities, the future-oriented 
temporal structure of transcendence coincides with Dasein's understanding of being. As 
we will see in the next chapter, how this unfolds is determinate not only for the shift in 
Heidegger away from theor[a that marks a major difference between his thought and 
Aristotle's; it also grounds the "destruction" of ontotheology that is the core of his 
innovative ontology. 
22 Peperzak: "Heidegger and Plato's Idea of the Good'', p. 258. See also Volpi, 
Heidegger e Aristotele: "Per Heidegger . . . Aristotele avrebbe fornito una geniale 
'fenomenolgia' delle determinazioni fondamentali della vita humana (theor[a, po[esis, 
praxis ... ) senza tuttavia porsi esplicitamente il problema della loro unita fondamentale" 
and this because of Aristotle's understanding of being and of time, which did not allow 
the connection between the two to be fully exploited (p.116). I will draw out this latter 
connection in the next chapter. 
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III 
Hermeneutic 
The discussion of fundamental ontology sets the stage for an explanation of 
"hermeneutic" as Heidegger uses it in section seven of Being and Time to describe "the 
meaning of phenomenological description as a method"(SZ 37\61), as well as when, in 
sections 32 and 33 of that work and in the 1925-6 lecture course (GA21) he discusses it 
in the context of the structure of primary understanding.23 It is the logos of the 
phenomenology of Dasein that has the character of hermenefa. This means first of all that 
from a methodological standpoint we are faced with the task of interpreting the basic 
ontological structure of Dasein. 
In chapter five of the first division of Being and Time, Heidegger turns to an 
analysis of being-in. Being-in refers us to a "there", the Da of Da-sein, the entity 
constituted by being-in-the-world, which as such is openness to the world. It is itself 
"lighted", meaning that its very being is tendency to disclose, to bring to light (SZ: 132-
133\171). In other words, Dasein is logos, it is the mediation that makes things 
meaningful, through transcendence. The disclosedness of Dasein has the structure of 
23 The title by which I have been referring to Aristotle's work, De Interpretatione is 
of course a Latin translation of the Greek Peri Hermenefas. The word hermenefa derives 
from the name of the god Hermes, messenger between the gods and human beings, 
interpreter therefore of divine or absolute truth into human terms. The word was reborn 
when used, appropriately, to describe the work of biblical exegesis. In Aristotle, since the 
treatise deals with semantic meaning and logos, but primarily apophansis, we must read 
"hermenefa" in the widest sense of expression and communication of what is- the way 
in which words, as signs of affects in the soul, relate to, or translate, the objects of which 
they are likenesses. Heidegger's usage of the word is not dissimilar: it seems to mean the 
way in which humans "read" the world. 
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disposition, [Be.findlichkeit] and understanding [Verstehen], which are characterized by 
discourse [Rede]. In brief, disposition, which shows itself ontically as moods, discloses 
Dasein to itself as being, and as being necessarily and involuntarily (being thrown), and 
as being in such a way that the world matters to it (SZ: 139\178). The articulation of 
intelligibility disclosed in the passive moment of Be.findlichkeit, and in the active moment 
of Verstehen and interpretation is discourse [Rede], the ontological foundation for 
language (SZ: 161\204).24 
The hermeneutical "as" structure that we are pursuing relates to the interpretive 
nature of Dasein, and is a development of understanding. As constituent of the "there" 
of Dasein, understanding describes one of the ways that Dasein is as being-in-the-world. 
Dasein is being-possible: "possibility as an existential is the most primordial and ultimate 
positive way in which Dasein is characterized ontologically" (SZ: 143-4\183). Concretely 
Dasein understands itself as able to choose and to reject various options within the 
practical situation it is thrown into, from among the definite possibilities that result from 
its prior commitments to one choice or another. On an ontological level, being-possible 
24 Volpi suggests an identification of disposition with the traditional passivity and 
receptivity of the subject, contrasted to the spontaneous activity of the understanding, 
retrieving Aristotle's passive and active soul (1984: pp.105ff). Heidegger does in this 
section (§29) refer to pathe (affects) in the context of Aristotle's Rhetoric (SZ: 138\178). 
Despite the temptation, it would seem difficult to show that Befindlichkeit is a retrieval 
of hexis (though certainly the moral hexeis relate to pathe). Note that at PIA 33\380, 
Heidegger translates hexis as "being-able-to-have-at-one's-disposal"; at 32\379 as "habit'', 
again at 376\383 as "having-at-one's-disposal". It is not easy to see Heidegger's 
understanding of Aristotle's hexis thus expressed as retrieved in the notion of 
Befindlichkeit. However, a case could be made: a hexis, like Befindlichkeit is a given 
disposition that is only manifest under certain conditions (see ch. V section V). 
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means that Dasein has the potential for being in different modes in its dealings with the 
world and itself, modes that disclose possible significance of the world and Dasein. 
In the attempt to discover possibilities, both within Dasein and within entities in the 
world, understanding manifests its existential structure of "projection": it looks towards 
its own potential for being, and projects itself towards a possibility that, as characteristic 
of its being, it already is. Dasein always already is in the mode of projecting itself beyond 
its "now", and into possibility- which means that the "now" itself is possibility. Projection 
projects onto significance (it looks to make sense of things), and onto a "for-the-sake-of-
which" (it looks at things in terms of use): it either sees its possibilities in relation to the 
world and the possibilities of that world, or else it turns inwards to its own understanding 
of itself, its ultimate end or "for-the-sake-of-which" [Worumwillen]. It is not that 
possibilities are chosen "with an end in mind", but that the "what-for" of projection 
becomes clear through the very act of projecting in which Dasein is always involved. 
Recognition of this potential in entities and in Dasein itself constitutes "sight" 
[Sicht], which, as an understanding of the situation of being-in-the-world, is the condition 
for the possibility of access to entities, and to Dasein's own being as possibility (SZ: 
147\187). By projecting itself on its own possibilities, by transcending itself, by what 
Heidegger calls ek-sisting, Dasein opens the way for disclosure of the world, itself, and 
of being in general. Understanding is being-ahead-of-oneself, that is holding oneself out 
beyond one's self into the possibilities one sees through the "in order-to" of concern, and 
then returning to something, and in so doing, disclosing (GA21: 148). This movement 
constitutes the hermeneutical as-structure. 
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Working out the possibilities projected in understanding is Auslegung, interpretation. 
Primordial understanding is not an appropriation of possibilities, but an implicit grasp of 
them. Interpretation, on the other hand, which is grounded in the prior understanding, sees 
an explicit "in-order-to" in the things available in the world. As soon as we interact with 
things, repair them, prepare them, set them up, we are explicitly taking something as 
something. This as is not brought to language immediately, but is a pre-predicative mode 
of our comportment towards entities, from which the predicative assertoric mode is 
derived. In using a hammer to pound a nail, I have already interpreted it in terms of its 
as, in this case "as" a tool for pounding nails. It is not the case that I first see the hammer 
as a bare meaningless object, and then throw over it a practical meaning. On the contrary, 
the hammer is seen immediately in a structure of involvement, and in terms of its 
usability, serviceability, and detrimentality. 
The interpretation of a tool is founded on an original pre-predicative fore-
understanding of a tool. The entity in front of us must already be accessible. This prior 
accessibility is based on a "fore-having" of the totality of involvements in which a tool 
is found; on a "fore-sight" of the definite particular way that the tool can be interpreted 
(used), or in other words understanding of its own "in-order.:to"; and on a "fore-
conception" of the particular use of the tool in its relation to the totality of involvements 
in which it is found, that is how a particular tool can be used for a wider task. This 
structure is constitutive of what Heidegger calls the hermeneutical situation: we are 
always already involved in a world, and we always already have an understanding of how 
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that world works. I live as already understandingly dealing-with things in the world, and 
this constitutes my existence as being-in-the-world (GA21: 146). 
Interpreting is the explicit appropriation of the fore-structure of the understanding, 
by taking hold of the possibilities revealed in our understanding. In taking the hammer 
as a hammer, and using it, we are displaying an understanding of the possibility of the 
hammer. By becoming aware, in some sense, of the hammer in its "in order to", by 
seeing it as a tool for repairing or completing a greater task than the immediate 
hammering, seeing beyond its own particular function to a larger in-order-to; or perhaps 
also by seeing it as inadequate for the task at hand- in these ways we explicitly 
appropriate the fore-structure of the understanding: we see the hammer as good for fixing 
a roof, as crooked and inappropriate. The hermeneutical "as"-structure, as a way of 
making-sense-of, is a part of human comportment (GA21: 146). We see the hammer as 
having a meaning within the totality of relations by our pre-predicative interaction with 
it. 
"Meaning" is not something somehow attached to or emanating from entities: it is 
what Dasein is, as a being that makes sense of things. Making sense of things is an 
existential of Dasein, as it discloses what beings are: "only Dasein can be meaningful or 
meaningless" (SZ 151\193). There can be no disclosiveness if nothing is disclosed. But 
nothing can be meaningful if Dasein is not disposed to understand. It is Dasein that 
makes-intelligible: Dasein is this making-sense-of, and expresses itself in meanings to 
which it gives words (GA21: 151 ). The question of the meaning of being is therefore one 
about the disclosure-structure of Dasein, in its relation to beings and to itself as the being 
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that already has some understanding of being. It asks how it is that beings are given to 
human experience as intelligible. Being is this meaningful givenness. We must already 
understand in order to interpret, and the articulation of interpretation is "meaning". 
There is clearly a circle here: in order to interpret, to give meaning to something, 
we must already have understood it, yet interpretation contributes to the understanding. 
But this circle is the existential constitution of Dasein's way of disclosure. In order to 
exploit the circle to reach a positive possibility of knowledge, interpretation must: 
... have understood that our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our 
fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies 
and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by 
working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves . . . (SZ 
153\195). 
In a phenomenological inquiry, guided by the motto "to the things themselves", we must 
be careful that the ground upon which we build our interpretation is clearly demarcated 
not by preconceptions, but by what is actually understood in primordial disclosure of the 
things themselves. Then interpretation can enrich understanding. 
This hermeneutical structure of understanding and interpretation, so important to 
Heidegger's way of approach to the question of being, is the ground of the assertion. 
Since in ancient ontology, "the logos functioned as the only clue for obtaining access to 
that which authentically is, and for defining the being of such entities" and "as the 
primary and authentic 'locus' of truth", (SZ 154\ 196), the way in which the "as" of 
assertion is in fact a derived form of the hermeneutical "as" will help us to see how 
Heidegger's approach to the question of being differs from Aristotle's and how that 
difference relates to a different understanding of 'truth'. And it will emphasize again the 
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form of behaviour, reflecting an immediate "circumspective" understanding of the 
practical possibilities at hand.26 The language of assertion proper is already a step towards 
a theoretical understanding of the entity at hand. This way of seeing an entity transforms 
it from something readily available, as it is seen primordially in the context of "what-for" 
in which we are involved in the world, to something "present-at-hand". The entity is thus 
seen as a bare object, as mere presence of a thing removed from the way in which it is 
first encountered as available for use, or in its serviceability. Taking something as present-
at-hand obscures its character of availability, and removes it from the context of 
serviceability. It is seen no longer as something with-which we do something, but as 
something about-which the assertion is made. It therefore shows something in such a way 
that we "just look at it" instead of doing something with it. 
The distinction between immediate expressions and assertoric statements is one we 
have already seen in Aristotle: the distinction holds between commands or requests, which 
demand a performance as a response; and apophantic discourse, which calls the 
interlocutor simply to look at what is pointed out in the definite character expressed. The 
various kinds of assertion "in between" the two extremes of the command "hand me the 
hammer!" and the theoretical remark "the hammer is too heavy", such as reports on the 
situation, descriptions, etc., originate in circumspective concern, the comportment 
described in the hermeneutical "as" (SZ: 158\201 ). To think of them as springing from 
26 Note: "the kind of interpretation which is circumspectly expressed is not 
necessarily already an assertion in the sense we have defined" (SZ: 157\200). 
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theoretical statements, Heidegger says, is virtually impossible: they have a prior 
connection to human comportment in the world as projective understanding. 
Heidegger re-values human comportment as a way- the only way- in which beings 
can be revealed for what they are. His search for the unity of the ways in which beings 
appear is a search for the ways in which beings appear to human being, and is inseparable 
from this. His look towards the things themselves involves a study of the "look". And the 
primordial look he finds is pre-predicative practical involvement with entities. In Aristotle, 
as Heidegger says, truth is in things- inasmuch as things are taken as the objects of the 
assertion that is made about them- and not in the understanding. In Heidegger's own 
view, however, "truth as revealing is in Dasein, as a determination of its intentional 
comportment, and it is also a determinateness of some being, something extant, with 
regard to its being as a revealed entity."(GA24: 311\218). We will have to look more 
closely at the meaning of "truth" to understand what this means. But first, I will continue 
the methodological analysis, with a more formal discussion of phenomenology and 
Heidegger's innovation in applying it to ontological concerns. 
IV 
Three Discoveries of Phenomenology 
Now that I have discussed the goal of phenomenology, and the way in which it is 
intrinsically related to ontology, I will briefly resume what Heidegger, in the Prolegomena 
to the History of the Concept of Time (GA20), calls the three major discoveries of 
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phenomenology as a science. These are: 1) intentionality; 2) categorial intuition; and 3) 
the original sense of the a priori. I will look at each of these in turn. 
a) Intentionality 
The neglect of the question of being in Husserl's phenomenology is a product of 
Husserl's neglect of the question of the being of the intentional. For Heidegger, 
phenomenology is in fact the "analytic description of intentionality in its a priori'' (GA20: 
108\79). The meaning of this should become clear in the following pages. 
Heidegger argues that the field of intentionality has been unduly restricted, and 
needs to be opened to the things themselves as they actually are in their being as 
perceived. This requires an analysis of what is perceived in perception; what Husserl has 
left out is the factical involvement of human beings in a world, and how this shapes the 
intentum. 
Intentio means "directing itself towards"; every form of comportment, every lived 
experience, every psychic occurrence is a directing towards. Intentionality is thus the 
structure of lived experience as such (GA20: 36\29). It is not a relation between a psychic 
event and a real thing "outside consciousness": it is not, in other words, the structure of 
a correspondence theory of truth, nor is it something added onto experience. Perception 
itself is intentional. 
The intentum of intentionality, that toward which perception is directed, is the 
perceived of the perception. Heidegger notes that in looking at things as they are in 
themselves we perceive them in various ways. In the 1925 course, as in Being and Time, 
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he insists that we first see things (where "seeing" means "simple cognizance of what is 
found" (GA20: 52\39)) as "environmental", which seems equivalent to ready-to-hand. The 
theoretical perception of something as a "natural thing" (present-at-hand) is derivative, 
as is seeing something purely in the determinations universal to any physical object 
(seeing its "thingness"). The field of intentionality is clearly broader than perception of 
the theoretical. In contrast to Husserl, Heidegger sets intentionality in the everyday 
practical situation; Dasein is not a transcendental ego removed from the factical situation. 
The being of the intentional being has to be considered in discussing intentionality. The 
way that we direct ourselves towards an entity is disclosive of the meaning of that entity. 
We transcend ourselves towards the world as the complex of significant structures, and 
disclose the meaning of beings, that is, the being of beings. The intentionality of being 
in the world is thus expressed as transcendence: no longer intentionality between 
experience and entities, but transcendence between experience and the meaning of those 
entities, or being. 27 
The perceivedness of the entity, the way it shows itself as being-perceived, belongs 
to the structure of intentionality, to the manner (the "how") of its being intended, and not 
to the entity. Thus, an entity can be given: 1) through "empty intending"; 2) through 
intuitive fulfillment; 3) through the perception of a picture; or 4) superlatively as bodily 
presence. The first of these cases is the most common way in which things enter our 
ordinary discussions (as we have seen in the discussion of assertion) and the way in 
which they become ready-to-hand. We generally talk about things that are not "intuitively 
27 Cf. Sheehan (1983): p.289. 
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given": we talk about a chair without the chair actually being present before us, and 
without calling to mind the image of a chair. In the second case, we represent to 
ourselves what is intended, for example in trying to remember the details of something, 
and thus give "intuitive fulfillment" to the intention. The third kind of representation is 
that which we experience in looking at a picture: we look through the material context 
in which something is pictured, to what is there pictured. Finally, in simple perception, 
I simply see the thing itself as bodily present. There is no "in between" stage in simple 
perception in which I represent the object to myself: I do not make for myself a 
"representation of a chair", I just see the chair.28 Furthermore, I see it as complete entity, 
even though I in fact perceive only an aspect of it; and I see it as selfsame, despite the 
different views I might have of it in walking around it. 
There is a structural interrelation between these different modes in which something 
is intended, as different ways of toward-which inherent to the being of the one who 
intends. The way in which something is intended determines the way in which it is 
perceived. Every intention tends towards fulfillment: simple perception, as a superlative 
case of intentional fulfillment, finds fulfillment through perception of the bodily presence 
of an entity; remembrance through envisaging, etc. But in the definitive demonstration of 
the accuracy of fulfillment, we turn to the simple perception of the thing as bodily 
presence. In looking to find fulfillment for the empty intention of assertion, I must direct 
28 Cf. Aristotle on perception at APo: 79b 29-31. As I argued in section four of 
chapter one, it seems that for Aristotle also "simple perception" means perception of an 
ousfa with attributes, not of Lockean primary or secondary qualities. I see a blue chair, 
not "hardness" or "blueness". 
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my being-toward not to the assertion itself, but to that about which the assertion speaks. 
There is then some sort of identification between the assertion and its about-which 
required for demonstration.29 But how does this actually pan out in intending as the 
belonging together of intentio and intentum? The second "discovery" elucidates the issue. 
b) Categorial intuition 
Categorial intuition is an intentional comportment that makes concrete the basic 
constitution of intentionality; it reveals the ontological a priori of a subsistent entity, or 
the being of a being. Intuition means "simple apprehension of what is itself bodily found 
just as it shows itself' (GA20: 64\47). In the perception of the given, and in every such 
experience, we already also apprehend the categorial, that is, we have an intuition of what 
can be conceptually grasped as a category. The categories are correlates of certain acts. 
In the immanence of consciousness I find nothing like "this", "and", "being" 
(GA20:77\57). The categories then are found by referring to what is intended in an act, 
what is intended in a comportment. They are discovered through non-sensory perception 
of an originary self-given: through categorial intuition. Categorial intuition is an act that 
establishes the relation that perception involves. 
Simple perception is already pervaded by categorial intuition: in perceiving a bodily 
entity, we "see" not only a sensible being, but also its "surplus" [Ueberschuss], that is, 
what is not sensibly perceptible in bodily presence. Categorial intuition is the articulation 
of forms already found in the composition of sensible experience- forms that are not 
29 Pertinent to this, see my discussion of truth as adequation in section V below. 
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sensible but intuited: intuition represents the whole matter in its totality. Being, for 
example, is self-given in perception through categorial intuition. Gaining the insight that 
it takes to make the leap between seeing an aspect of something and "filling in" the 
whole, between a particular view of something and the selfsameness of that thing, 
between the intended and the intuited is called "evidence". What was intuited is 
illuminated in the state of affairs, by an intentional act of identifying the intended and the 
intuited. 
We saw that there is a definitive fulfillment of any intention when the perceived 
entity shows itself bodily. Fulfilling an empty intention by reference to a given present 
entity requires an act of identification between the empty intention and the perceived. 
Fulfillment of an intention is an adequatio, phenomenologically understood as a bringing 
into coincidence of what is intended (intellectus) with the intuited subject matter (res). 
A first concept of truth (one of three discussed here) emerges from this adequation: 1) 
that of the identity of the intuited and intended, which I experience in the "living act of 
concrete perceiving". Here, I do not "apprehend" the identity between what I intuit and 
what I perceive, that is, I do not thematize it as true, I rather "live in the truth" (GA20: 
70\52). This is clearly the concept of truth we will see as fundamental in section 44 of 
Being and Time. Truth here is a comportmental relation that I experience by directing 
myself towards the subject matter. A particular notion of being emerges from this form 
of truth, if I try to express it via an assertion. In the phrase "the chair is yellow", I can 
emphasize the being yellow of the chair, so that I mean that the chair is really and truly 
yellow. In this case being is taken in the sense of truth as "the subsistence of truth, of the 
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truth relation, subsistence of identity" (GA20: 71\54). Being and truth are identified in the 
"translation" of my everyday experience of perception. The being-yellow of the chair is 
not sensibly perceived, but intuited, and played out in my comportment towards the chair. 
It is possible to arrive at a second concept of truth on the basis of phenomenological 
adequation, however. Here, truth is: 2) a structural relationship of the acts of intending 
and intuiting. It is, in short, predicative truth. Being in this case also has a different 
meaning: in the phrase under discussion, I emphasize the being yellow of the chair, 
attributing a predicate to a subject, the being P to S. In this sense, "being" is used as a 
copula; being is a "relation factor" of the state of affairs, a structural moment in the state 
of affairs. But the copula is not intuitively fulfilled. In the statement, "the chair is 
yellow", when "is" is a simple copula, we can find no fulfillment in perception for the 
"is", any more than we can find fulfillment for the totality of a given thing when we see 
only an aspect of it. I can see the yellow and the chair, but not the "is", any more than 
I can see the being-yellow.30 
The difference between these two notions of truth is, in short, that the first is 
focussed on the experience as such. I grasp the whole situation in which a chair is there 
as yellow, and comport myself towards the yellow chair. In the second case, I separate 
myself from the experience and begin a rudimentary analysis, such that I perceive the 
30 The analysis recalls the Russell\Frege distinctions in the meaning of "is": 
existential (A is); identity (A is A); predication (A is B); and class inclusion (A is a B). 
Cf. Russell ( 1937) p.64. For these philosophers, the senses of being are not unified. 
Heidegger (like Aristotle) seeks a unity on the basis of truth. Aristotle focusses on ous{a, 
given as true; Heidegger on the complex of human perception of which determines the 
truth of ous{a. 
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chair particularly as a yellow thing, as opposed to any other possibility of colour. In this 
second case, I separate out the quality of yellowness from the chair (I ask if yellow is a 
good colour for the chair); whereas in the first case, I simply live in the situation in which 
the chair is yellow (I sit down on a yellow chair). To express this latter experience of the 
chair in an assertion, I would have to emphasize somehow that the chair "is" yellow; 
something that is lost when I begin to analyze the relation between subject and predicate 
in asserting that the chair is yellow as opposed to, for example, red. Yet on the surface, 
the two assertions have the same structure: "the chair is yellow". 
In assertion, there is a "surplus of intentions", and no demonstration can be made 
either of the notion of being or the notion of truth: predication expresses something that 
is not found perceptually. Furthermore, non-relational acts of simple apprehension can 
also be true: this shows that phenomenology breaks with the restriction of the concept of 
truth to relational acts, or to judgements. Truth as disclosure has its ground in the pre-
predicative comportment in which we relate to being. Thus, writes Heidegger, 
"phenomenology has demonstrated that the non-sensory and ideal cannot without further 
ado be identified with the immanent, conscious, subjective ... and this constitutes the true 
sense of the discovery of categorial intuition" (GA20: 79\58). 
A third concept of truth is that focussed on the intuited entity itself, as that which 
makes knowledge true. This is: 3) the condition of possibility for any truth whatsoever, 
i.e. that the entity reveal itself, that there be "phenomena". As the Greeks saw, it is the 
being of entities that ultimately makes knowledge true. 
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We have been talking about "being" on two levels: as it is initially intuited as self-
given, and as it is expressed in a proposition. Assertion expresses something that is not 
found perceptually (GA20 78\58), and that is why there is no possible fulfillment of what 
is found in the assertion containing the copula except through categorial intuition. A 
perceptual assertion is "communication about the entity perceived in perception and not 
about the act of perception itself' (GA20: 76\57). At the level of simple perception, a 
categorial intuition is already found in giving the thing in its totality. Through an act of 
expression, what is intuited is brought to language. A predicative judgement establishes 
the relation of unity or identity between sensible givens, drawn from intuited content. 
When a relation is explicitly expressed, a categorial act is made and a categorial object 
is given. There are two kinds of categorial acts: acts of synthesis and acts of ideation, 
which seem, respectively, to be a re-appropriation of Aristotle's synthesis and diairesis, 
and a retrieval of Aristotle's notion of "abstraction", or "potential" knowledge of the 
universal through "actual" knowledge of the particular.31 
i) Acts of synthesis 
In bringing the intuition to language, whichever side we accentuate in the 
proposition, "the chair is yellow", involves accentuating the whole relation, the "state of 
affairs". The state of affairs is ideal: being-yellow is not a real property of the chair. 
"What is real is the yellow, and in the state of affairs only the quality is accentuated as 
something real, objective" (GA20: 86\53). The presentation of a state of affairs is only 
possible on the basis of the already given subject matter, but we do not change anything 
31 See ii on acts of ideation below. 
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in the real matter by making an assertion of it. In forming an assertion, "the subject 
matter becomes present in the how of the state of affairs" (GA20: 87\64). The act of 
relating is synthesis and diairesis, wherein by showing that P belongs to S, we do not 
connect two objects, but show the wholeness of S more explicitly. "Synthesis is not a 
connecting of objects, but synthesis and diairesis give objects" (GA20: 87\64). Through 
the accentuation of the state of affairs in this movement, the chair becomes present in 
what it is in a more authentic objectification that brings out the relation of the state of 
affairs (GA20: 86\63). The accentuation of the state of affairs is a categorial form. By 
bringing out this structure through objectification, we make the reality of the thing 
comprehensible in its structure. 
This makes it clear what the work of phenomenology is, and how it is not a betrayal 
of the primordial truth of Dasein as disclosive involvement in the world. The task of 
phenomenology is to bring out the a priori structures which are revealed through 
categorial intuition in intentionality directed towards the being of the perceived. Making 
assertions is not to disturb the truth revealed in intentionality, but to draw out the 
structures inherent in perception. Because synthesis and diairesis inherent in assertion are 
founded on the self-giving of an entity in perception, and because simple perception 
already is pervaded by intuition of categorial forms, assertion brings out the reality- the 
truth or the being- of entities. 
Notice what happens here: Heidegger grants to the assertion the function of 
accentuation, of bringing out the truth of being that we experience in the world. The truth 
of the assertion is theoretically derivative of what we experience as factical beings. 
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Theory then is no longer, as it was in Aristotle, directed towards the eternal in 
"contemplation" [theor{a], but is rather turned towards the world, through the articulation 
of what is experienced in finite transcendence (which, I argue, is praxis). This is the 
meaning of the shift to the practical and its implication for theory. That the theoretical 
is a mode of the practical has radical consequences for any notion of the eternal, or the 
beyond of finite being.32 
ii) Acts of ideation 
The other kind of categorial act is the act of ideation. Such acts do not intend the 
sensible content of perception, but as acts of intuition of the universal, they give the idea 
or species [efdos] of the sensible object. They give what is seen in sensible objects "first 
and simply" (GA20: 91\66). When I look about and see houses, to use Heidegger's 
example, I do not first see them in their distinctive individuality: what I first see is this 
as a house, I see a universal feature of the house.33 This as-what guides my looking at 
the sensible matter, and permits me to make sense of it. The as-what is not expressly 
apprehended in my initial simple intuition, however: the sensible foundation for acts of 
ideation is submitted to an abstractive ideation, such that I bring the species out from 
32 An exploration of this in chapter six will make it clear how Heidegger can write: 
"philosophical research is and remains atheism, which is why philosophy can allow itself 
'the arrogance of thinking' ... this arrogance is the inner necessity of philosophy and its 
true strength" (GA 20: 109\80). 
33 Cf. Aristotle on universals. In seeing a particular individual, we have a perception 
of the universal (Apo: lOOa 17-18; see my chapter one section IV). Also book Mu of the 
Metaphysics (1087a 10-25): we have actual knowledge of particulars, but through the 
perception of individuals, we have potential knowledge of universals. 
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individual instantiations. This gives for the new objectivity of generality (GA20: 94\69), 
which is again founded on practical comportment. 
Heidegger writes that "the categorial 'forms' are not constructs of acts, but objects 
which manifest themselves in these acts" (GA20: 96\70). Categorial acts let an entity be 
seen in its objectivity, not by adding something to them, but by accentuating what is 
already there in a simple act of perception. By illuminating the ideal features of entities, 
categorial acts simply thematize the intuition already inherent in perception. 
Phenomenology, which thematizes the objective features of entities brought out on the 
basis of perception, is scientific ontology. 
c) The a priori 
The third discovery of phenomenology is that of the original sense of the a priori. 
The term itself implies a time sequence, and thus introduces temporality into the notion 
of being: it denotes ontological structures that are already there in entities, and that are 
thus a priori in relation to the here and now of a particular thing (GA20: 101\74). But the 
a priori is not in the entity itself, nor is it some form of "immanent knowledge" of a 
subject: it belongs to the being of the entity, and is thus a structure of meaning. It is 
therefore determined by the way that an entity is perceived and brought into view, the 
way that it is accessed by categorial intuition. The a priori belongs to intentionality, "not 
as title for comportment, but as a title for being" (GA20: 101\74): it is the way that the 
entity first manifests itself as intelligible. Being itself, the way that an entity manifests 
itself as meaningful, has an a priori character, which calls for a priori cognition as a way 
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of approach to apprehending being. Phenomenology is this cognition, that lets us see 
beings as they manifest themselves as accessible. 
Summing up: intentionality in its a priori is the basic field of phenomenological 
research: it denotes the search for the structural elements of entities in their being, 
through transcendent comportments directed towards the meaning of entities. Categorial 
intuition is the originary way of access to these structures, the method of this 
phenomenological research. The method is descriptive, in that categorial acts express 
through accentuation what is originally intuited along with perception, in pre-predicative 
understanding. Accentuation is a form of analysis, in that it shows up theoretically what 
has been pre-predicatively understood in the primary act of transcendence (GA20: 
108\78). The definition of phenomenology as "the analytic description of intentionality 
in its a priori" is now understandable. 
Phenomenology aims then at exposing the truth of beings. We have seen three 
concepts of truth emerge from this analysis. In the next section, I will look more closely 
at what Heidegger means by truth. 
v 
Truth 
In the very dense section 44 of Being and Time, Heidegger, by drawing on what has 
already been discussed concerning Dasein's mode of being as disclosure, arrives at the 
characterization of truth as the disclosedness of human existence in relation to entities as 
disclosed: aletheia. He repeats on a new ontological level the discussion of the 
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relationship between assertion and the primordial mode of revealing on which it is based: 
in this context, it emerges as a search for the ontological foundation of the "traditional" 
concept of truth. The analysis then proceeds in the opposite direction to that of section 
33 on assertion. 
A look at the traditional conception of truth shows that there is clearly a connection 
between logical truth and ontological truth. As Volpi contends, Heidegger was dissatisfied 
with the interpretation of Aristotle (put forward by Brentano) that saw the unity of the 
senses of being as focussed analogically on ous{a. Here he examines being as being-true 
as a possible fundament of this unity, culminating in the virtual identification of being and 
aletheia.34 
There is nothing new about the relationship between truth and being: as Heidegger 
points out, Aristotle describes philosophy both as the science of the truth and the science 
of being qua being, or entities with regard to their being (SZ: 213\256).35 But there is a 
view commonly, and in Heidegger's view, falsely, ascribed to Aristotle: 1) the judgement, 
or the assertion, is the place of truth; and 2) the essence of truth is in the agreement of 
34 Volpi (1988): pp. 5-6. Volpi defends the view that Heidegger goes beyond being 
as truth [to on hos alethes] to giving being itself the character of aletheia. This is 
evidenced in Heidegger's courses of WS 1925\26 (GA:21); WS 1929\30 (GA 29\30); and 
the first part of SS1931 (GA31). Volpi contends that Heidegger later in SS 1931 (GA33), 
on Metaphysics Theta, makes a similar attempt to explore the possibility of being as 
dunamis and energefa as a fundament for the unity of being, such that being itself is 
given the character of phusis. 
35 Cf: Alpha Elatton 993b 20-32. Also, of course being as truth (but, note, predicative 
truth) is one of the four senses of being Aristotle describes inter alia in Meta V 101 ?a 
8ff and Meta. VI 1026a 34ff, though it is rejected there as a subject of the primary 
science. See my chapter two, section II. 
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judgement and object (SZ 214\257; GA21: 128). Aristotle did not in fact say any such 
thing: this explains why to on hos alethes, which is being as the judgment of truth, is not 
being in the most fundamental sense. The truth for Aristotle, as we saw, is the essence 
of things, or the ground of form, not the essence of judgments. Aristotle referred truth to: 
1) entities as revealing themselves (the ground of being in the sense of being true) and 
2) modes of logos as the human disclosure of truth (episteme, techne, phronesis, nous, 
sophia); 3) the way of being that can either uncover or cover up (logos apophantikos). 
Heidegger argues that Aristotle further recognized 4) the primary locus of truth in his 
conception of noesis, which, as pure disclosure, has no opposite, and he discussed 
aisthesis as pure revelation through the senses.36 
We have seen that for Heidegger, the assertion must have, as the ontological 
condition for the possibility of its covering up or uncovering beings, a moment of pure 
disclosure at its root; a moment that Aristotle does not develop. Heidegger's innovation 
is to characterize Dasein as disclosedness. Primordial truth is the place of assertion, and 
not the other way around. Truth is a part of the basic constitution of Dasein, as being-in-
the-world (SZ 226\269). 
Aristotle is however responsible for the traditional notion of truth as agreement, if 
only because of a certain reading of his texts. In De Interpretatione, Aristotle speaks of 
truth as a likening between the soul and its experience of things. At De Int: 16a 7, 
36 Nous is revelatory of universals; aisthesis of particulars. Recall that -episteme 
(which with nous is a theoretical disposition that constitutes sophia) is understanding of 
explanations, but this is not a direct noetic apprehension, since it relies on prior 
knowledge of universals. 
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Aristotle writes that vocal sounds and writing are indications of affects in the soul, and 
that affects in the soul are likenesses of things in the world. Also in De Anima (430a 14-
15) we read: "Nous in the passive sense is such because it becomes all things"; and later 
(430a 20): "Actual knowledge [energefan episteme] is identical with its object". 
Furthermore, in the Metaphysics passages I have discussed, Aristotle clearly talks about 
judgement of the truth or falsity of predication, but one that is not fundamental, since it 
is dependent on a noetic apprehension of the being of things. 37 
The notion of agreement gives rise in Medieval philosophy, and particularly Thomas 
Aquinas, to a conception of truth as adequation or agreement between intellect and thing 
(adequatio intellectus et rei). In Christian theological belief, and with the influence of the 
Platonic conception of participation, this becomes adequatio rei ad intellectum divinum 
(wherein created things only are inasmuch as they correspond to an idea in the mind of 
God); or adequatio intellectus humani ad rem creatam (wherein the created human mind 
must conform to the object as created). Under the influence of the modem conception of 
the dominance of human reason, the Kantian sense of adequatio rei ad intellectum means 
that the subjectivity of human being is such that the perception of an object is constituted 
by the structures of the transcendental subject; whereas the positivist conception of truth 
involves conformity of statement to matter of fact (intellectus ad rem). In each of these 
37 The "correctness" of this judgement, that is, whether the synthesis and diairesis is 
true or not, is dependent on how things are, thus: "he who thinks that what is divided is 
divided, or that what is united is united is right; while he whose thought is contrary to 
the condition of objects is in error" (Meta: 1051b3-5; cf. also 105lb32-35). Truth properly 
consists in knowing whether things are or not, or having n6esis of things; the opposite of 
truth is not falsity but ignorance, or not having noetic apprehension of things [agnoia] 
(Meta: 1052a 1-4). See my discussion of the ef esti in ch. I, sec. II above. 
200 
cases, there is always at issue the question of concordance or correspondence, which 
involves a judgement about whether what is posited concords with what is the case (cf: 
The Essence of Truth, [WW]: 8-10\120-122). 
This begs the question of what this correspondence or agreement means and 
presupposes, and what kind of relation obtains between a statement of something and the 
things about which the statement speaks. A statement about a picture on the wall and the 
picture itself are two very different things, although knowledge, as the outcome of 
judgement concerning agreement of thing and statement, is supposed to give the thing as 
it is. Clearly, we are speaking of a relationship between two different species of things: 
an ideal content, and a real thing that is present-at-hand. The relationship between real 
and ideal content, often framed epistemologically as the way that a subject has knowledge 
of the world over against which it stands, has long remained obscure because it has not 
been questioned in its ground. Thus, writes Heidegger, in one of his most charming lines: 
"Is it accidental that no headway has been made with this problem in over two thousand 
years?"(SZ: 216-7\259). Truth becomes phenomenally explicit when something is 
demonstrated to be true. An analysis of demonstration (not used in the Aristotelian sense) 
will clarify the relationship between statement and thing, by bringing forward truth as 
truth. 
Heidegger's example of the statement "the picture is askew" makes the role of 
intentionality in the demonstration of truth clear. If someone with her back to the wall is 
told that the picture is askew, she turns round to look at the picture to seek confirmation. 
What is confirmed is not agreement between a picture one "represents" to oneself and the 
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actual picture, but whether what the assertion points to is just as the assertion says it is. 
In the absence of the picture, in "empty intending", one has in mind not a representation 
of the picture, but the picture itself. An assertion is therefore not related to a mental 
representation, but to a real thing: it is an intentional relationship which points something 
out. Thus confirmation of a such a statement is gained by looking at the picture, and not 
comparing a "representation" of the picture with itself, not, in other words comparing 
psychical content with physical matter. In looking at the picture, one notes whether it 
does in fact present itself as askew, whether the empty intentionality of the assertion does 
in fact find adequate fulfillment in the entity that it intends. What is confirmed in looking 
at the picture is that the entity is as it is pointed out by the assertion, that the entity shows 
itself in its self-sameness. Thus the uncoveredness of the entity itself is what is 
demonstrated. Being-true then is being as uncovering: inasmuch as what I say reveals 
what is, it is true, inasmuch as it obscures what is, it is false. The subject-object 
distinction, the separation of the real and the psychical and the seeking of "agreement" 
between them, can only be made on the basis of this uncovering. 
This conception is of course not new to our analysis. We have seen already how the 
uncovering and revealing is the true function of the assertion. But we have also seen, and 
see again in this new context, that uncovering and revealing are only possible on the basis 
of Dasein's being as being-uncovering. Since uncovering is a very part of the way that 
Dasein is, as being-in-the-world, since Dasein is this constant comportment of making 
sense of things, it is Dasein that is primarily true, and entities, as uncovered, are true only 
secondarily. It is Daseins' own structure, the structure of Dasein's "there", as being-in and 
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as already ahead of itself, that makes possible the uncovering of entities. As being-in-the-
world in the manner of projective disclosing, Dasein is "in the truth". 
This latter phrase, or principle, as Heidegger calls it, means that disclosedness is a 
part of each of the structures of human existence. The structure of Dasein' s being is care 
[Sorge]. Care signifies the primordial ontological structural totality of Dasein, that is, the 
unity of the various structural elements of Dasein: the being of Dasein means "ahead-of-
itself-being-already-in-(the world) as being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-
world)" (SZ: 192\237). Dasein is ahead of itself in the structure of projection: its 
existentiality is such that it has to transcend itself towards its own being-able-to-be. As 
in-the-world, its factical existence is such that it is thrown. Finally as alongside the world, 
it is absorbed in the things of the world, it is fallen. As a unified phenomenon, care 
signifies the a priori structure that is the condition for the possibility of actual 
comportment in the world.38 
Disclosedness permeates the whole of this structure, such that the disclosure of 
beings within the world is a part of, as well as a consequence of, Dasein' s being. 
Thrownness, as a form of disposition, is part of the structure of Dasein' s disclosedness. 
Dasein is already in a definite world of relation to things and definite patterns of 
involvement with things; this facticity of Dasein means that it is in each case my own 
disclosedness that is at issue. Dasein's mode of being also involves projection, throwing 
itself into its possibilities, as we saw in the discussion of understanding. In trying to make 
38 Cf. Kockelmans (1989): p.165. Care in its temporal meaning will be drawn out in 
the next chapter. 
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sense of itself, Dasein relates to the world, others or itself as potentiality for being. When 
it projects itself authentically, that is, when it discloses itself as its own potential for 
being, when it sees itself in relation to its own ultimate structures and possibilities, when 
it comes face to face with the truth of its own finite existence, then Dasein is in the 
truth.39 Finally, falling is a constitutive element of Dasein's being. Mostly Dasein is not 
contemplating its own finite existence; usually we go about our business, making sense 
of the world and other people, living according to generally accepted norms and beliefs 
(what "they" say). Often we become totally absorbed in the everyday world, we become 
lost, and no longer see entities for what they are. Things become disguised, and even 
though they have been uncovered, now show themselves as semblances. This is a part of 
Dasein's facticity and shows that Dasein is equally in untruth (SZ 221-222\ 264-265). 
Because it is a very part of Dasein's being to be in the untruth, it is a struggle, and 
an essential one, to constantly try to wrest the truth from semblances. Things easily slip 
back into disguise, because we slip back into an everyday mode of just viewing what 
seems to be. Thrown projection- the fact that Dasein is in a world, and must live out 
towards the possibilities of things, others and itself as its means of making sense of the 
situation in which it finds itself- this is the existential ontological condition for the truth 
and untruth that characterizes Dasein. The type of access that we have to entities and to 
ourselves is the condition for our disclosedness. (SZ: 223\265). 
39 This authentic praxis of this projection is the root, as I have noted and will develop 
in chapter five, of the theory\practice division, revealing as it does the meaning of being 
as time. 
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Ultimately then, truth as agreement is a derivative modification of the primordial 
form of truth as Dasein's disclosedness, and this derivative modification leads to a 
theoretical notion of truth, as the truth of judgement. The roots of assertion are likewise 
in the hermeneutical "as" and in Dasein's understanding. An assertion is Dasein's 
expressing itself as intentional, and communicates the way in which entities are 
uncovered. Once an assertion is spoken, it becomes something available, that can be 
repeated and passed on into common parley, becoming adrift from its basis in disclosure 
of an entity. This is to a large extent how we have access to entities: not through our 
original dealings with them, but through hearsay in which the uncoveredness of something 
is preserved. Becoming absorbed in assertions that "they" make, our relationship to what 
is said changes. We no longer even look for the intentional relation to entities which the 
assertion originally spoke: the assertion becomes something "ready-to-hand" available for 
our use and manipulation. 
If, however, we want to demonstrate that the assertion does in fact uncover, we must 
show that what is preserved as uncoveredness in the assertion relates to the entities it 
originally intends. In order to demonstrate this, the assertion as ready-to-hand then shows 
itself as the uncovering of something within the world, and a theoretical relationship is 
established between the assertion and the entities it "describes". The assertion itself is 
seen as a theoretical thing, something present-at-hand, no longer taken for granted, and 
as possibly conforming to something either ready to hand or present at hand. The 
uncovering preserved in the assertion is an uncovering of something: the demonstration 
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we seek to verify this thus takes a theoretical stance towards both entities and assertion. 
Truth becomes agreement.40 
Dasein' s concemful absorption in the things it encounters in the world as it goes 
about its daily business, its pre-understanding of being that allows it to live in such a 
way, leads it to see truth also as something present at hand. The uncoveredness expressed 
in assertions comes to us removed from its intentional relation to entities, and we begin 
to see assertions as assertions "about" something. Truth as disclosedness is obscured by 
the average understanding in which we live. 
Truth is disclosure and Dasein is disclosedness. Truth then is only as long as Dasein 
is, which means that truth is relative to Dasein's being. This is not to say that truth is 
"subjective", meaning that it is a product of the whim of an individual. Rather, it means 
that truth, as a kind of be-ing that is Dasein is ultimately dependent for its being on the 
existence of a subject. There can be an understanding of being only because Dasein is 
constituted by disclosedness. 
Phenomenology then is the disclosure of entities as they are in themselves, which 
is conditional on the a priori existential constitution of Dasein as disclosedness. It 
signifies a way of encountering something, a way of being towards things such that they 
appear from themselves as themselves. Heidegger's method is distinguished from 
Aristotle's in that whereas Aristotle presumes the truth of beings and then inquires into 
the grounds of the being of those beings, Heidegger thematizes the truth of beings, which 
4
° Cf. SZ: 225\268: "Truth as disclosedness and as intending uncovered entities- a 
being which itself uncovers- has become truth as agreement between things that are 
present-at-hand within-the world". 
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we grasp predicatively as the meaning of beings. In attempting to describe how beings 
are, how they show themselves, Heidegger must enter into a description of who it is that 
discerns how they are. The emphasis on human involvement in truth as disclosure entails 
a shift from an emphasis on theoretical knowledge (seeking grounds for why), to a 
prioritization of practical knowledge (seeking description of how). 
This very large look at the meaning of phenomenology in Heidegger, and the way 
in which it bears directly on ontology and the question of the meaning of being clears the 
way for the next move in my analysis. So far I have looked at the being of Dasein 
removed from the temporal structures that constitute it at its very root. In the next 
chapter, I will examine the structures of Dasein that reveal its finitude, and therewith, the 
finitude of being and the absence of God; this contrasts with Aristotle's eternity of 
movement and the eternal prime mover. A discussion of finite transcendence as kinetic 
praxis will also explain how Heidegger grounds Aristotle's energefai: theor{a, po{esis and 
praxis. This will in tum allow for a clearer analysis in chapter six of the radical 
separation of theology and ontology that fundamentally differentiates Heidegger's 
ontology from Aristotle's. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
Ontology and Finite Temporality 
Phenomenology in Heidegger entails, or is identical with, a particular understanding 
of ontology. Up to now, I have discussed Heidegger's ontology without relating it to 
temporality [Zeitlichkeit]. In this chapter, I will look at some of the structures of Dasein's 
being that bring out the connection between human being and time. The thematization of 
Dasein as finite radically affects the function of a possible God in ontology. 
What being means, the truth of being, is for Heidegger how human being 
understands and interprets beings. Human understanding of being is conditioned by human 
finitude. Finitude relates not only to the fact of death, but through and because of human 
mortality, it permeates the care structure of Dasein as thrown, fallen, and ahead of itself. 
Being itself- the network of meaning that Dasein experiences- is finite because Dasein is 
finite. Being is always the being of entities, and Dasein' s relationship to entities is 
necessarily constrained by Dasein's own finitude. The world, in the "objective" sense of 
the "stuff' out there that does not include me, of course will not come to an end with my 
death. "World" in Heidegger's sense, however, is the understanding involvement of 
Dasein in a given structure of relations. This world does come to an end when I die; 
Heidegger can only discuss the world as Dasein experiences it. Death as an end is not the 
207 
208 
main issue in Heidegger's discussion, however; rather, it is the way that Dasein lives as 
one who will die that is thematized in the question of the meaning of being. 
Though Dasein persistently avoids the issue of its mortality, the experience of angst 
reveals the unavoidable truth of finitude. Conscience calls Dasein back from its guilty 
denial of this "nullity" towards recognition of Dasein's true uttermost potentiality, that 
is, the absence of any possible further potentiality for being. Radical understanding and 
acceptance of Dasein' s own finitude, "anticipatory resolve", is the clue to authenticity. 
Authenticity is an existentiell: it is a particular way of relating to the world by 
understanding oneself as thrown. But even in relating to other entities, Dasein is primarily 
concerned with itself. Finite temporality is thus the primordial ontological basis of 
Dasein's existentiality as a whole. The kinetic praxis of transcendence by means of which 
Dasein understands being is itself consequently finite: it leads Dasein beyond itself, 
beyond the isolation of the ego over against a naked set of facts, but towards the world. 
Transcendence is not transcendence of, "over", or "beyond" the world, not towards an 
eternal being, but towards the (finite) world, towards the discovery of meaning. 
My general aim in this thesis is to show how and why Heidegger's ontology differs 
from Aristotle's on the issue of God. A secondary aim is to show how Heidegger, in 
conversation with the Greek master, retrieves and transforms some of Aristotle's 
fundamental notions to accomplish this difference. In this chapter, I map out some of the 
basic conceptual shifts that mark the change. These include a shift from the priority of 
theory to the priority of praxis, from the priority of the eternal to the priority of the finite, 
and from the priority of actuality to the priority of possibility. The methodological 
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difference between Aristotle and Heidegger is explanatory of these changes, and thus, I 
will argue in chapter six, of the shift from ontotheology towards an ontology that is 
independent of theological considerations. 
In this chapter, I document the shift from an ontology that is dependent on the 
notion of eternity to one that is rooted in temporal finitude. This involves thematizing this 
finitude, and how it affects Dasein as a rational being who interprets being. My approach 
in this chapter is first to describe the way in which Dasein's finitude is evidenced to 
Dasein itself in angst (section one), then to describe the nature of this finitude (section 
two) and how Dasein understands it authentically (section three). On this basis, it can be 
argued in section four that finitude is an essential feature of Dasein's being as care. In 
the fifth section, I discuss how Dasein' s two modes of comportment in concern- practice 
and theory- are a retrieval and transformation of two of Aristotle's energefai. The unity 
of these energefai, understood now as dunameis, is to be found in a fundamental human 
praxis, also dynamic, and thus kinetic, discussed in the final section of this chapter. This 
will lay the ground for my argument in chapter six that the separation between ontology 
and theology which is a consequence of Dasein as radically finite does not necessarily 
entail throwing out consideration of the infinite from phenomenological ontology. 
I 
Angst 
The first question in the analysis of Heidegger's finite ontology is how Dasein 
understands itself as finite. This requires an examination of authenticity. A theme that 
210 
runs through Being and Time is the back and forth between authenticity and 
inauthenticity, not to be confused with the methodological shift between existential and 
existentiell analysis. Authenticity is that which constitutes the most extreme possibility 
of Dasein, and that which principally determines Dasein (BZ: 10\1 OE). As indicative of 
Dasein' s awareness of its existential situation, authenticity gathers all of the characteristics 
of Dasein's being, and shows them as what they are. But Dasein is in fact authentic only 
on an existentiell level: authenticity is an "existentiell modification" of the inauthentic 
they-self (SZ:267\312). It is angst that brings Dasein back to itself from fallenness in the 
they, and "makes manifest to it that authenticity and inauthenticity are possibilities of its 
being". (SZ: 190\235). 
Angst is the primary mode of revelation of Dasein's finitude. We have already 
looked at the mode of falling and absorption in the world of concern as essential 
ontological structures of Dasein. Being thrown into a particular world of interrelations, 
Dasein is easily lost in concern for the things and easily available concepts it finds ready 
to hand. Being so absorbed in the everyday is a way of turning away from or "fleeing" 
in the face of Dasein's potentiality for being itself. The retreat into the "they" is a fleeing 
from Dasein itself, and it is grounded in angst. Angst makes us want to retreat to the 
comfortable ground of living according to well-accepted rules. It is an indefinite form of 
fear: an oppressive feeling of overwhelming lostness and helplessness and responsibility. 
No definite thing in the world, but rather being-in-the-world as such provokes angst 
(SZ: 186\230; GA20: 402\290); angst is latent in being-in-the world. Angst is 
indeterminate: we simply feel ill at ease, uncanny, not at home [unheimlich]; all things 
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recede and sink into indifference, but in this receding things somehow close in on us (WM 
32\103). 
That which we are anxious about is also indefinite: it is our own authentic 
potentiality for being in the world. Angst provokes the realization that Dasein is free, free 
to choose what it can be, free to chose itself. Dasein is anxious about its potentiality, 
revealed to it in all its nakedness as nothing fixed, nothing determinate; and it is free in 
the face of being-in-the-world. The world is disclosed as the simple relational "where" 
in which Dasein will be as it can be. This "where" is not determinate: there is nowhere 
in particular to be nothing in particular, there is no directive. 
Through the experience of angst, the potentiality for being of Dasein, as being-in 
a world, is individualized and thrown (SZ 188\233). Angst throws Dasein back upon itself 
as the only one who is at issue; its choices are its own, no longer prescribed by the 
comfortable directives of the "they". It is pure potentiality, but its potentiality is its own; 
what it can choose is dependent only on what is given to it, as a thrown entity. The world 
of the "they" is revealed as empty, and Dasein is face to face with itself as possibility to 
be, and as having to be. Everything, including the very existence of Dasein, seems 
precarious, and the world itself slips away. In this sense, Dasein means being held out 
into the nothing (WM:35\l05), and this is transcendence (WM 38\108). 
Dasein is held out beyond the factual existence of beings, into the meaninglessness 
of the nothing. But this very meaninglessness, this absence of connection, draws Dasein 
back again to beings. Faced with itself, with what it essentially is, (thrown possibility), 
Dasein is drawn out beyond what it factically is, towards its possibilities. But to 
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experience these possibilities, Dasein must return to beings, through which it can 
experience itself. This is the movement of transcendence, here shown as prescribed by a 
angst as a fundamental disposition of Dasein. 
The nothing that opens before the anxious Dasein throws Dasein back on its own 
authentic potentiality-for being-in-the world (SZ: 187\232), and opens Dasein to the 
freedom for its ownmost potentiality-for- being, and thus for the possibility of authenticity 
or inauthenticity. 1 The tripartite care structure of Dasein- existentiality, facticity and 
being-fallen- is clearly stated here. Anxiety shows Dasein as factically existing as being-
in-the-world. Dasein projects onto possibilities, it is ahead of itself, it has to transcend 
itself towards its own potentiality for being; it is thrown, it finds itself in a world already 
given, revealed forcefully in angst; and it is fallen, it flees from itself, from its authentic 
possibilities into the they-self. Heidegger's contention that "being is an issue" for Dasein 
means that Dasein is self-projective. Understanding oneself as finite is the ground of 
transcendence, which is how Dasein understands being. 
But this dedication to oneself in authentic understanding, to this Dasein that each 
of us is, is not something that Dasein does: it is not the expression of a practical 
comportment. Theory and practice are both possibilities of Dasein defined as care (SZ: 
193\238), a way of being that defines what Dasein essentially is, as the possibility of 
being authentic or inauthentic. Care finds its meaning in a more original form of praxis, 
1 As Henry points out (1992; p. 357), "this revelation [i.e the self-revelation of 
existence] is not peculiar to anxiety; like the revelation of the world, the revelation of 
being-in-the-world, the revelation of existence to itself, is the fact of affectivity 
[Befindlichkeit] itself." 
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that of transcendence. Awareness of finitude in angst, by pushing Dase in towards 
projection of its possibilities in relation to beings, in a sense provokes understanding of 
what is. 
Human finitude is not thematized in Aristotle; instead, for Aristotle what provokes 
the movement to understand what is, is the given telos of human being to become 
rational, to exercise the divine part of our nature in contemplation of the eternal. Thus 
whereas in Heidegger the push towards understanding being is rooted in finitude, for 
Aristotle it is rooted in eternity. But what does finitude mean for human being in 
Heidegger's analysis? 
II 
Death 
In division one of Being and Time, the preparatory analysis of Dasein, Heidegger 
for the most part looked at the existentiells, the way that individual Dasein comports itself 
in the world; then he looked to the condition of possibility for such comportment, the 
existential structure that underlies the existentiell. This analysis was done primarily from 
the perspective of the inauthentic "they-self'. In the second division of Being and Time, 
Dasein and Temporality, Heidegger seeks to lay clear the authentic mode of Dasein's 
potentiality for being, in order to bring the whole of Dasein to light, not only the 
inauthentic, everyday mode of its existence. Here there is a reversal in methodology: 
Heidegger examines the ontological conditions of authenticity before seeing it "attested" 
in the ontic mode. The totality of Dasein, we saw, is the tripartite structure of care. 
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Authentic Dasein must now be included in this totality, not only in order to make the 
analysis complete, but also to explain what the individual Dasein is in its own selfhood. 
Dasein was characterized ontologically as care, and care is defined as "ahead-of-
itself-being-already-in-(the world) as being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-
world)" (SZ: 192\237). This is the disclosure structure of the one who discloses being. As 
Aristotle seeks a unity in the ways that being is said, Heidegger, since he thematizes 
human involvement in the disclosure of what being means, must find a unity in the way 
that being is understood. 
The fact that aheadness is part of the disclosure structure would seem to make the 
task of getting Dasein into our grasp as a whole impossible. Dasein's existence is defined 
in terms of potentiality: this implies a not-yet that remains to be filled. If the essence of 
Dasein is existence, and if existence is potentiality, then "'existence' means a potentiality-
for-being- but also one which is authentic" (SZ: 233\276). Why so? Because authenticity 
is part of the essence of Dasein: it is what Dasein is in its own intimate mode. The 
condition of possibility for Dasein's being as care is the temporality and historicity of 
Dasein, its living always towards its own ultimate possibility, while finding itself already 
in a given world of possibilities, and having to choose among them. The task then is not 
only to explain how aheadness, with its structure of projecting onto possibilities, can be 
incorporated into an interpretation of Dasein as a whole, but also how we can ensure that 
the interpretation includes Dasein as authentic. There are thus two questions that arise: 
1) the existentiell one of whether Dasein as a whole is possible, and 2) the existential one 
of what Dasein' s end, totality and death are. 
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1) The existential analytic started with everydayness, the being "between" birth and 
death. The end of being-in-the-world is death, which limits and determines what is 
possible for Dasein. Death, as the possibility that destroys all other future possibilities, 
can be experienced in life existentielly only as being-towards-death [Sein zum Tade]. 
Dasein lives towards its own death, directing itself towards this end.2 Being ahead of itself 
means that Dasein exists for the sake of itself, and comports itself towards its ultimate 
potentiality for being. This implies that there is always something outstanding which has 
not yet become actual, until the ultimate potentiality is fulfilled in death. This presents 
a difficulty of course: in achieving wholeness through death, Dasein is no more; in 
becoming complete, in no longer having anything outstanding, Dasein ceases to be its 
"there". It cannot experience its own death or reflect back upon it. It seems impossible 
then that we can ever get the whole of human being into a comprehensive grip. 
Furthermore, another Dasein can never stand in for us in death: dying is in every case my 
own (SZ: 240\284). Death is always my own death (GA20: 429\310). It is my own being 
that is at stake: no one can die for me- even sacrificing oneself for the sake of another 
is only putting off what is inevitable for the other. 
Three theses then emerge from the analyses in section 47 of Being and Time, 
described above: i) Dasein is such that it has something still outstanding, a not-yet; ii) 
coming-to-its-end involves the destruction of Dasein; and iii) there can be no substitution 
or representation for Dasein in its coming-to-an-end. However, it becomes clear that to 
2 Since death is a potential for being in this sense, how can Dasein be interpreted 
authentically as a whole? This will be resolved in the fact of Dasein's wanting to have 
a conscience, as we will see below. 
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think of death in this way, is to posit Dasein as something merely present-at-hand, that 
can "disappear" or become no-longer present-at-hand. An existential analysis is wanting. 
We have to then to rethink what "end" and "totality" mean, and we must think these from 
Dasein's being, in such a way that "end" signifies being-a-whole. "Dying is not an event", 
writes Heidegger, "it is a phenomenon to be understood existentially" (SZ: 240\284). 
Dying is what constitutes the wholeness of Dasein and is thus an existential matter. 
2) In discussing what is still "outstanding" in Dasein, we must be careful to define 
the kind of "becoming" that is involved: it is not to be understood as a debt that has yet 
to be paid, a sum to be exacted that only affects Dasein at the very moment of payment. 
The not-yet is not a perceptual trick, like the waxing and waning of the moon, when we 
see only some parts of it. Nor is it the growing towards fulfillment or perfection like a 
ripening fruit. As Heidegger points out, we often die well after we have achieved 
"ripeness"; or most often, we die before having achieved fulfillment. The analogy with 
ripeness does help in the understanding of death in relation to Dasein, however, when we 
note that ripeness is not something outside the fruit that is somehow added to it 
afterwards. The not-yet of unripeness is the being of the fruit; the coming to ripeness of 
the fruit is already prescribed by the what-it-is of the fruit itself. Death is what Aristotle 
would call an "irrational potency"3: it belongs to Dasein as given potential, and is not a 
3 Though he does not do so, at least not in the specific case of human beings. 
Aristotle does of course treat generation and destruction of all sensible ous{a as a natural 
process (that is, one that affects sensible things as ta phusei). However, the fulfillment 
of the telos of a sensible ous{a is the attainment of form; since, as I argued in chapter 
two, an individual ous{a does not have its own form, form is not destroyed with the 
destruction of the individual. Matter is that which is receptive of coming-to-be and 
passing-away, and thus the material ground of destruction (De Gen. et Corr.: 320a 3-5). 
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matter of choice. The coming towards death, Dasein's ultimate potentiality-for-being, is 
what Dasein is. 
Dasein then is already its not-yet. End-ing and dy-ing, understood as processes, and 
not as some definite stopping points, are part of Dasein's existence, ways of being of 
Dasein. We start dying as soon as we are born. It is clear that the not-yet of Dasein is 
then not something still outstanding, that awaits Dasein. But what it is in a positive sense 
needs to be looked at, with the help of the care structure: existentiality, facticity, and 
f allenness. 
Death is the uttermost possibility towards which Dasein comports itself. It is 
something impending, as a possibility of myself that I must take over: it is ownmost: the 
issue at stake in Dasein' s confrontation with death is its own being-in-the-world, and the 
possibility of no longer being there. It is non-relational: when Dasein is confronted with 
its own death, it removes itself from all relationships to other Daseins. It is 
Matter thus fulfills its potential in destructing. However, ous{ai are not essentially but 
only accidentally material: they are defined according to the species- essence which does 
not pass away with the particular instantiation. There is no destruction in a universal 
sense. Thus what is to be explained is not the destruction of this individual, but the source 
of motion of the perpetual cycle of generation and destruction, sensible things attaining 
form and then passing away; and this is "the province of the ... prior philosophy" (318a 
17): it is God as pure form. 
As for Heidegger, then, also for Aristotle death is not a fulfillment of telos; for 
Aristotle, it is a completion of potential on a material plane. In the context of the Ethics, 
Aristotle mentions that nous constitutes human happiness providing that humans have a 
complete span of life (1 lOa 5; 1077b 24-5). The death of an individual is not a telos, but 
a naturally prescribed ending, an irrational potency having to do with matter, that should 
occur at an appropriate time in order for human beings to reach their rational telos. This 
is again similar to Heidegger: death is not a fulfillment of what we are given to be (not 
a culmination like ripeness), but yet it is a potency- the ultimate possibility already given 
to us, and in the light (or shadow) of which we live out our other possibilities. Death is 
an irrational potentiality (a material potency) in that we do not choose it. 
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unsurpassable: "death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Dasein" (SZ: 
250\294). Existence, as ahead-of itself, grounds dying. Dasein is disclosed to itself 
essentially as in terms of possibility, as ahead-of-itself. Thus we see the existentiaJity of 
Dasein reflected in death. 
Facticity plays a role, when we see that Dasein is thrown into the possibility of 
death. I am always already thrown into the situation in which I am dying. This 
thrownness is revealed, as we have seen, in angst. Anxiety in the face of death is anxiety 
towards being-in-the-world itself, because it is angst in the face of that unsurpassable 
possibility of Dase in' s being. It is not fear in the face of one's own demise, but a basic 
disposition of Dasein, awareness that Dasein is a thrown being-towards-its-end. The 
existential conception of dying is thrown being towards its ownmost potentiality for being 
(SZ: 251\295). 
For the most part, Dasein flees in the face of death: in relation to death, then, it is 
mostly fallen. It is ignorant of death, and not in the state of awareness of death that angst 
reveals. Mostly, Dasein, absorbed in the world of concern, covers up dying, flees in the 
face of it, and uncanniness announces itself. Existence, facticity and fallenness then 
characterize being-towards-the end (SZ: 253\296). Dying, an ontological possibility of 
Dasein, is grounded in care. How does this play out in everydayness? 
Being towards death authentically means that Dasein comports itself in relation to 
itself as its own ultimate possibility. But in everydayness, Dasein comports itself in 
relation to others, in particular, in relation to the "they", the public interpretation of 
things. In the everyday mode, Dasein knows that death is a certain fact, but it is seen as 
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an event that occurs in the world, that is neither personally imminent, nor, as such, really 
important. There is a temptation to cover up the fact of our own deaths. Moreover, we 
conceal death even from those who are obviously dying: we tranquilize them, and we 
treat death as a social inconvenience, or as "tactlessness" (SZ: 254\298). To think about 
one's own death is publicly considered to be a form of fear, and thus cowardice; whereas 
in fact it takes courage to confront our own death in the mode of angst. The result of this 
public denial is that Dasein is alienated from its own death. Not surprisingly, then, the 
experience of death in the they-self is that of falling. The ownmost potentiality for being 
that is non-relational and unsurpassable is an issue for Dasein, and one which Dasein 
attempts to evade in taking refuge in the they. 
The certainty that I myself will one day die is "the basic certainty of Dasein itself' 
(GA20: 437\316). The everyday certainty about death is not authentic certainty, however, 
since it involves evasion and concealment of Dasein's own death. The everyday Dasein 
is not certain about being-towards-death, but about the empirical fact that all people die. 
In fact, what is certain is that death is possible at any moment, though it is indefinite as 
to its when (SZ: 258\302). To cover up the indefiniteness of death is to cover up its 
authentic certainty. Since covering up involves the prior existence of something that must 
be concealed, "inauthenticity is based on the possibility of authenticity" (SZ: 259\303). 
But as a kind of certainty, authentic being-towards death is an existentiell possibility of 
Dasein; it is a decision that must be made, a choice amongst others.4 
4 Cf. the course of summer 1925: "Dasein's running forward toward death at every 
moment means Dasein's drawing back from the they by way of a self-choosing" (GA20: 
440\318). 
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Being-towards-death is being towards a distinctive possibility of Dasein. This does 
not mean actualizing the possibility, nor brooding on it, or calculating how we can control 
it. It must be understood as a possibility, not annihilated. Nor is expecting death an 
appropriate comportment, for this is to wait for its actualization. Rather, to be towards the 
possibility of death is to act such a way that death is seen as a possibility. This is 
anticipation. 5 
Death is an "irrational potentiality": we do not choose it. Aristotle and Heidegger 
agree on this. They also agree that death is not fulfillment of a telos, but rather a potential 
within finite sensible beings. For Aristotle, death (destruction) is the material end of a 
particular, but the universal form or essence of a particular is eternal. For Heidegger death 
is my own; it is not simply my end, but permeates my ontological structure as being-
towards-death. The focus for Heidegger is not to see my death in relation to an eternal 
continuation after me, but rather to live my life in relation to my finitude which is all that 
I can know. Heidegger notes that the existential analysis of death is an interpretation of 
death insofar as it is a possibility of being of any particular Dasein. In this sense it is 
"this-worldly": it cannot take any existentiell stand on the question of whether there is 
another world after this one, or if Dasein is immortal and lives on beyond death.6 What 
5 Dasein's finitude as revealed in the fact of death, and in the anticipation of death, 
does not constitute an "extrinsic" limitation, but rather a starting point. As Dastur writes, 
death is "a limitation which, because it is internal, makes possible [Dasein's] own 
surpassing, i.e. makes possible both ekstasis and temporality" (Dastur: 1992; p.177). 
6 Cf. SZ: 248\292: "Only when death is conceived in its full ontological essence can 
we have any methodological assurance in even asking what may be after death; only then 
can we do so with meaning and justification. Whether such a question is a possible 
theoretical question at all will not be decided here. The this-worldly ontological 
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it means to know about one's finitude, and how one knows it, is the subject of the next 
section. 
III 
Anticipatory Resolve 
Anticipation is the possibility of understanding one's ownmost potentiality-for-being. 
It reveals that it is my own being that is at stake, and thus wrenches me from the they. 
This ownmost possibility is non-relational: it is me myself that must take over my own 
being. It is an unsurpassable possibility; anticipation frees me for my ownmost 
possibilities in showing how these are determined by the end and are thus finite. By 
letting me see that the uttermost possibility is death, it loosens my hold, and allows me 
to choose among the possibilities that precede this ultimate one. I can thus see myself as 
a whole, bounded by the ultimate possibility. Anticipation reveals death as a certain 
possibility, more primordial than any empirical certainty we encounter in the world. 
Finally, anticipation, as an indefinite possibility, is essentially angst (SZ: 266\310). 
Anticipating the indefinite certainty of death keeps open the constant threat that is a part 
of Dasein's "there": it brings us towards the nothing. Anticipation then reveals to Dasein 
its lostness in the they, and brings it to the possibility of being itself, in an "impassioned 
freedom" towards death (SZ: 267\311). 
interpretation of death takes precedence over any ontical other-worldly speculation." The 
finitude of Dasein seems to prohibit speculation concerning what might lie beyond its 
own finite existence. This is significant for the analysis of how a god might appear in 
Heidegger's thought. 
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Ontologically, we can see now the possibility of existentiell being-towards-death as 
the possibility of Dasein's being-a-whole. But it remains a purely ontological possibility. 
We need to see phenomenal evidence that authentic existence is possible; we need to see 
it "attested" in Dasein. 
Dasein is usually lost in the inauthenticity of the "they self'. It does not choose its 
own possibilities, but allows the common way of behaving, the expected mode of 
comportment, to make its choices for it. One of Dasein' s possibilities is that of bringing 
itself back from its lostness in the "they" to its authentic being-itself. The move to 
authenticity is thus an existentiell possibility, an alteration in the everyday self, and one 
that must be chosen. But how can Dasein know that there is this possibility if it is lost 
in the they? As possibility, Dasein is also potentiality-for-being-itself, but it must have 
this "attested", it must feel some pull, or have the possibility of authenticity presented to 
it. The voice of conscience, as a primordial phenomenon of Dasein, plays this role (SZ: 
268\313). 
Conscience discloses: it is a call, a mode of discourse. We have seen that discourse, 
logos, is the expression of disposition and understanding as constitutive existential 
elements of Dasein's disclosedness, which itself is the being of Dasein's there. The call 
of conscience is an appeal to Dasein, and calls it to its ownmost potentiality-for-being 
(SZ: 269\314). It is not an utterance, not an actual voice, but a "giving to understand" (SZ: 
271\316). It is a discourse that discloses understanding- understanding that we are lost in 
the they. The call comes to the they-self, but one is called to one's own self, away from 
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the they-self, which then collapses (SZ: 272\317). However there are not two selves; only 
an authentic self hidden in the they. 
The call does not say anything, does not give any information. '"Nothing gets called 
to this self, but it has been summoned to itself- that is, to its ownmost potentiality-for-
being" (SZ: 273\318). It is silent: it has an indefinite content, but the direction it takes is 
sure. It is an appeal to the they-self in its self. It is a summons to be one's genuine self. 
To the question of who does the calling, or where the call comes from, Heidegger 
replies unequivocally: "the call comes from me and yet from beyond me and over me" 
(SZ: 275\320). "It" calls: and the "it" is not some other person in the world with me.7 The 
conscience is sometimes thought to be a voice that comes from a power beyond ourselves, 
that is, from God. We cannot make this leap, in Heidegger's view. (Or if we do, we must 
first go through the interpretation of Dasein's existential constitution.) The conscience is 
a phenomenon of Dasein: we must stick to the phenomena as we find them. There is no 
justification for taking recourse to a being that has some character other than Dasein for 
an explanation of the conscience as a phenomenon that occurs in Dasein (SZ: 275-
7 This raises the question of whether the call of conscience could not be some 
biologically determined mechanism. Perhaps it could be a matter of "instinct", (that vague 
term that is called upon as a way of explaining inexplicable behaviour). In Heidegger's 
view, to call upon biology here would be to take Dasein as an object present-at-hand. It 
would be, in other words, to step away from our phenomenological experience of being 
this entity, and to treat the manifestation of conscience as a fact, instead of as a lived 
experience. Heidegger notes that the caller of the call has also been conceived as some 
sort of objective power shared by all hearers, a kind of universal conscience; it has been 
seen as something we all share by virtue of being human beings, or as something that 
comes from the outside and attains all of us as human beings. This "world-conscience" -
as some kind of public recognition of a higher morality that we should all follow in order 
for things to run smoothly- this is simply the voice of the "they". 
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276\320-321). Again we see that there is no appeal to an eternal; unlike Aristotle, 
Heidegger seeks grounds for the phenomenon of human being only in human being. The 
conscience is mine in each case: it comes to me and from me (SZ: 278\323). 
Conscience is Dasein calling itself from its thrownness to its potentiality for being, 
its being as pro-ject. The call is the call of care: it is rooted in the ontological fact that 
Dasein is thrown, is fallen, and is ahead-of-itself. 
If there is a call, there must be a hearing that corresponds to it. This Heidegger calls 
"wanting to have a conscience" [Gewissenhabenwollen]. This is the choosing to choose, 
the existentiell shift to authenticity that is called resolve [Entschlossenheit]. If the call 
discloses by awakening understanding, it is only by an understanding of the call that the 
experience of the call can be grasped. This understanding is the existential condition of 
possibility of Dasein's existentiell being-able-to-be. 
Despite the existential turn of Heidegger's analysis, it is difficult not to see a 
parallel with Aristotle's ethics here. Crudely stated, for Aristotle, we are as human beings 
torn between appetite and reason, between the animal and the divine, between what we 
are unthinkingly, and what we are rationally and essentially. Desire [6rexis] is between 
these two, as an irrational element of the soul which yet participates in the rational 
principle (NE: 1102b 13). Desire is desire for the good; like Heidegger's conscience, 
when applied rationally, it calls us towards what we truly are. In Aristotle, the language 
is one of telos, the rational end of human being. Choice, fproafresis] supposes this 
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rational end, and, with the right desire, looks for the means by which to accomplish it.8 
But notice that for Aristotle what we truly are is rational; and we achieve our telos in 
contemplation of the eternal. For Heidegger, so far, we are not called to anything other 
than ourselves, and to recognition of what we are. Aristotle's "final cause" becomes 
Dasein's "for the sake of itself'. We should ask then what, in Heidegger, does the call 
give one to understand? 
The call of conscience is the call of care: it is Dasein calling to Dasein, calling it 
back from fallenness, to what it factically is. Being free for the call means letting myself 
be called to the potentiality-for-being that as Dasein I already am. Conscience calls me 
to accept myself as thrown, as fallen, and as potentiality for being. I choose myself in 
facing the nullity that makes me up.9 Ultimately then the conscience has nothing 
normative about it: 10 it displays what Dasein is, as finite. Wanting to have a conscience, 
allowing oneself to be called to account, is accepting the radical finitude that permeates 
Dasein's existence. The conscience is not a purveyor of practical advice; it calls one to 
8 Proafresis is thus "deliberate desire of things in our own power, for we first 
deliberate, then select, and finally fix our desire according to the result of our 
deliberation" (1113a 13-14 ). 
9 In the important section 58 of Being and Time, Heidegger discusses the 
phenomenon of guilt, so commonly associated with the conscience. Guilt is the ground 
for a being that is defined as a not: it is the basis of a nullity in the core of Dasein. This 
nullity, the nothing that was already called to our attention in angst, is essentially the lack 
of power that one has over one's thrown existence. I never asked to be here, in this 
particular world: I do not have complete control. Even in choosing among the possibilities 
open to me, I must always reject some: I cannot realize all of my possibilities fully. My 
freedom is then conditioned by my powerlessness, my thrownness, manifested in 
Befindlichkeit. Dasein is guilty, indebted, at its root. 
10 Except inasmuch as an "is" might imply an "ought": but this is another topic. 
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factical action only when, in hearing the call authentically, Dasein brings itself to its own 
potentiality for being in the world. 
Understanding the call of conscience is a mode of Dasein' s being; it is a way in 
which Dasein is disclosed. Disclosedness, Dasein's openness to the world, the primordial 
truth of Dasein, is constituted by understanding and disposition, as the pre-articulation of 
Dasein's being which determine logos, as that articulation. In the case of the conscience, 
understanding involves existing in the pure possibility that projecting oneself on one's 
own potentiality for being implies (SZ: 295\342). The corresponding disposition is evoked 
in coming face to face with the nothingness that this pure potentiality reveals: it is being 
ready for the consequent angst. The call itself is a kind of discourse, but it does not 
provoke a counter-discourse in wanting to have a conscience. The articulation of the 
understanding and mood that characterize wanting to have a conscience is manifest, 
paradoxically, as keeping silent. Heidegger calls it "reticence'', an end to any chit-chat or 
to pleading one's cause in the face of guilt, and listening quietly to the stillness of what 
one essentially is. Putting together these elements of Dasein's disclosedness, then, we 
have "reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost being-guilty, in which one is ready for 
angst" (SZ: 297\343). This is resolve [Entschlossenheit]. 
Resolve is authentic disclosedness, it is the revelation of authentic being-one's-self. 
Of course, because conscience calls us into our definite factical possibilities, it reveals a 
situation to Dasein. It is not in other words, a disclosure of an isolated ego, but an 
uncovering of Dasein as involved in the world- a given world with determined limits. 
Anticipatory resolve is a kind of understanding, a disclosure of Dasein as both the 
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revealing and the being-revealed. Dasein is both the call of conscience, and what 
conscience calls. Anticipatory resolve permits Dasein to see what it actually is, and how 
it is in its factical situation as being-in-the-world. 
I mentioned that the conscience calls one to taking factical action. This is not, 
Heidegger is adamant to point out, a kind of practical comportment that is to be 
contrasted with some kind of theoretical "faculty". Activity in the sense it is used here 
includes passivity (SZ: 300\347). Indeed Heidegger is referring again to what we 
discussed in the last chapter as the praxis of Dasein that precedes the theory\practice split. 
The projecting of Dasein onto its possibilities is presupposed before any such division. 
This praxis, which I am gradually trying to develop here, is that of the kinetic 
involvement of Dasein in its own existence: at its root it is the temporality of Dasein, 
already becoming more evident here as a living-with, acceptance of and reaction to, 
Dasein' s own finitude. 11 
So far, we have seen anticipation as authentic being-towards-death as the solution 
to how the whole of Dasein can be taken into our grasp existentially. Living towards 
death, and projecting onto possibilities that fall short of this ultimate possibility is part 
of the ontological (existential) structure of Dasein. Resolve demonstrates how this 
authentic potentiality can be achieved existentielly, that is, how it can be seen to occur 
as a choice made by an individual Dasein. The question now is how to tie these together, 
11 I have mentioned, and discuss further in section v below, how this contrasts with 
Aristotle's notion of praxis: for Aristotle, praxis is engagement in the world, a doing that 
is guided by the prescribed telos of human being as rational. Praxis is the activity 
associated with phr6nesis, a disposition not towards any action whatsoever, but to the 
choosing of means to ends that conform to the rational human telos. 
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the aim still being to see how the unity and totality of Dasein is possible. Seeking unity 
in Dasein has the same motivation that Aristotle had in seeking a unity in the ways that 
being is said: to know how it is possible that we understand (the meaning of) being. An 
analysis of care will clarify this unity in the light of finitude. 
IV 
Care and temporality 
Care, the unity of the being of Dasein, indicates the harmonious unity of 
existentiality, facticity and fallenness. The projecting onto possibilities of existentiality 
encompasses death as an ontological element understood ontically by authentic Dasein in 
anticipatory resolve as being-towards-death, the authentic potentiality for being a whole 
of Dasein. The existentials of death, conscience and guilt have furthermore been seen as 
anchored in care. But what holds this structure together? What is, in other words, the 
unity not of the ways that being is "said", but of the ways that being is understood. 
Since care indicates the entity for which its very being is an issue (GA20: 406\294), 
the immediate answer to such a question is clearly "I!" It is my self, my persisting as 
something that is, that constitutes the unity of care. Of course what this self is, is 
somewhat obscure, since Dasein presents itself (primarily) in the "they-self' as well as 
in the authentic self. Since the essence of Dasein is in its existence- since, in other words, 
what Dasein is, is played out and determined in the being of that entity, the answer to the 
unity of Dasein must be found in existential analysis. 
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The immediate "f' is not a bare subject: since the beginning of our analysis it has 
been evident that Dasein has always to be conceived in relation to the world of meaning 
in which it finds itself. The worldless I, the transcendental ego, and the consequent 
"division of tasks" of this ego into the theoretical and practical misses out on the most 
basic phenomenological findings. The I is always involved in a world; any sort of 
theoretical knowing is derivative of the primordial experience of Dasein's being already 
involved in the totality of meanings that make up the "world". Theoretical knowing 
requires explicit reflection; whereas the primordial praxis of Dasein is the pre-predicative 
projective knowing that constitutes Dasein's disclosedness. Saying "I" is expressing 
oneself as being in the world. Aristotle did not seek the unity of the ego in its various 
energefa, except insofar as he saw a unified telos of human activity. In Aristotelian 
language, Heidegger is looking for a formal, rather than final unity; but what Dasein is 
cannot be separated from "where" it is, that is, the ego cannot be constituted without 
reference to the world. 
For Heidegger, in the everyday self, the I is constantly asserting itself as over 
against and separate from the world with which it is concerned. Being fallen into the 
they-self, the denial of what one authentically is, is a part of what Dasein is, as non-self-
constant. However, in anticipatory resoluteness, the authentic moment of disclosedness 
of Dasein as authentic potentiality-for-being-its-self, the constancy of the self is evidenced 
(SZ: 322\369). In resolve, Dasein comes back from the they to its authentic self by 
appropriating what it already is and, in anticipating death, projects towards its authentic 
future. The I is the entity for whom its own being is an issue. It is the constant concern 
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for oneself evidenced in authentic care: the self one says "yes" to in anticipatory resolve. 
The temporal structure of care is what makes the movement of resolve possible. 
Being and Time reaches a climax of sorts in section 65, where Heidegger inquires 
into the ontological meaning of care. This begs the question of the meaning of "meaning" 
[Sinn]. Meaning is "that wherein the understandability of something maintains itself' (SZ: 
324\370). How does something become understandable, then? By making sense of it, by 
seeing it in its possibility, by seeing it in the context of the hermeneutical situation. This 
is exactly the function of projecting, looking beyond the "now" into possibilities, taking 
something as something.12 To say that entities have meaning is to say that they have 
become accessible in their being, in their meaningful givenness: that they have, in other 
words, been conceived in terms of possibility. It is Dasein that thus conceives them, 
Dasein which in taking entities as something, already has a pre-understanding of (the 
meaning of) being. The question of meaning is not just one of how entities are given to 
Dase in as intelligible, but of how Dasein discloses, or makes intelligible, entities. Dasein' s 
understanding disclosure of being, and the condition of its possibility must be 
questioned. 13 Ultimately, that which makes meaning, Dasein's disclosure of entities, 
possible at all, is temporality. 
Care is definitive of human existence as involved in this movement of understanding 
and disclosure. When the projective disclosure is turned in on Dasein itself in anticipatory 
12 Meaning was discussed in relation to section 32, Understanding and Interpretation. 
See the section of my chapter three above entitled Hermeneutic, and SZ 151\193ff. 
13 Cf. Dastur (1992): p.171 
231 
resolve, then what care means, what it is essentially, is seen as the disclosure and 
understanding of human existence itself in its authentic potentiality. But what is the 
ontological meaning of care? In other words, what is the condition for the possibility of 
the self-understanding of anticipatory resolve having any meaning? The answer is 
temporality [:zeitlichkeit], "the phenomenon of original time" (GA24: 377\266). The three 
moments of care must be understood as conditioned by three temporal structures or 
ekstases: 1) becoming [Zu-kunft]; 2) alreadiness [Gewesenheit; je schon]; and 3) making-
present [gegenwiirtigen]. 
1) Dasein's constant project, being ahead of itself, transcending its immediate self 
and looking towards the possibilities of the world in which it is involved, is grounded in 
the future (SZ: 327\375). The future is not some abstract not-yet, however, but the 
movement of becoming (playing on the etymological tie between Zukunft and Zukommen, 
coming-towards) in which Dasein seizes upon the possibilities that by its nature as 
project, it realizes in entities. But also, in choosing itself in anticipatory resolve, Dasein 
comes towards its self, and recognizes its own potentiality for being. What this means is 
that in authenticity, Dasein recognizes its own potential for being; it sees the possibilities 
of its future, and among them the ultimate possibility, that of death. Death is my ultimate 
becoming, whether I choose to recognize it in anticipation, or to deny it in the they-self. 
I am always becoming my potential, whether I actively choose or not; and I am always 
becoming my death, (hence Heidegger's expression being-towards-death). Becoming is 
primordial amongst the temporal structures that underlie care. In Aristotle also, the 
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movement of coming into form, of fulfilling potential, is primordial in defining sensible 
beings. 
2) The self that Dasein returns to in anticipatory resolve is not an empty space of 
undefined possibility. We have seen that the essential being-guilty, the nullity at the core 
of Dasein's existence is what the conscience announces and resolve hears. Dasein is 
thrown: it is already in a set of conditions and circumstances over which it has no power. 
Dasein is what it already has been. Heidegger equates this with Aristotle's tot{ en efnai, 
the "what it was to be" (GA24: 150\107). As in Aristotle, what I am already, is the 
movement of becoming (though in Aristotle there is a definite telos of movement; and 
this is precisely the shift Aristotle's emphasis on actuality to Heidegger's prioritization 
of possibility). When Dasein returns to what it is, then, it returns to its "having-been", 
that is, to what it already is determined to be: becoming, and ultimately becoming unto 
death. In this sense the "future", becoming, determines the "past", alreadiness. 
3) The "present" likewise is determined by the "future", and it presupposes having-
been. It is only in accepting myself as becoming through anticipatory resolve that I can 
see the possibilities that surround me in my factical situation. This authentic present is 
seen im Augenblick, in the moment of vision, in which I bring myself back from falling, 
and "make present" the entities around me as participants in my becoming. Because I am 
concerned with my own becoming in anticipatory resolve, I see the possibilities of entities 
in relation to my authentic self, to my own ultimate potentiality. In general, however, my 
interaction with entities is in the mode of falling. Any involvement with the world 
requires some level of comprehension; it thus requires going beyond myself towards the 
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world in the movement of transcendence. Understanding myself as in the world, involved 
with entities, I realize the possibilities inherent within the entities around me. But any sort 
of encounter with entities ready-to-hand involves making them present- bringing them into 
my world. Thus even the fallen mode of treating entities as ready-to-hand and present-at-
hand, as objects for my practical use or theoretical speculation, is based on the becoming 
that I am, and on that which I already am determined to be. As in Aristotle, what 
something is now, is understood in reference to what it is determined to become. 
The structure of Dasein as projecting onto possibilities, and as already given, permits 
interaction with other entities. The movement beyond myself in transcendence that makes 
it possible for me to interact with, make present, or "have access to" entities- this 
movement is that of becoming what I already am. 
Resolve is the movement of Dasein coming back to itself, recognizing itself as 
becoming, and involving itself and entities in its own becoming. Temporality, therefore, 
unified by the future as becoming, is the condition for the possibility of authentic care. 
The ahead-of itself, existentiality, is grounded in the future; being-already-in, thrownness, 
is revealed as having-been; and being alongside, fallenness, is possible only by making-
present. The self-projection in authentic care, looking to oneself, is determined by and 
grounded in the future. The way in which possibility has precedence over actuality in 
Heidegger is clearer now in the light of these analyses. Indeed it is this future-centred 
temporality that makes it possible for Dasein to be in its various modes, particularly as 
authentic or inauthentic (SZ: 328\377). 
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Heidegger calls the modes of temporality "ecstases", and in later works refers to 
Dasein's way of being as Ek-sistenz, in an attempt to encapsulate in a word the way that 
Dasein is temporality. 14 Temporality is only by being generated in the movement of 
Dasein's becoming: indeed it is simply the expression of this movement, of Dasein's 
stretching out beyond itself. Temporality is the original being outside of itself, the 
ekstatikon (GA24: 377\267). The "ordinary" conception of time as an infinite sequence 
of nows is derived from this primordial experience of Dasein's becoming what it already 
is, by making present things to which it is in relation. The prior phenomenologically 
accessible experience is that of Dasein's understanding of itself and the world in the 
movement of transcendence. 
In section 65 then, temporality emerges as the condition for the possibility of the 
authentic self in care. In section 68 of Being and Time, Heidegger begins his discussion 
14 (Cf. particularly the contrast between the two terms in the letter to Beaufret Ueber 
den Humanismus.) The word "ecstasy" does not, however, share the same root as 
"existence". The latter comes from the latin ek-sistere, to stand outside of, or to be 
independent of that which caused. "Ecstasy" on the other hand comes from the Greek 
exfstenai, to drive or be out of place. In the classical sense this word was used to mean 
insanity or bewilderment, or in phrases such as existanai tina phrenon, to drive out of 
one's wits. In later Greek, it meant the withdrawal of the soul from the body by trance, 
catalepsy or spiritual absorption. "Ek-sistence" is an appropriate term even in the early 
Heidegger to capture both of these senses, and refer to human existence as lived through 
the ekstases of temporality. Dasein is thrown, without power over the source of its being; 
it is further driven from its comfortable place in the inauthentic "now" of the they-self, 
in the bewildered attempt to come to terms with what it essentially is. The ecstatic way 
that we stand in relation to what we are, our projective search beyond our selves in the 
effort to make sense of the world, conflicts with the desire to withdraw further from the 
search, and return to the passive acceptance of the they-self. Dasein is this tension 
between peaceful "thereness" in a given world, and frenzied movement to comprehend 
itself in terms of authentic possibility. 
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of the temporality of care.15 Dasein is the movement of disclosure; disclosing, being the 
"between" of subject and object, is how Dasein relates to the world. Understanding and 
disposition are the constitutive elements of disclosedness, the way that Dasein finds itself 
in a world. Understanding reveals Dasein's existence as possibility and awareness of its 
own possibilities, its existentiality; disposition shows the actual givenness of Dasein in 
the world; its facticity. In the everyday being of Dasein in falling, these two elements are 
covered up as Dasein hides itself behind the given projects and opinions of the group. 
Discourse makes the whole structure of disclosedness\care explicit. 
1) Understanding, the fundamental way of Dasein's relating to the world, means 
futural projection, Dasein's being ahead of itself by looking to its potentiality for being. 
The present and past are also understood in terms of possibility. The understanding thus 
acts primarily in the ecstasis of the future: authentically in anticipation, and 
inauthentically in concern (SZ: 336-339\385-389). 
2) Disposition is the affective counterpart to the understanding. Though like the 
understanding disposition manifests itself in all three ecstases, its primary ecstasis is the 
past, not the future. How one is, or how one feels is based on thrownness, on what one 
already is and must be. It is authentic in angst as awareness of one's true situation; 
inauthentic in fear, as forgetting of oneself (SZ: 339-346\389-396). 
15 Dahlstrom (1995; p.105ft) in responding to Fleischer's (1991) critique of the 
necessity of the transcendental tum to temporality notes that having explained how care 
constitutes Dasein as a whole, Heidegger must see whether care describes Dasein only as 
it is inauthentically, since such a description has been achieved through the analysis of 
the everyday. I offer here the conclusions of Heidegger's analysis. 
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3) The ecstasis characteristic of falling is the present, though again the other two 
ecstases are manifest. Of course falling cannot have any authentic mode, since it involves 
precisely the falling away from the authentic self into inauthenticity. In falling, entities 
are made present not in order to understand them, or to see one's self in relation to them, 
but only in strict terms of immediate use. It sees entities as facts, and not as possibilities; 
and as such the present presence of entities "leaps away" from any future possibility (SZ: 
346-349\396-400). 
4) Discourse does not have any particular ecstasis as the condition of its possibility, 
although of course language, the primary medium of discourse, is in general addressed 
in relation to the immediate present environment with which Dasein is concerned. The 
tenses and aspects that language does and must use reveal the temporal character of 
human existence (SZ: 349-350\400-401). 
Each of the three moments of care then is primarily expressed in one of the ecstases 
of temporality, while incorporating the others: understanding is primarily grounded in the 
future, disposition in the past, and falling in the present. Each ecstasis implies the others. 
The unity of the ecstases is therefore an expression of the unity of care. Ecstatic 
temporality is the ground of Dasein's being, the condition of the possibility for Dasein's 
existing as it does. Inauthenticity and authenticity, being-in, and the world, are all 
grounded in temporality. Discourse makes the temporality associated with each ecstasis 
explicit. 
Care is simply what is distinctive about human existence, the way that we are as 
interpretive beings open to the world, as defined by our being in a world; and as 
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interacting with that world: in brief, as disclosing the world- and therewith ourselves. That 
which makes it possible for us to look for meaning in the world, to see things as, and 
primarily to see ourselves as, is ecstatic temporality. Temporality makes possible, "lights 
up", or "clears" Dasein (SZ: 351\402). It makes it possible, (following the meaning of 
tegein ta phain6mena as letting that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very 
way in which it shows itself from itself) for Dasein to show itself to itself- to be clear to 
itself- in its essential structures; and to show to Dasein the world. It thus permits 
phenomenological truth; but also it permits Dasein to interact with the world on a pre-
logical or pre-phenomeno-logical level, the level that Aristotle did not thematize. 
Temporality is the light that makes any showing possible. "Dasein is temporality" means 
that Dasein becomes clear to itself whether through entities, or through the nullification 
of entities, only on the basis of the temporal structures of care. 
So far, we have looked at the temporalized structures of the "there" of Dasein: how 
it is disclosed to itself, and how the world is disclosed to it. But Dasein is being-in-the-
world. It relates to the world mostly in the mode of concern; it deals with the world 
mostly as ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, in practical and theoretical ways. Are these 
structures also rooted in temporality? Can the priority of the practical over the theoretical 
which we discussed in the preceding chapter, finally be explained here in the light of the 
primordial praxis of human being, finite transcendence? We will see here that the 
question posed in section 32 of Being and Time, viz., whether the fore-structure of 
understanding and the as-structure of interpretation has an existential-ontological 
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connection with the phenomenon of projection (SZ: 151\192), can finally be answered in 
the affirmative. 
In other words, we will see that the method that Heidegger describes as the way to 
interpret beings, and the being of Dasein, is not "constructed". It is rather descriptive of 
how Dase in in fact understands being, because it is a consequence of Dase in' s ontological 
structure. This is not unlike Aristotle's grounding of his methodology in the being of 
human being. For Aristotle, we seek explanation because we are beings that by nature 
desire knowledge; it is our given telos to seek knowledge. The highest form of knowledge 
is theoretical soph{a; comprehension of universals, and knowledge of universal 
explanations, and ultimately knowledge of the eternal archa'i ka'i a{tia. For Heidegger, on 
the other hand, it is not theory that drives the understanding, but the praxis of self-
understanding in terms of possibility: transcendence. The goal is not knowledge of the 
eternal and actual, but knowledge of the finite and possible. 
v 
Practice and theory 
a) From Aristotle's actuality to Heidegger's possibility 
For Heidegger, possibility precedes actuality: though human beings have a factical 
structure, the way that we interpret the world is on the basis of possibility. For Aristotle, 
however, actuality is prior to potentiality (Meta: 1049b 4ff). Now Aristotle's notion of 
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physical potentiality and what Heidegger calls possibility are not identical. But nor is 
Aristotle's notion of potentiality limited to the coming-to-be of form in sensible things. 
In Metaphysics Theta, Aristotle distinguishes between rational potencies [dunameis 
logoi] and irrational potencies [dunameis alogoi]. Irrational potencies are those that admit 
of only one result, thus something hot must produce heat; this is the physical and 
metaphysical notion of potency, that everything tends, by nature, towards fulfillment of 
its potency. In the physical world, we saw that sensible ous[a are finite as particulars, but 
the universal character of ousfa, the universal form, is eternal. The physical cosmos is the 
eternal cycle of movement from potentiality to actuality in sensible things. This eternal 
movement is grounded formally and finally by a first mover, an eternal being, who is 
fully actual. Thus actuality precedes potentiality in the physical cosmos. 
The notion of rational potency is perhaps closer to what Heidegger intends by 
possibility. Rational potencies, such as the technai (the poietic sciences), admit of contrary 
results: the science of medicine can produce sickness or health. The actualization of 
rational potencies is determined by desire (particularly in the case of animals) or by 
rational choice [6rexin e proafresin], though it depends on whether the desire or choice 
is directed towards that for which we have a given capacity (Cf: Meta: 1046a 36-b 9; 
1047b 3 l-1048a 15). But desire and choice are also directed towards some end. Choice 
is the efficient explanation of action; and the final explanation of choice is desire and 
reason, themselves directed to some end (NE: l 139a 6). 
The end of the disposition [hexis or dunamis] of techne is pofesis, the production 
of something; the end of the disposition of phr6nesis, is praxis, action itself. The end of 
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the disposition of sophfa, on the other hand, is not action, but theorfa, universal 
knowledge. 16 But in all these cases, actuality is prior to the principle of change. The three 
rational hexeis come to be only through being employed; thought and desire are what 
bring the dispositions to actuality. And human being [anthropos], the originator of action, 
is a union of desire and intellect (NE: l 139b 5-7). The end of human being is eudaimonfa 
(happiness) the exercise of the dispositions of the soul in conformity with excellence, 
throughout a complete lifetime (1098a 12-20). But the highest form of happiness is the 
exercise of the highest virtue, sophfa. Nous is the best activity for human being, and the 
telos of human life NE: l l 77a 13-22). Now nous is directed towards the universal and the 
eternal, and the eternal is fully actual. Thus even in the sphere of practical behaviour, 
actuality precedes potentiality in Aristotle. Rational potencies are dependent on rational 
hexeis, and these are dependent for their fulfillment on a more primordial irrational 
dunamis: that of the progression of all things from potentiality to actuality. Human beings, 
like all sensible beings, progress towards their telos, which is reason. 17 Reason is inspired 
16 We should recall the three fundamental modes of activity [energdai] in Aristotle's 
description of the logos of the psuche: theorfa, pofesis and praxis; these correspond to 
three natural potentialities [dunameis] of the soul, or dispositions [hexeis]: respectively 
sophfa (which unites episteme and nous), techne, and phr6nesis. Cf. NE book VI, 
l 139bff- chapters that Heidegger himself cites frequently in courses and published texts. 
17 The telos of human being is the good, and the good for human being is happiness, 
and happiness is the life of contemplation. Ethics is not an exact science: thus it cannot 
give universal and necessary explanations of human being attaining a given telos. The 
science is complicated by human desire, which can be directed according to or.contrary 
to reason (depending on education and circumstance). Nonetheless, there is clearly a 
rational "authentic" telos of human being: the life of contemplation; as well as an 
irrational (inauthentic) one, conformity with societal pressures to achieve honour, riches 
or sensual pleasure. 
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by and directed towards the eternal, pure actuality. Pure actuality is thus the final 
explanation of any human potentiality; and explanation precedes explanandum. 
For Aristotle, the eternal and fully actual is primary in establishing the meaning of 
being, and the way that human being understands his or her own being. Eternity is the 
basis of Aristotle's ontology and his ethics: being is eternal. 
In Heidegger, on the other hand, any notion of the temporal infinite, if such a notion 
is coherent,18 is gathered from Dasein's prior understanding of itself as temporally finite. 
Since Dasein is finite, and since Dasein is disclosiveness of being, time and being are 
primordially finite. Whereas kinesis in Aristotle applies to beings coming into actuality, 
and human being achieving its rational telos, in Heidegger, Dasein's understanding of 
beings, and thus of being, is kinetic. Kinetic understanding is grounded in the kinesis that 
is Dasein itself in its transcendence. Finite movement, as opposed to infinite presence, 
defines Heidegger's ontology. Human being as living into finite possibility, and as aware 
of its own possibility, precedes actuality in the order of understanding. Between Aristotle 
and Heidegger, there is then a shift from the priority of the eternal to the priority of the 
finite. 
b) From Aristotle's theory to Heidegger's practice 
Theoria in Aristotle is the activity of contemplation of necessary objects, while 
praxis and poiesis require knowledge of contingent objects. Whereas poiesis is an activity 
of making, aiming at a goal that is distinct from the action involved in the achievement 
18 See chapter six, section ii below. 
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of the goal, the goal of praxis is achieved in accomplishing the very action itself. What 
about the goal of "contemplation" [theorfa]? Aristotle is quite clear that theory is 
sufficient onto itself; that the goal of theory is not something other than the activity of 
contemplation itself, and that it is non-poietic. 19 Likewise, happiness, which is activity 
[energefa] in accordance with the exercise of soph{a as the highest virtue, (and soph{a is 
the disposition associated with theor{a), is self-sufficient and an end unto itself (NE 1076b 
2-6). 20 Theory is clearly not poietic activity in Aristotle. Is it a form of praxis? 
The virtue associated with praxis, phr6nesis, concerns the affairs of human beings, 
and things that admit of deliberation [boule]. It is concerned with action, and action has 
to do with particular and contingent things (NE: 1141 b 8-17). Phr6nesis determines the 
right means to the right end of a particular action; it is not itself poietic. Phr6nesis and 
soph{a are contrasted throughout the Nichomachean Ethics on the grounds of the 
particular and contingent object of the one, and the universal and necessary character of 
the object of the other. 
19 Cf NE 1l77b 2-5: "[The activity of contemplation; energefa] may be held to be 
the only activity that is loved for its own sake: it produces no result beyond the actual 
activity of contemplation". Also in the Metaphysics, Aristotle characterizes first 
philosophy or sophfa as non-productive [ou' poietike] and as something we engage in for 
its own sake. To know in any non-poietic sense is an end in itself. Cf: Meta 982b 10-30. 
20 We saw in chapter one that sophfa is the unity of the other two noetic dispositions: 
episteme, which has as its goal the understanding of explanations; and nous, which aims 
at the direct apprehension of the principles upon which episteme ultimately depends. As 
we saw, both ultimately deal with universals; things that do not vary. Both are in a sense 
means to the end of the "consummate" form of human knowledge, i.e, wisdom, soph{a, 
as knowledge of the first principles and explanations. Soph{a is ultimately contemplation 
of God, a goal which needs no further justification, no higher goal than is involved in the 
performance of the activity itself. 
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Theorfa then, as not concerned with action and the affairs of human beings, must 
also be distinguished from praxis. It is an energefa, an activity, concerned with 
investigation of explanations, and contemplation- the highest activity of human being. It 
is concerned with the question why, and the answer to this question does not necessarily 
have practical consequences.21 None of Aristotle's three energefai are reducible to the 
other,22 but theor{a, as the telos of human life, and as revelatory of the first archai kai 
a{tia is primary amongst them. 
For Heidegger, Theorie is no longer concerned with the contemplation of necessary 
objects. Theory in Heidegger involves stepping back from the world, and conducting a 
cold analysis of things seen as merely present in the world. Unlike Aristotle's theor{a, 
however, theory in Heidegger is in no way directed towards the end of contemplation, nor 
does it study "necessarily existent" objects. Theoretical behaviour is looking at things, 
without looking at them in terms of use. As I will show in the section below, theory in 
Heidegger is a derivative form of po{esis, stemming from the original moment of 
21 Thus the wise person (the soph6s) is not always phr6nfmos (NE: l 141b4-7); it is 
possible to understand the arche kai aitfa of things without being practically wise. 
(Heidegger springs to mind.) Wisdom is not a means to a good life, but is rather 
explanatory of what a good life is: "Wisdom produces eudaimon{a not in the sense in 
which medicine produces health, but in the sense in which healthiness is the explanation 
of health" (NE: 1144a 3-5). Thus it is not the case that you can bring about a good life 
by being wise. Rather if you live a good life, then you will seek wisdom; if you 
understand already what a good life is, you will be on the path to wisdom. 
22 See Meta: 1025b 25, where once again Aristotle specifies that there are three 
dianoetic activities, viz. po{esis, praxis and theor{a, and in the subsequent passages sets 
physics, mathematics and theology as the three theoretical epistemes. 
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involvement in the hermeneutical situation. Theorie, I argue, is not an entirely separate 
realm of dianoetic activity, but is already permeated with the productive.23 
"Concern" [Besorgen] refers to Dasein as caught up in the world of things, entities 
and abstractions, as involved in the world and as "seeing" the world. "Seeing" here is to 
be understood as the understanding and interpretation of the entities with which Dasein 
finds itself already "alongside"; it designates a way of comporting oneself towards beings. 
In circumspective concern, Dasein sees things as "ready-to-hand"; in theoretical 
observation, it sees things as "present-at-hand". Practical absorption and theoretical 
distancing, as I argued in chapter four, conform more closely to the Aristotelian 
distinction between po[esis and theor[a, than to that between praxis and theor[a.24 In using 
things, seeing them as primordially ready-to-hand, Dasein aims at something other than 
the action itself. 
How does praxis then fit into Heidegger's schema? Since Dasein at the outset is 
concerned with itself, its finitude, etc, it must prioritize praxis, as the activity that aims 
at an end non-distinct from itself. Being in the world is the fundamental praxis of Dasein 
23 Theor[a in Aristotle is not derived from pofesis. Techne (the disposition of pofesis) 
and episteme (the disposition of theorfa) both involve knowledge of universals, gathered 
through sensation, memory and experience. The difference is in the application, not the 
discovery, of the universal; in the case of techne it is applied to contingent things; in the 
case of episteme it is used to find explanations of what is. Cf. Meta: 980a 28- 98la 12 
(Aristotle here refers us to the discussion in NE, clearly book six); also APo: 1 OOa 3-9; and 
see above ch. I sec.iv. 
24 But even so the analogy is flawed, since Heidegger's "Theorie" is a derivative 
form of pofesis, whereas in Aristotle, as we saw "theor[a" is an entirely separate 
(dia)noetic activity. 
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that grounds both the poietical and the theoretical.25 Dasein's concern for its self, 
expressed in care, and more primordially in the movement of finite transcendence, is the 
condition for the possibility of both seeing things as zuhanden and vorhanden (that is, in 
modes of po{esis and theor{a). Praxis is primordial in Heidegger's analysis; not theory. 
I suggested in the previous chapter that the way in which po{esis, theor{a and praxis 
are unified according to Heidegger, who sought to find a unity where Aristotle did not 
posit one, is through temporality. For Heidegger, the ground of the unity of Aristotle's 
energefai is temporality, but for this to be the case requires not only a shift within the 
structure of these "activities", but since in Heidegger possibility precedes actuality, it 
requires also a re-interpretation of the energefai as dunameis. In order to demonstrate this 
transformation, we have first to see again how in Heidegger theorfa is a derivative mode 
of po{esis: but now on the basis of temporality. Since care is at its root temporal, so also 
are po{esis, expressed as the form of knowledge that sees the world as ready-to-hand, and 
theor{a, as the form of knowledge that sees the world as present-at-hand. The shift from 
the prioritization of theor{a in Aristotle to praxis in Heidegger will be interpreted in terms 
of a shift from energefa to dunamis, and will result in an understanding of the 
understanding of being that is kinetic, as opposed to static. 
25 Since theor{a is derived from po{esis, and since po{esis is the primordial way in 
which Dasein interprets the world and (through the world) itself, it could be argued that 
all po{esis is praxis and vice versa. But the praxis of transcendence involves also Dasein 
as authentic; this existentiell modification cannot be achieved through interaction with 
things, but only in confrontation with the self on a more primordial level. 
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c) From Heidegger's poiesis to Heidegger's theory 
What is the temporality of zuhanden? Seeing things as ready-to hand entails "the 
hermeneutical situation"; the pre-predicative way that we relate to entities in the world, 
showing our understanding of the possibilities inherent in them by unthinkingly using 
them, or interacting with them. In this mode of circumspective concern, we do not see for 
example a hammer "theoretically" as a hammer of a certain weight and size, except 
insofar as this relates to the relative utility of weight and size for the task at hand. We 
might reject it as too heavy for the task at hand, without yet standing back from it in 
order to assess its mass. We simply let something be involved, or not involved, in the 
situation: in Aristotelian terms, things as zuhandenes are seen poietically; in terms of use, 
and to perform an action for the sake of producing something. 
Concern is a part of care, as the mode of being-alongside entities in the world. Since 
care is grounded in temporality, so also must be concern (SZ: 353\404). In looking at a 
tool "as" something, we "project" the possibilities of that tool in relation to the current 
situation by seeing it as "in order to". Temporally expressed, this is "awaiting" and 
"retaining": we expect that the tool function according to the possibility that we implicitly 
understand it to have; and we retain some understanding of the context of the equipmental 
totality in which we expect it to function. In other words, we do not every time conjure 
up anew some understanding of the way in which everything with which we interact fits 
together. We always already understand how things work, and we expect things to work, 
given this sustained understanding. Awaiting and retaining hint respectively of the future 
and the past: however in taking concernful action in the world, we are making present. 
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We rely on our understanding of what will happen, which is conditioned by our 
understanding of what has always happened, in order to take action in the present 
situation. 
My involvement in the world is sometimes interrupted in its smooth course by an 
unanticipated hiatus, such that what is at hand no longer conforms to my fore-having or 
fore-conception of the situation. But even in cases when we are not actively engaged in 
action in the world, we are still primordially involved in an hermeneutic situation, though 
there can be a level of "tarrying" or holding back from the situation at hand. Deciding 
how on earth to extricate myself from an immediate difficult situation, such as locking 
my keys in the car, does not necessitate my becoming implicated in theoretical 
speculation; it does involve some ingenuity and adaptation to the situation as it has 
presented itself. This is the deliberative aspect of circumspection. 
Every circumspective dealing with the world involves some sort of overview of the 
whole situation [Sicht]. Sight is the insight that Dasein has into itself as itself concerned 
with and involved in the situation; it is the understanding of Dasein itself as potentiality 
for being, as a being which is fundamentally concerned with itself, expressed in the care 
structure to which concern belongs. The condition for the possibility of such seeing of the 
situation is that Dasein is potentiality for being.26 As such, it sees the world in terms of 
possibility (taking things as something)- but this is founded on Dasein's understanding 
26 Cf. SZ: 359\410: "Such a survey illumines one's concern, and receives its "light" 
from that potentiality-for-being on the part of Daseinfor the sake of which concern exists 
as care". 
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of itself as involved in the taking as. The henneneutical situation reflects Dasein's 
potentiality for its own self-expression. 
In the context of circumspection, this understanding is expressed in deliberation 
[ Ueberlegung], a consideration of the situation that takes the fonn of if ... then, ("if I call 
a tow truck, then they can unlock my door ... "). Deliberation does not require predicative 
fonnulation; rather, it is a further development of the temporal character of 
circumspection as awaiting and retaining, the expectation of fulfillment of possibility 
based on past experience. Deliberation upon the situation underlines the way in which I 
explicitly see the possibilities inherent in a situation and "bring objects closer" by 
interpreting them in relation to my own factical situation. Ueberlegung recalls the 
deliberation [boule] of Aristotle which is associated with the phr6nesis, the excellence of 
praxis. 27 Deliberation in Aristotle is a praxis that leads towards the excellence of praxis 
in general. Heidegger's Ueberlegung, though explicitly poietical in character, is likewise 
associated with a fundamental praxis: that of transcendence. 
In taking something as something, I have already "seen" it in relation to its situation, 
and to my situation. In projecting its possibilities, I have already projected myself, and 
seen myself in relation to it as possibility. I look towards what it can be (in its situation, 
as part of my factical situation), in referring to what it has been (how it has worked 
before, what I know myself to be capable of), in order to realize a certain present 
27 
"To deliberate well is the most characteristic function of the phronim6s" (NE: 
1141b 10). Phr6nesis is not itself deliberation, but rather the knowledge that results from 
such deliberation. Phr6nesis "issues commands" (1143a 8), it is knowledge of the 
particular (as opposed to universal) principles that govern the rightness of means to good 
ends in the sphere of human action. 
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possibility. Thus the future and having-been are the ground of the present. But it is 
primarily the future-oriented nature of projection, looking ahead to possibilities, that 
makes it possible for anything to be seen as something. The as structure (like 
understanding and interpretation in general) is thus grounded in ecstatic temporality (SZ: 
360\411). Concern is understandable only in terms of the fundamental praxis of care, as 
projection and transcendence. Thus the poietic involvement with things as ready to hand 
is primordially futural and dynamic. 
To sum up: seeing things as zuhanden is seeing them poietically and in terms of 
possibility for production and use. But using something involves a prior understanding of 
being, and therefore of the being of Dasein: this is accomplished through the dynamic 
structure of transcendence, Dasein's fundamental praxis, which is the movement ofDasein 
in understanding possibilities. Zuhandenheit is therefore grounded in transcendence; or in 
Aristotelian terms, pofesis is grounded in praxis: and both are dunameis, not energefai. 
Just as circumspection involves a level of stepping back from the situation to view 
it as a whole, every theoretical apprehension of the world involves some kind of 
circumspective grasp.28 Every theory has a canon of procedure, a method (SZ: 69\99); and 
28 
"Praxis" is the term Heidegger uses in this context in reference to concern (SZ: 
357-358\409). If we take this usage to mean involvement in the hermeneutical situation, 
it seems to conflict both with what Aristotle means by praxis (for the manipulation of 
things he would use ''pofesis"), and with my interpretation of circumspection as a retrieval 
of Aristotelian po[esis. However, note the following sentence, (parenthetical interpolation 
Heidegger's): " ... just as praxis has its own specific kind of sight ("theory" [Theorie]), 
theoretical research is not without a praxis of its own" (SZ: 358\409). The sentence 
permits another interpretation. There is a praxis that underlies and is manifest in both 
Zuhandenheit or po[esis; and Vorhandenheit or theory, understood as modes of behaviour 
in relation to entities. Projection shows itself in circumspection as the "sight" that grounds 
deliberation, and in theory as the surpassing of Dasein's factical situation that grounds 
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every scientific experiment involves manipulation of materials. However the character of 
involvement in seeing the world as zuhanden is different from that of removal in seeing 
the world as vorhanden. What changes is the way that I am towards the object in 
question: my manner of being is different. This modification is grounded in temporality. 
In saying "the hammer is too heavy'', I can remove myself from a situation in which 
the hammer is useful or not useful, and refer to it as an object with a particular mass and 
weight. In this case, I no longer see it as an object for manipulation and in terms of 
awaiting and retaining, but rather I separate it out from its immediate in-order-to, and see 
it in a "new way". I have a "different understanding of being" in such a case (SZ: 
361\412): in other words, the way that I understand my relationship to the hammer 
changes, thus what the hammer is changes. It is not necessarily the case that I see it 
totally removed from its context, or as independent of its tool character, since after all 
many sciences (economics, anthropology) study relations between entities and their 
environment. However what does happen is that I no longer see it as a tool inseparable 
from a particular place in which it has a given meaning. Rather I see it as in a spatio-
temporal point that is indistinguishable from any other point. It is "released from 
confinement" (SZ: 362\413) in the particular environmental context, and seen rather as a 
part of the ensemble of things present at hand. 
thematization (objectivization). But projection is projection of Dasein's possibilities, and 
can be accomplished either in relation to the world (which always also establishes a 
relationship of Dasein to the world); or specifically in relation to Dasein· itself in 
authenticity. Theory and practice, authenticity and inauthenticity, are made possible by 
the fundamental temporal praxis of transcendence. See next section. 
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Merely looking at something implies that I must look through the way in which it 
appears in the context of use and in relation to an equipmental totality, and see it as 
merely there within a particular defined domain of objects of study. I must, in other 
words, already have seen this entity in the context of involvement, and then assume an 
attitude towards it that projects it as a theme for study: "in principle there are no bare 
facts" (SZ: 3622\414).29 
Thematization is objectivization. It frees entities from their equipmental context and 
makes them present in revealing their objective character. This kind of making-present 
involves awaiting, but not awaiting the functional character of a thing. Rather, entities are 
seen as discoverable, as the locus of objectively describable features. But this is possible 
only because Dasein is as an interpreting being that projects itself towards its potentiality 
for being in the truth, only because Dasein seeks this kind of assertoric truth. Dasein must 
already be in a certain way, in order for thematization to be possible. 
29 Even the scientific study of matter involves seeing it in relation to motion, force, 
location, etc. There is no naked approach to the study of entities, even in the realm of 
science. Aristotle, recall, argued in book Gamma of the Metaphysics that sciences must 
separate out a clearly defined subject area that studies "a portion of being": the episteme 
of to on he 6n, however, "is not the same as any of the other particular sciences, for ... 
they divide off some portion of being and study the attributes of this portion" (Meta: 
1003a 23-26). It thus precedes the other sciences. All sciences refer in some way to the 
primary science that studies being qua being, as well as to the axioms that make any 
scientific discourse about beings possible. Heidegger writes "The more appropriately the 
being of the entities to be explored is understood under the guidance of an understanding 
of being, and the more the totality of entities has been articulated in its basic attributes 
as a possible area of subject-matter for a science, all the more secure will be the 
perspective for one's methodological inquiry" (SZ: 362\413). Is this a defense of 
phenomenology as first philosophy? 
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Specifically, Dasein must already have some understanding of being in order to 
separate off a particular domain for objective thematization. Furthermore, Dasein must 
transcend the entities that it thematizes: Dasein, as the thematizer, cannot be a part of 
what is thematized, even if (as in Being and Time) it is Dasein itself that is thematized. 
Of course Dasein is involved in thematization. but the kind of understanding that projects 
objects as free from the context in which Dasein is involved, requires Dasein to go 
beyond the immediate situation. Vorhandenheit then is also dynamic; it also involves 
projection of possibilities, and it is rooted in the primordial praxis of Dasein as projection. 
Thus the two modes of being-in-the-world, theory and practice, theorfa and pofesis, 
vorhanden and zuhanden, are both rooted in transcendence. The condition for the 
possibility of both modes of behaviour is temporality, and specifically the futural 
movement of projection. Pofesis and theorfa, two of Aristotle's energefa are in this 
Heideggerian reappropriation, dunameis. And they are rooted in the fundamental human 
dunamis of transcendence, a retrieval of Aristotelian praxis, to which I turn now. 
VI 
Transcendence 
"Transcendence, being-in-the-world, is never to be equated and identified with 
intentionality" says Heidegger in the summer course of 1928 (GA26: 215\168).30 In the 
30 In the 1928 course, Heidegger cites note xxiii from section 64 of Being and Time 
that reads in part: "the intentionality of 'consciousness' is grounded in the ecstatical unity 
of Dasein" (SZ: 363\414). Cf. also WG: 28, where Heidegger again says that intentionality 
is possible only on the basis of transcendence. On the issue of intentionality and 
transcendence see Arion Kelkel ( 1988). 
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previous summer's course, on the other hand, he asserts (and discusses at length) that "it 
is precisely intentionality and nothing else in which transcendence consists" (GA24: 
89\63). How to explain this apparent contradiction? 
First of all, Heidegger is careful to distinguish transcendence from any "traditional" 
notion of intentionality, that sets a worldless subject against an object in a noetic 
relationship. As we saw in the previous chapter, in Heidegger's sense intentionality is the 
very structure of lived experience, a comportmental directing towards, that reveals to 
Dasein how it stands in relation to the world. 
Secondly, intentional fulfillment gives for two kinds of truth, which correspond to 
two kinds of comportment: 1) identification of the intended and the intuited gives for a 
non-thematized comportmental and fundamental sense of truth as living in the truth. I 
make possible what I intend by seeing my intention as already fulfilled in my interaction 
with entities: I am directed towards the subject matter itself (GA20: 69\52). This is the 
hermeneutical sense of truth, or the way of understanding being manifest in 
circumspective concern. 2) The other sense of truth is the structural relationship that is 
seen to apply between acts of intending and acts of intuition. I direct myself towards the 
evidence, that is, towards the actual identification, such that truth becomes a character of 
knowledge (GA20: 70\53). I see the world as conforming to a noetic act of identification 
of intended and intuited; in other words, I see it theoretically. 
Both practical and theoretical behaviour are intentional; both involve a directing-
towards. But both these modes of understanding the world presuppose some prior 
understanding of being for it to be possible to relate to the world in these modes. 
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"Intentionality is based on transcendence" means that at the root of any intentional 
relationship is the transcendent comportment of Dasein that makes directing-towards 
possible at all. "Intentionality is transcendence" means that for Dasein to be in an 
intentional relationship, interacting with entities in the world, it must already be 
transcending. Original transcendence, as the primal praxis of Dasein, is what makes 
possible any relationship to entities whatsoever. In short, "intentionality is the ratio 
cognoscendi of transcendence. Transcendence is the ratio essendi of intentionality in its 
diverse modes" (GA24: 91\65). Before the intentional relationship (ontic transcendence) 
can be established, Dasein must be in the world, and as such must have an understanding 
of being (primal transcendence) (GA26: 194\153). 
Transcendence and this understanding of being that is being-in-the-world, are in fact 
identical. The world is just the network of meanings that is constituted through Dasein's 
relationship to the given. In every movement of understanding, every relationship of 
involvement, Dasein deals with entities in various ways so that it can be what it is; 
Dasein is always for its own sake. This does not mean that things are there for us, but 
that we bring things into relation with ourselves. In understanding entities, we posit 
something about ourselves; we are primarily concerned with our own becoming. This self-
understanding, or self-creation is the root of any understanding of entities. The world is 
that for the sake of which Dasein exists; but Dasein exists for the sake of itself. Therefore 
the world is part of the selfhood of Dasein (WG: 84 ); Dasein is its world (SZ: 364\416). 31 
31 In saying that "Dasein is for the sake of itself', or that "Dasein is in each case 
essentially mine", Heidegger is not asserting that the world and nature and all things are 
merely there for the unquenchable enjoyment of Dasein as ego. It does not mean that 
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"Transcendere" means to step over, go through, pass over. The world, as the 
network of meanings revealed to Dasein as it steps over factual entities towards their 
possibilities, (conceived as possibilities of Dasein), is what Dasein steps towards. Dasein, 
in stepping, is the passage across (GA26: 211\165). It is Dasein that is passage. 
For-the-sake-of refers to the ontological selfhood of Dasein as free to commit to 
becoming itself (GA 26: 247\191; cf. WG: 96).32 This means leaping over factual and 
factical beings, being excessive (GA26: 248\192), stepping out beyond the actual into the 
possible. Potentiality for being is the essence of transcendence, the defining character of 
Dasein as for-the-sake-of-itself. 33 
In self-understanding, Dasein is always caught within a horizonal temporal schema, 
that determines how entities are disclosed.34 Temporality, we saw, is constituted by the 
Dasein cannot essentially be concerned with others, or enter into I-thou relationships. 
Dasein is not an isolated ego over against the world. However there is an essential 
"egoicity" at the root of Dasein which makes it possible for it to enter into relationships 
with others. As a feature of Dasein' s transcendence, to be for the sake of itself means that 
Dasein directs itself towards its own potentiality for being on every plane: this is the 
metaphysical condition of the possibility for a thou to be, and for any I-thou relationship 
to be (GA26:240\187; WG:86). The other can be seen in this way as not just another ego, 
but as a being concerned in its way with its own free becoming. 
32 The for-the-sake-of seems to be a retrieval and ontologization of Aristotle's hou 
heneka (Cf: Volpi 1994: p.207-209). In Aristotle, praxis is an end in itself, that is, its "for 
the sake of' is itself. Since Dasein is for the sake of itself, this accrues further evidence 
to the thesis that transcendence is the praxis that unifies po{esis and theorfa, 
determinations borrowed from Aristotle and transformed. 
33 
"To put it briefly, Dasein's transcendence and freedom are identical!" (GA26: 
238\185). 
34 Cf. Dahlstrom (1995; p.109): "With every existentiell projection-and-horizon, every 
authentic or inauthentic existence (care), there is an existential ecstasis-and-horizon, a 
temporalizing that is the ontological sense ( ... projection-and-horizon) of Da-sein". 
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three ecstases, corresponding to the three moments of the care structure that is Dasein. 
Each ecstasis involves a stepping out of Dasein from itself, an intentional directing 
towards a "horizon", or a scope of possible meaningfulness. The horizon of the 
understanding is the finite future, as Dasein projects itself onto possible significance by 
"being ahead of itself', seeing its potentiality for being as a fulfillment of what Dase in 
already is. Thus Dasein comes towards itself, for the sake of itself. In disposition, the 
horizon of significance is the finite past, what already is the case, the backdrop of what 
has always been, the factors and situations that I cannot control, and in the face of which 
I am thrown into being what I am. Finally in falling, in being alongside entities in the 
world in a relationship of use, in being concerned with things in the world, I see things 
as significant in order to accomplish something in the present. The horizon of falling is 
the present. Each of the ecstases in transcendence involve Dasein' s relation to itself. 
By being for its own sake, Dasein understands the world as potential for its own self 
to become what it already is. In angst, or in any disposition, by coming to see what it 
itself is, Dasein construes itself in relation to an already given world. In falling, by 
bringing entities into the world of its immediate concern, Dasein construes itself in 
relation to that with which it is now involved. The world then is already presupposed in 
the ready-to-hand and the present-at-hand; it is that onto which Dasein constantly projects 
itself in any of the ecstases. "If no Dasein exists, no world is 'there' either" (SZ: 365\417; 
cf. GA24: 422\297). The world must be disclosed before any entity can be encountered; 
thus neither the practical nor the theoretical construal of the world are primordial. 
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In the Logic course of 1928, Heidegger goes even further. In constructing a world, 
Dasein also constructs being, as meaningfulness of beings: "being 'is' not, but being is 
there [es gibt] insofar as Dasein exists. In the essence of existence there is transcendence, 
i.e. a giving of world prior to and for all being-towards-and-among intra-worldly beings" 
(GA26: 193\153). Dasein must "give itself' being, Heidegger continues, in order to make 
sense of the world at all, or in order for beings to emerge as what they are. It is Dasein 
that constructs the meaningfulness of the world (the world as its world), through its 
disclosive essence. The meaningfulness of the world is being, and Dasein has access to 
it only on the basis of the transcendent movement of understanding that is at its very root. 
Transcendence is the giving of meaning that makes up what we mean in saying "world". 
There is being, as meaningfulness of beings, only insofar as Dasein understands beings, 
or transcends itself towards the world. 
Transcendence then is the name for the ecstatic movement of Dasein as in-the-world 
understandingly: "transcendent Dasein" is a tautology (WG: 36). As the fundamental 
praxis of Dasein, it is just what Dasein is, as being-in-the-world in the articulated care 
structure that is grounded in temporality. As the towards which of Dasein's surpassing, 
the world is transcendent, that is, it is grounded in the horizonal unity of ecstatic 
temporality. But what is surpassed in transcendence? Being itself: that is, every being that 
Dasein can disclose, including Dasein itself (WG: 38). It is the totality of beings that 
Dasein goes beyond, in order to choose what and how amongst the possibilities of those 
beings, Dasein can constitute itself. Dasein then comes back from surpassing to focus 
again on entities themselves as revealed through this kinetic projective structure of 
258 
transcendence; this means, within the limitations of its thrownness, (i.e. that Dasein must 
encounter entities along with itself), Dasein is free to discover and disclose entities in 
various modes. What makes it possible for entities to be encountered within the world 
then, and made use of or thematized, is the transcendence of the world, i.e. the world as 
transcendent (SZ: 366\418). 
The self-defining movement of Dasein is limited always by what Dasein already is 
determined to be. The definitive feature of Dasein's thrownness is Dasein's finitude. 
Dasein lives in relation to its death: whether it is explicitly aware of death in the authentic 
moment of anticipatory resolve, or whether it flees from death in the they-self, Dasein's 
time is limited. Its possibilities are limited, and hence the field of possible significance 
onto which Dasein projects at any given time and in any ecstasis is limited. As Heidegger 
says, "by its very nature temporality is finite" (GA24:385\272). 
How does all this tie into Heidegger's goal, of getting phenomenological truth about 
the meaning of being? In the introduction to Being and Time, Heidegger describes being 
as "the transcendens pure and simple ... Every disclosure of being as the transcendens 
is transcendental knowledge. Phenomenological truth (the disclosedness of being) is 
veritas transcendentalis"(SZ: 38\62). In other words, Dasein has access to truth by being 
in excess of itself.35 But this excess, this self-transcendence, already includes, or already 
is limited by what Dasein is determined to be: its thrownness. Dasein is the transcendent 
being: it is always ahead of itself, stepping over its being what it is in going out towards 
its own possibility of becoming by means of relating to beings. The movement of 
35 To use Sheehan's language (1979). 
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transcendence is thus a becoming of what Dasein already is (projection or aheadness 
within the confines of thrownness), through the understanding of beings. This 
understanding of being is itself already a part of what Dasein is as fallen. The tri-partite 
structure of Dasein (aheadness, thrownness, fallenness) constitutes its disclosedness. And 
Dasein discloses truth by becoming what it already is. 
To sum up: transcendence is the fundamental comportment of Dasein on the basis 
of which it can relate to any other being. It is being-in -the-world, as the basic way in 
which Dasein is in the world, as disclosive, and as temporal. "Transcendence precedes 
every possible mode of activity in general, prior to n6esis, but also prior to 6rexis" 
(GA26: 236\183); it is prior to any noetic intentional relation to the world, and prior to 
any sort of erotic relationship also. It is also prior to any practical or theoretical mode of 
understanding the world, prior to all behaviour (WG: 34-35). As Heidegger himself points 
out, "the problem is the common root of both intuition, theorein, as well as action, 
praxis" (GA26: 236\184). Transcendence is the key. Transcendence, being-in-the-world 
as attempting to understand the world in relation to its own possibilities is the primordial 
praxis of Dasein that roots theory and practical comportment. 
Transcendence always takes place within a "horizonal unity", within, that is, a field 
of possible significance that is limited by what we already are. Death is the ultimate limit 
of making-sense-of in the crudest sense: my time, and therefore my possibilities, are 
limited. But the reverberation of the realization of death in anticipatory resolve is greater 
than the actual coming-to-an-end of Dasein. The fact of my living-towards-death, and the 
sometime awareness of this, permeates the way in which I approach the possibilities open 
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to me. The way that I project onto possibilities is conditioned by the nature of those 
possibilities as finite, thus by the horizonal limitation of Verstehen, and by my awareness 
of the limit that hangs over me, the horizonal limitation revealed by Befindlichkeit. The 
way that I make entities present, the way that I concern myself with entities in the world 
is conditioned by both the ecstasis of "future" as possibility, and the ecstasis of "past" as 
the given.36 The world is comprehensible to Dasein, because Dasein is finite 
comprehensibility of possibility. The radical finitude at the core of Dasein affects the way 
in which being is interpreted. As I will argue in the next chapter, because Dasein is finite, 
being, as meaningfulness for Dasein, is also finite. 
Heidegger has retrieved many of Aristotle's notions, as well as the central question 
of the unity of the ways in which being is said. But Heidegger no longer seek the grounds 
of why what is, is as it is, a question which in Aristotle leads to the positing of a supreme 
being who is fully actual. Rather, Heidegger asks how it is that we see things as we do: 
the grounds for what is, are in the groundless ground of Dasein as understanding what is 
through transcendence. Because Heidegger thematizes the disclosure structure of Dasein, 
as decisive in the way that being can be said, and because the one who discloses is finite, 
much of Aristotle is in a sense turned "upside down". For Heidegger, possibility precedes 
actuality, praxis is primordial over theory, and the finite is primordial over any possible 
36 Cf. Henry (1992; p.360):"Time, in its original temporalization, projecting the 
horizon of the future in advance of itself and coming into confrontation with it, turned 
back by it and brought back to itself, discovers in the unity of this twofold movement, 
in the ecstasy of the return 'back upon' both the world as finite world and its own 
existence to which it is handed over". 
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notion of the infinite. What this means for the way that God can enter Heidegger's 
ontology is the subject of the next chapter. 
CHAPTER SIX 
God and Being in Heidegger 
Heidegger never explicitly affirms or denies the existence of God, nor does he think 
that it is the role of philosophy to do so. In his later works, he treats the holy and the 
divine; and in his personal life he seemingly maintained some relationship to Catholicism. 
But my question here concerns the early Heidegger's philosophical treatment of God in 
relation to his ontology. Particularly, I treat how Aristotle's "metaphysical" God is 
incompatible with Heidegger's ontology; and how a different notion of God, as the 
infinite, might be compatible with it. 
Aristotle's god is a god of reason, "the god of philosophy", quite removed from a 
notion of god as an object of religious feeling. Aristotle's god cannot be said to be a 
personal God to whom individuals can pray, or with whom they can develop a 
relationship of trust. Rather, god as first mover is a ground of the workings of the 
physical cosmos, of the continued manifestation of sensible ousfa or ta phusika. 
In the first section of this chapter, I will look at what Heidegger has to say about 
this kind of metaphysical god, and why it cannot be a part of his ontological thought. 
Heidegger argues that in Aristotle the question of the being of beings (ontology) and that 
of the unity of beings (theology) are distinct. Although Aristotle treated the two questions 
as part of one science, prate philosophfa, he did not, in Heidegger's view, discuss the way 
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in which these questions belong together. Heidegger further argues that in the later 
tradition, these two questions were combined through the notion of metaphysics as 
knowledge of "that which lies beyond", focussing on God as the supreme supersensuous 
being. 
Heidegger's arguments against the ontotheological character of post-Aristotelian 
metaphysics do not concern my topic here, except by way of contrast. Heidegger contends 
that in the post-Aristotelian tradition, Aristotle's two questions are united in a 
fundamentally different way than Heidegger himself proposes. Heidegger recognizes the 
distinction between the two questions as Aristotle posed them, and seeks their unity, 
which he finds not in a notion of something which "lies beyond", but in an understanding 
of the essence of grounds as transcendence, that which makes it possible for us to "go 
beyond". The for-the-sake-of, a retrieval of Aristotle's final a[tion, becomes the essence 
of Dasein as free transcendence, the ground of understanding being. 
I have argued throughout the first part of this dissertation that for Aristotle the 
question of being and that of God are not separable. This clearly contrasts with 
Heidegger's view. Before I review my argument for the unity of ontology and theology 
in Aristotle, I will look at Heidegger's argument that they are separate. Since I argue that 
theology and ontology in Aristotle are related through the method of science, the seeking 
of grounds, and since Heidegger is proposing a different sense of "ground", one that is 
compatible with his hermeneutic phenomenology, the issue does not affect the general 
direction of Heidegger's argument. He seeks a (new) unity between the question of 
universality of being and that of the beings taken as a whole. 
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In the second section of this chapter, I discuss how God might be re-instated into 
Heidegger's ontology by means of the infinite. This God is no longer the eternal ground 
of the rational and teleological workings of the universe, like Aristotle's god. Nor is this 
God entirely "beyond the scope" of ontology, however, as something that Dasein cannot 
reach towards or question about except speculatively. Rather, the infinite, even though it 
might be understood only in relation to the experience of Dasein's own finite possibilities, 
will be seen to re-emerge, phenomenologically experienced as gratitude for being here at 
all. Dasein is the being for whom its own being is an issue. I will suggest that because 
its own finite being is an issue, the infinite is also an issue for Dasein. 
I 
God and grounds 
According to Heidegger, Aristotle's notion of grounds leads to a bifurcation in the 
subject matter of first philosophy. Two distinct questions are asked in first philosophy: 
1) the question of what unifies beings as a whole; and 2) the question of what is common 
to all beings. Aristotle's metaphysics asks exactly these questions, without positing a 
relation between them.37 In his Logic course of 1928, Heidegger writes that theologike in 
Aristotle regards the study of beings as a whole (GA26: 22\17). But philosophfa, as 
37 Cf: Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (GA32): "Aristotle already brought 
philosophy in the genuine sense in very close connection with theologike _episteme, 
without being able to explain by a direct interpretation what the relationship is between 
the question concerning on he 6n and the question of thefon" (p. 141\98). 
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knowledge of being, as the search for conceptual understanding and determination, or for 
a logos of the on he 6n is ontology (GA26: 16\13). 
Thus the concept of "metaphysics'', understood in relation to Aristotle, encompasses 
the unity of "ontology" and "theology" (GA26: 33\24). 
Heidegger's argument can be constructed as follows. For Aristotle, who prioritizes 
theory as a way of knowing what is, ontological inquiry takes the form of the search for 
grounds for the presence of beings. Beings, as that which is present for observation, are 
seen as requiring grounds for their presence. Aristotle inquires into the grounds of 
sensible ous{a, which comes down to explaining how it is that the universal form of 
individual ous{ai continues to be manifest despite the cycle of generation and destruction. 
To explain how form continues eternally to manifest itself in sensible things, recourse has 
to be made to a being that determines the form of things as constantly present 
(universally). A highest being, eternally present, is the ground of the presence of beings. 
In this sense, God unifies beings as a whole, and answers the first question. 
But God is itself an ous{a, a being. The being of beings is determined as constant 
presence, constancy both of the eternal cycle of the generation and destruction of beings, 
and of the highest being which ensures the continuance of this cycle. The common 
element to all beings then, the answer to the second question, is presence: that they are 
here, and that they will be here eternally, at least inasmuch as they are construed 
according to their universal element. But in Heidegger's view, Aristotle does not inquire 
into the relationship between presence of beings, and God as the unifier of beings as a 
whole. God is not responsible for the presence of beings (he is not a creator, not directly 
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an efficient aftion), but only for the continued presence of beings, a characteristic which 
he himself, as a being, shares. 
In Heidegger's view then, metaphysics as the name for first philosophy has two 
different foci, which Aristotle did not question in their unity. Let's look at how Heidegger 
sees these two questions arise now in relation to the meanings of phusis. 
In the course of winter Semester 1929-30, The Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics (GA29\30), Heidegger discusses the meaning of ta meta ta phusika especially 
in relation to Aristotle, since it was in that context that the phrase came to be (cf: 
GA29\30: 44ft\30ff). There are two meanings of phusis. The first refers to phusei 6nta, 
as opposed to the techne 6nta; here phusis means that which does not arise or pass away, 
that which is always already at hand, as opposed to those things that are produced by 
human beings. In this sense, phusis means "that which prevails", and ta phusika are 
beings taken as a whole, with the prime mover, thefon, which eternally prevails, as the 
ultimate determinant of the whole of beings.38 The other sense of phusis is the innermost 
essence of things, that which determines whatever prevails as a being, as when we use 
the phrase "the nature of things". This is ousfa, the beingness of beings, the essentiality 
of beings. To philosophize in the sense of first philosophy is to question concerning both 
senses, thus, we see again, to question concerning 1) beings as a whole, and to question 
2) about the universal communality in beings. "At the same time Aristotle says nothing 
... about how he thinks these two orientations of questioning in their unity, to what extent 
precisely this questioning in its dual orientation constitutes philosophizing proper in a 
38 Though Aristotle does not refer to the prime mover as god in the Physics. 
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unitary way. The question is open and is open to this day, or rather is not even posed 
anymore today" (GA 29\30: 51\33). 
The disharmony between these two different questions, says Heidegger, lies in the 
fact that notions of equality, opposition, difference, those problems that concern the being 
of beings, are very different from the question concerning the ultimate ground of beings 
(GA 29\30: 75\49). Heidegger finds this disharmony in Aristotle because he makes a 
distinction between the question of what something is, and that of why it is, questions 
which, I have argued above, Aristotle unites in the scientific study of first philosophy. 
Heidegger in his reinterpretation of the questions finds a different unity that focusses on 
Dasein as disclosive of the meaning of beings, which requires a prior understanding of 
the manifestness of beings. He has a different approach to the question of the unity of 
being, or the "whole of beings", one which includes the articulated unity of Dasein as that 
which discloses the meaning of being. It is not the question of ultimate grounds, but the 
expression "as a whole" which contains the real problem of metaphysics (GA29\30: 
85\56). "Philosophizing proper" puts the questioner himself into question, only in this way 
can we ask about beings "as a whole". But the question of the essence of grounds must 
also be asked before we look to ground simply as ontic explanation of the presence of 
beings. Where does the notion of grounds itself arise from? What is it that makes us seek 
grounds? The two questions of beings as a whole and the ultimate ground of being are 
found in an analysis of the questioner. 
I have argued that the science in the Metaphysics is a unified science, because for 
Aristotle the question of what and the question of why are ultimately identical. Because 
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of Aristotle's notion of science as the seeking of grounds, to know the essence of 
something scientifically is to know the grounds of that thing being as it is. Thus Aristotle 
seeks the universal communality of beings, which he finds in the form of ous{a. But first 
philosophy as a science does not stop there. It must inquire into the grounds of ous{a, and 
particularly into the grounds of the continued manifestation of species form in individual 
ous{ai. Taken at the level of species, or understood universally, (and science is knowledge 
of the universal) form is eternal. Individuals come to be and pass away but form does not. 
Looking for the ground of the continued reoccurrence of species (or "universal") form in 
individual sensible ousfa, leads Aristotle to God as the transcendental condition for the 
possibility of form. But this God is also an ous{a: Aristotle does not leave the study of 
being in order to explain beings, but finds within ontology a ground of ous{a, his prime 
subject matter. 
Heidegger sees the two questions as distinct because he does not take into account 
the way in which Aristotle's search for the unity of the ways in which being is said, is 
part of a scientific questioning to get to the grounds of being qua being. It is true that we 
can see two different directions of inquiry in Aristotle's Metaphysics, but they are related 
methodologically. The book is a search for the pros hen unity of the way that to on is 
pollachos leg6menon. But this inquiry is itself part of the larger search for the first archai 
kai a{tia: ous{a, as the unity of the ways in which being is said, defines the subject matter 
of which the first principles and grounds are sought. The questions of universal 
communality and the unity of beings as a whole are expressly related through the 
scientific nature of Aristotle's inquiry. 
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The fact that Heidegger sees ontology and theology as disunited in Aristotle does 
not affect his principal argument, which is one that concerns a reinterpretation of grounds. 
Heidegger reinterprets the notion of grounds, and shifts it from a search for the theoretical 
explanatory grounds of beings (which in my argued view unifies ontology and theology 
in Aristotle) to an examination of human being as involved in the grounding of beings. 
Because of his methodological shift away from theory and towards phenomenological 
description of human poietical involvement with entities, Heidegger finds the ultimate 
grounds of being, that is, the meaningfulness of entities, in the kinetic praxis of human 
being in transcendence. The roots of this shift, as we saw, are found in that which 
Aristotle presupposes but does not thematize: the pre-predicative manifestness of beings. 
The concept of god as the god of philosophy, god as a ground, in Heidegger's view does 
not get to original thinking about being, that is, thinking being in a way that questions the 
"as" of the being as being, or human involvement in disclosure of the meaning of being. 
Defining the individual according to its form as a universal (whether or not we see this 
definition of the "what" as separable from the "why") presumes a way of human being 
towards beings, that takes them "as" something. 
In the course of WS 1929\1930, Heidegger discusses the meaning of the logos as 
the "word" that takes the prevailing of phusis from out of concealment; or, in other 
words, logos reveals what is- the manifestness of beings. The ground of the possibility 
of logos as logos apophantikos, the predicative structure, is its sunthesis-diafresis or as-
structure. In order for the assertion that posits something as something, to be either true 
or false, there must already be a pre-logical manifestness of beings. Aristotle himself 
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recognized this, in recognizing that being in the sense of being as true, the judgement of 
the truth or falsity of a proposition, is not in itself a subject of first philosophy. We 
already see the manifestness of "beings as a whole" in making an assertion that requires 
an either\or judgement (true or not); that is, we see the context in which the assertion 
either holds or does not hold. The prelogical apprehension of "beings as a whole", or 
ontic context, is "a fundamental occurrence of Dasein" (352\511). 
For Heidegger, the question of what unifies beings as a whole is no longer answered 
by recourse to a god as a ground, but rather by Dasein's prelogical apprehension of a 
"world". In apprehending a world, we do not add up all the beings and grasp them as a 
unified entity. Or, to use Heidegger's example, to see a forest we do not first have to 
perceive every tree, and then see them collectively as a forest, as if a forest were 
something "added on" to the trees. Rather, we always already understand the "as a 
whole".39 In understanding something as something, I already see it as a part of my world. 
And I am included in the "as a whole", not as an added component, but as being always 
already in relationship to beings.40 
But how does this apprehension of beings as a whole, the world of Dasein, clarify 
the question of the being of beings, the second Aristotelian question of the on he 6n? This 
raises the question of the distinction between being and beings, the "ontological 
difference". This is a distinction that we always already make in our intercourse with 
39 Cf. chapter four, section iv on categorial intuition. 
4° Cf. GA 29\30: p. 507\349: " ... the 'as' is a structural moment of what we call 
world- world taken as the manifestness of beings as such as a whole". 
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beings, or rather one that always happens to us as a fundamental occurrence of Dasein. 
In order to see beings as what and how they are, we must first always already have an 
understanding of whatness and thatness of beings. Predication relies on ontical truth, that 
is, on a pre-predicable manifestation of being. But it also depends on the discoveredness 
of the manifest in the disclosive activity in which Dasein is always already involved. 
Dasein "forms the world", that is, it lets the world happen and gives to itself a view of 
all manifest being (WG: 88\89). There is a distinction between manifestness of beings [on 
hos 6n], or ontic truth; and being as disclosedness, the being of beings [on he 6n], or 
ontological truth. 
There must already be an understanding of being for any pre-predicative 
comportment or discovery of the manifest to be possible. Dasein, as already having an 
understanding of being, relates to beings, goes beyond beings towards being, or goes 
beyond the simple manifestness of beings towards the grasp of the possibilities inherent 
in those beings. In order to project the possibilities of a being, in order to seize upon one 
particular possibility, we must already have an understanding of the context in which this 
being belongs. We must already have a grasp of beings as a whole, in order to understand 
the meaningfulness of a particular being. Being as meaningfulness is not the 
meaningfulness of an individual being removed from its contextual relationship to other 
beings, rather the possibilities of this being are already given by my interaction in a given 
world of meaning. The distinction between comportment towards beings and the 
disclosedness of being, is the ontological difference that Dasein always already 
understands in behaving towards beings by understanding being in the movement of 
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transcendence (WG: 26\27). Dasein goes beyond the simple manifestation of beings 
towards the meaning of beings. 
Thus Heidegger unifies the two questions which he finds distinct in Aristotle, that 
of the communality of beings, which Aristotle answers by an appeal to form; and that of 
the unity of beings as a whole, which Aristotle answers by appeal to God. For Heidegger, 
the two questions are intrinsically unified not by scientific method (as I argue they are 
in Aristotle), but by hermeneutic phenomenological method, that is, by appeal to the 
involvement of the questioner in the question. But how does transcendence relate to 
grounds? 
Transcendence is freedom; and this (finite) freedom is the origin of grounds, the 
possibility of asking about grounds in the first place, and as perceiving the identity of 
being and the nothing, the origin of the question of "why".41 It is Dasein's understanding 
of being that makes the why possible, freedom as transcendence that is the ground of 
grounds. Freedom, however, is itself groundless; there is no other recourse than Dasein 
existing as possibility to be other. Thus freedom is limited, or finite, since Dasein is in 
a sense determined to be free by its factical existence as thrown. Dasein is factically and 
therefore finitely free. As such, it is presented with possibilities from amongst which it 
must choose. In other words, "in transcendence, the essence of the finitude of Dasein 
discloses itself as freedom for grounds" (WG: 130\131). There is no ground for truth any 
41 
"The essence of ground differentiates itself into diverse sorts of "grounds" (e.g. the 
four causes), not because there are different beings, but because the metaphysical essence 
of Dasein as transcending has the possibility of establishing world-access for diverse 
beings" (GA26: 277/214). 
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more than there is a ground for Dasein as free transcendence; there is no statable reason 
why either should be. Yet Dasein must always and does always presuppose truth, in its 
disclosive encounters with beings in the world. 
As long as the question of the grounds of being is not asked in inextricable relation 
to the one who questions, who is thus also brought into question, the answer remains 
speculative discussion about beings seen as merely present. In contrast to Aristotle then, 
for Heidegger the origin of the why, and the answer to it, is not in a constant presence 
that explains the existence of beings, but rather in the constitution of Dasein as always 
involved in the project of understanding what is in relation to itself. This has its 
consequences: "because philosophy is the most radically free endeavour of human 
finitude, it is in its essence more finite than any other" (GA26: 11\10). 
In The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, (SS 1928), Heidegger gives a different 
interpretation of Aristotle's two questions, which demonstrates the shift from the need for 
a God as the ground of beings, to the role of Dasein as the ground of the meaning of 
being. 
First philosophy has a twofold character, as the study of beings with regard to being, 
to on he 6n; and as theologike, thematized as the aftia tofs phanerofs ton thefon, the 
grounds of eternal sensible ousfai (that is, God as the ground of the movement of the first 
heaven, which moves non-eternal sensible ousfai).42 Heidegger writes: "to thefon means 
42 Heidegger's translation of this passage (Meta. 1026a 18.) is "the causes of the 
superior manifesting itself in evident beings". Cf. Tredennick: "the causes of what is 
visible of things divine"; Ross: "the causes that operate on so much of the divine as it 
appears to us (i.e. that produce the movements of the heavenly bodies)". 
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simply beings- the heavens: the encompassing and overpowering, that under and upon 
which we are thrown, that which dazzles us and takes us by surprise, the overwhelming" 
(GA26: 13\11). In fact, if we look at Aristotle's text, to theion here means the ground of 
the cosmos. But for Heidegger's Aristotle, theology is contemplation of the cosmos 
(which indirectly it is), or knowledge of the overwhelming. First philosophy then has the 
twofold character of knowledge of being and knowledge of the overwhelming. 
Interestingly, Heidegger remarks here that knowledge of being and knowledge of 
the overwhelming correspond respectively to existence and thrownness in Being and Time 
(GA26: 13\16). I interpret this as follows: first, ek-sistence, as the ecstatic transcendence 
of Dasein, approaching the world from a pre-understanding of being and then manifesting 
this understanding in a self-transformative practical intercourse with entities in terms of 
possibility, is Heidegger's conception of understanding being. There is a shift from 
theoretical knowledge of beings, to the involvement of Dasein as understanding beings. 
Secondly, there is a shift away from Aristotle's notion of contemplation of theion, the 
overwhelming givenness of eternal being, and the principle and ground of the inexorable 
movement from potentiality to actuality in beings,43 to Heidegger's non-aetiological 
perspective. The overwhelming in Heidegger is thrownness, the universal circumstance 
of the particular givenness of Dasein, individual powerlessness in the face of the given 
finitude of Dasein. Angst, knowledge or awareness of the overwhelming, is not a ground 
of being, but is rather the groundless ground of the possibility of understanding being. In 
43 The eternal first unmoved mover explains the movement of the spheres; the eternal 
moved spheres explain the movement of sensible moved things. 
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this reading, the metaphysical deity is no longer theoretically required, since the 
theoretical grounding of beings is no longer primordial. But a dismissal of any 
consideration of God from ontology may not be conclusive, as I suggest in section two 
below. 
Thrownness limits the power of freedom (the "abyss" of Dasein, its groundless 
ground that as potentiality for being is freedom for grounds). The givenness of Dasein as 
a self defined in terms of possibility, and as transcendent, is that in the face of which 
Dasein has no control. In The Essence of Ground, Heidegger writes: "This sort of 
powerlessness (thrownness) is not due to the fact that being invades [Eindringen] Dasein; 
rather it defines the very being of Dasein" (WG: 128-131\129-131). The essence of 
Dasein's transcendence as finite freedom is that which overwhelms Dasein in angst, the 
disposition that reveals Dasein's thrownness. The nothing that is thus experienced is the 
overwhelming: Dasein's finitude. This is the ground for wonder. Hence whereas in 
Aristotle the overwhelming is the eternal deity, the ground for being as being, in 
Heidegger the overwhelming is the givenness of Dasein's factical self as groundless in 
finite freedom, and is the ground for understanding being.44 Whereas in Aristotle it is the 
presence of beings that provokes wonder and leads to God as the overwhelming ground, 
in Heidegger it is the absence of grounds, the abyss at the core of Dasein' s understanding 
that is itself the overwhelming ground of wonder. This ground admits no ground: it is 
groundless. 
44 Cf. Cretella (1990): "Mais ou est demandera-t-on, "la theologie" dans Etre et 
Temps? Reponse: dans l'hermeneutique du Dasein tout simplement". 
276 
Finite Dasein is free to live out its possibilities through interpretation of the 
possibilities that beings present. This transcendent freedom, the movement of constituting 
the meaning of Dasein and consequently of being, though itself groundless, is the ground 
for any seeking of grounds. The facticity of Dasein, thrownness, is clearly a limitation of 
that freedom, and as such is a vague reflection of the notion of human powerlessness in 
the face of a deity. However, human being as given, and being as givenness remain a far 
cry from the necessity of a god to establish grounds of what is. 
Nonetheless, that the god of philosophy does not enter thinking in Heidegger's sense 
does not entail that God does not exist. Indeed, Heidegger writes: 
... The ontological interpretation of Dasein as being-in-the-world tells neither 
for nor against the possible existence of God. One must first gain an adequate 
concept of Dasein by illuminating transcendence. Then, by considering Dasein, 
one can ask how the relationship of Dasein to God is ontologically constituted 
... (WG: 90\91). 
Heidegger here supposes that any investigation of the concept of God would be 
posterior to the analysis of Dasein. But it may be that the concept of finite Dasein itself 
presupposes an infinite (God); Heidegger himself raises this possibility, as I will discuss 
in the next section. An inquiry into Dasein's relationship to the infinite might clarify the 
issue.45 
45 A note on the "ontotheological constitution of metaphysics", a notion that we see 
already in Heidegger's writings in the early thirties. My object here is to present 
Heidegger's view as background to the issues I consider in my text, rather than to analyze 
it. According to Heidegger, Aristotle's two questions, of universal communality and the 
unity of beings as a whole, are unified in the "tradition" (i.e. metaphysics from Thomas 
Aquinas to Nietzsche). Heidegger says that the originally technical title for Aristotle's 
work, ta meta ta phusika (after the Physics) came to be a title given with respect to 
content. In the Latinate version of the term, metaphysica, "meta" came to be understood 
not as "after", but as "turning away from" phusika, and turning towards what is beyond 
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the sensuous. In Heidegger's etymological history, "meta" becomes understood not as 
''post" but as "trans". 
"Metaphysics" becomes the science of the supersensuous. The supersensuous creator, 
God, becomes explanatory of the unity of beings and for the communality of beings. 
"This changeover in the title is by no means something trivial. Something essential is 
decided by it- the fate of philosophy proper in the Wesf' (GA29\30: 60\39). Whatever 
Aristotle meant by first philosophy, he did not mean what came to be known as 
"metaphysics". (See Heidegger's course, Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta 1-3: "Aristotle 
never has in his possession what later came to be understood by the word or the concept 
'metaphysics'". Nor did he ever seek anything like the "metaphysics that has for ages 
been attributed to him" (GA33: 1 \1).) 
In Heidegger's view, the "traditional" notion of metaphysics, referring to the realm 
of the supersensuous, is a re-interpretation of the content of ancient philosophy, and 
particularly Aristotle, to accord with Christian dogma (GA29\30: 64\32). This continues 
through the Renaissance, Humanism and German Idealism, and only begins to be 
understood with Nietzsche. In this tradition, God and man become objects of faith and 
theological systematology: God is the absolutely supersensuous, and human beings are 
seen in relation to their eternal fate, or immortality. Even Descartes at the beginning of 
modem philosophy sees the object of first philosophy as proving the existence of God and 
the immortality of the soul. (As for Medieval thinking: "because philosophizing proper 
as a completely free questioning on the part of man is not possible during the Middle 
Ages, since completely different orientations are essential during that period; because 
fundamentally there is no philosophy in the Middle Ages: for this reason the taking over 
of Aristotelian metaphysics according to the two directions already characterized is 
structured from the outset in such a way that not only a dogmatics of faith, but also a 
dogmatics of First Philosophy itself arises" (GA 29\30: 69\45) (my italics).) 
The distinction in Aristotle between the question of beings as a whole (raising 
questions of the supreme or ultimate being) and the essence of beings- which, in 
Heidegger's view, he left disconnected- prefigures the rift between theology and first 
philosophy. Through the Christian influence, Aristotle's theology (a logos of the the6s 
that is not a creator god or a personal god) becomes a theology of reason, not of faith, 
and God becomes the specific supersensuous being that is the object of first philosophy. 
The supersensuous is one domain of beings amongst others, and knowledge of both 
supersensuous being and sensuous being become objects of thought that are accessible in 
the same manner. Metaphysics becomes trivialized: it is everyday knowledge, and proofs 
supported by Church dogma and revelation. That which I go out to, away from the 
physical, is distinguished from the physical only through the distinction between the 
sensuous and the supersensuous. "Yet this is a complete misinterpretation of the thefon 
which in Aristotle is at least left to stand as a problem" (GA 29\30: 67\44). 
In another tendency in the traditional concept of metaphysics, the on he 6ni the other 
direction of Aristotle's thinking, becomes compressed into the problem of beings in 
general. Looking for what is common to all beings means passing beyond individual 
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II 
The Infinite 
As we have seen, the metaphysical god, a god that emerges from an aetiological 
approach to the meaning of "being'', is explicitly denied a place in Heidegger's ontology. 
It has become clear that the shift from an ontology that requires a god, to an ontology 
from which the metaphysical god is absent, occurs as a result of a difference in 
methodology between Aristotle and Heidegger. But the formal decoupling of ontology and 
theology does not disallow the possibility of another kind of God finding a place in 
Heidegger's thought. As the quotation which closes the previous section indicates, 
Heidegger does not explicitly hold to a thetic atheism, that is, one that pronounces the 
non-existence of God from the outset. There is no passage in Heidegger's work in which 
he declares that there is no God, nor indeed that there is a God. Furthermore, he does 
admit that we can have a faith relationship to God, even if this relationship is not a 
subject for philosophical analysis.46 
beings towards their most general determinations. The universal, or nonsensuous becomes, 
in Thomas Aquinas for example, combined with the supersensuous "nature" of God, as 
the same kind of "lying beyond". Metaphysics itself falls into confusion. There was seen 
to be no difficulty in combining rational theology and philosophy in this way until the 
philosophy of Kant, who begins to again pose the question of the limits of metaphysics. 
There is then in Heidegger's view, a distinction between the Aristotelian first 
philosophy, and the subsequent tradition. Aristotle leaves the being of God problematic, 
whereas the tradition more explicitly uses God as a solution to the unity of the two 
questions. Heidegger's unifying of the two questions no longer revolves around 
explanations of being, but around human understanding of being. 
46 This idea is developed at length in the rather obscure lecture Phenomenology and 
Theology (1927). 
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The fact that Heidegger develops his notion of being before asking the question of 
what role God plays in human existence, or in a phenomenological ontology, leaves us 
with some questions. Even if they cannot be fully treated here, I would like to look at two 
of these questions. First, is the metaphysical god the only God that Heidegger can treat 
or consider? If not, it may be that a philosophical treatment of some other God is 
congruous with Heidegger's ontology. Second, (a related question) is Heidegger's finite 
ontology provisional? In other words, does the fact that Heidegger begins his ontology 
from the standpoint of radical finitude mean that it must end with radical finitude, and 
not approach the question of the infinite? Or can it be considered a provisional basis of 
a larger picture that includes an infinite? 
To briefly summarize the position I will take on these questions: first, although the 
metaphysical god is clearly not compatible with Heidegger's phenomenological ontology, 
I postulate that a concept of God as the infinite might be. I suggest that there are 
phenomenological grounds to suppose that finitude and human mortality are not final 
phenomena. There is a prior infinite givenness, which precedes and follows upon Dasein' s 
being in the world, and which is a precondition for Dasein' s experience of gratitude, in 
the same way that finitude is a precondition for Dasein's experience of authenticity. 
Gratitude for the gift of being here at all, and hope that there is some other dimension 
than the merely finite human existence that is immediately given, are phenomenological 
indications that finitude is not the first or last word. 
Second, I give some indication of the possibility that Heidegger's ontology is 
provisional: although Heidegger determines the meaning of being without appeal to a 
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God, even bracketing God, his ontology can be maintained without abandoning a 
philosophical treatment of God. My discussion here takes the form of suggested directions 
only; the development of these ideas will have to be left for another occasion. 
a) From finitude to gratitude 
Heidegger explicitly declares that being is finite.47 But how does he arrive at the 
determination of being as finite? It is because he begins with the Dasein-analysis, and 
because Dasein is determined as temporally finite. Heidegger writes that "being is 
finitude" means that being is the horizon of ecstatic time (GA32: 145\100). That is, the 
perspective for understanding being is not speculative-dialectical (as in Hegel), nor is it 
"scientific", in the sense of a search for explanatory grounds (as in Aristotle). Rather, 
being is understood from the perspective of finite Dasein as understanding being. 
Being is finitude means then something about Dasein' s capacity to understand being, 
and about the temporal nature of what is, but only in relation to Dasein. Since "no 
understanding of being is possible that would not root in a comportment towards beings" 
(GA 24: 466\327), what being might mean for Dasein is issue of how Dasein comports 
itself towards beings. Thus "there is being only so long as there is Dasein" (SZ: 212\255). 
Time is the original essence of being (GA32: 212\146); this means that the finite 
horizonal perspective of temporality- as a given of Dasein- determines how being is 
understood. If Dasein is finite, then so also being is finite, since being is a function of 
47 Cf: WM: 40\108; GA32: 144\100. I find no passage in Being and Time that 
explicitly makes this claim. 
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Dasein's understanding. This is Heidegger's logic. But if we examine what kind of 
finitude this is, it becomes possible to admit that Dasein's experience of its own finitude 
does not preclude the possibility of experiencing an infinite, even though this experience 
necessarily occurs from a finite perspective. 
Heidegger's logic seems to be that Dasein is temporally finite; from this it follows 
that it is finite in respect of possibilities, and that being itself, as the nexus of Dasein' s 
possibilities, is finite. Thus thrownness indicates that Dasein is: 1) temporally finite, but 
the fact of temporal finitude indicates another sort of finitude: 2) finitude in respect of 
choice of possibilities, and therefore of understanding. Dasein is freedom, and expresses 
its being here in reaching out to the possibilities inherent in beings. Yet not only are these 
possibilities finite, but Dasein's capacity to unfold its possibilities through its relation to 
beings is finite: and both because Dasein is temporally finite. 
There is another level of finitude, however, which seems more primordial still: 3) 
Dasein is given as temporally finite, as being towards death. The facticity of Dasein as 
in a particular set of circumstances, which includes finite temporality and finite 
transcendence, is beyond the power of Dasein's freedom. Ek-sistence and thrownness, 
understanding and disposition, as well as the inevitable and constant practical 
comportment of inauthentic Dasein in fallenness- all forms of Dasein's finitude- are 
prescribed always already by what is given for Dasein to be Dasein. As we saw, Dasein 
is aware of its finitude in the authentic disposition of angst. And it is the finiteness that 
is revealed in angst; it is the abyss of human finitude that presents Dasein with the 
overwhelming, and provokes wonder. 
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In each case, it is the awareness of the limitations of possibilities that throws Dasein 
back to itself in the movement of authenticity in anticipatory resolve. In order to 
experience the contingency and finitude of its own existence, Dasein must experience the 
limitation, the "nothing that is at the core of being". Faced with this, Dasein can be 
thrown out towards those possibilities open to it. The givenness of Dasein is finite; and 
Dasein recognizes its finite givenness in authenticity. 
This then is Heidegger's analysis of human finitude. The question is, is this all that 
Dasein can experience? Or is Dasein's experience of its finite givenness not itself a clue 
to a prior infinite givenness? Perhaps there is another possible move, one that precedes 
that of the return to oneself in authenticity. This would be the recognition of another kind 
of givenness, which is arguably prior to Dasein' s recognition of its limitations. This kind 
of givenness is the infinite givenness that makes possible my finite givenness itself. 
I recognize that though I do not have to be here, and though I am dying, still, I am 
here. The givenness of my existence here and now is not simply that of a nullity, of a 
"not" that directs me towards myself, nor just that of being thrown out to finite 
possibilities. There is a givenness of finite givenness itself: givenness not of my being 
here as a finite creature, but of the whole given that encompasses the "not" at my core 
(which expresses something about my powerlessness in the face of having to choose) and 
the limited given possibilities of my existence. In this whole, the "not" is understood not 
merely in relation to myself and my own factical possibilities, but in relation to the larger 
given of my own contingent existence. There is a possibility that precedes my being-in-
the-world, that is, the possibility that would have dictated that I not be here. But it has 
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not been played out. Clearly, the possibility of my own non-existence has been overcome 
at the outset, since I am here. 
In the face of this realization, a realization not of my own being-towards-death, but 
of my being here at all, when I could also not have been here, I experience gratitude. 
Despite the contingency of my own existence, and the finitude of my existence, I am 
here. And, though I do not always experience this (any more than I always experience 
angst), it is good to be here. Facticity, finitude, mortality are not final phenomena, 
because they already suppose that I am when I could have not been. My finite facticity 
is, only because I first am: and I am grateful for being. 
The experience of gratitude for being here is an experience of the Other; I do not 
experience merely myself and my own possibilities, but I am directed outwards, beyond 
this world of finite possibility, towards the origin of my being here at all. This Other, 
larger than my own limited possibilities, is the focus of my gratitude; it is the infinite that 
has played out, from among the possibilities larger than my contingent existence, the 
factical event of my being here. 
b) A provisional ontology 
But what does Heidegger say about the infinite, and how could this relate to a God 
that might be compatible with Heidegger's ontology? If an infinite can be admitted into 
or alongside Heidegger's ontology, then his ontology could be part of a larger picture. 
Heidegger himself asks about the infinite in the provocative, unanswered questioning 
at the end of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics: 
. . . is it permissible to develop the finitude in Dasein only as a problem, 
without a "presupposed" ["vorausgesetzte"] infinitude? What in general is the 
nature of this "presupposing" ["Voraus-setzen"] in Dasein? What does the 
infinitude which is so "composed" ["gesetzte"] mean? ... (KM: 239\168). 
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But even were it permissible to presuppose an infinitude, writes Heidegger in the same 
passage, "there is nothing which even the idea of an infinite creature recoils from as 
radically as it does from an ontology". But why should this be so? Only because 
Heidegger has already determined being as finite, and the perspective of Dasein as self-
contained. An "infinite creature" then could not belong to a finite ontology. It appears at 
first that a move to presuppose an infinite would alter the character of this ontology from 
Dasein-focussed to God-focussed, from a focus on possibility to the priority of actuality. 
But is this the case? Could we not argue that if there are phenomenological grounds 
for the experience of an infinite, then an infinite is not simply "added on", but indeed 
already "presupposed" as Heidegger himself suggests? The question is, from the 
standpoint of phenomenological, and therefore ontological, investigation, can anything be 
said of the infinite? 
Clearly, Dasein will always only be able to understand the infinite from its own 
finite perspective, but this does not necessarily entail that there is no other than the finite. 
But to write any phenomenology of the infinite, Dasein would have to have some 
phenomenological experience of such a thing. 
It would seem that if the infinite is to be phenomenologically accessible, it must be 
accessible from the realm of finite possibility, since we understand what is from our 
temporal perspective. Perhaps the infinite can then be "experienced" as the ground for the 
possibility of the experience of finite temporality in authenticity. But what sort of a 
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"ground" would it be? For Heidegger, as I discussed above, the ultimate ground is always 
the groundless ground of Dasein as given. There are certain uncontrollable givens in 
Dasein's world- e.g. death, and an individual's particular circumstances- that define 
Dasein as finite possibility. Yet these finite givens, or givens which determine Dasein's 
finitude, are themselves always already given. It would seem then, that there is thus a 
primordial givenness of the given.48 We experience it intellectually as a ground, that 
which makes it possible that we are here in the first place, or we experience it in the 
disposition of gratitude that we are here, as finite creatures. 
The experience of gratitude for my being here, and that of hope that there is some 
significance to my being here other than my self-descriptive seizing of possibilities unto 
death, are indications that Dasein does experience an infinite. Gratitude to; hope of are 
directed away from finite possibility, away from the finite world, and towards some 
Other. This Other enters my world as an experience within my finite world. But it is not 
one of my finite possibilities, inasmuch as it precedes my being here; it is that to which 
I am grateful for my being here at all and having any possibilities whatsoever. 
The givenness of givenness is not. It "is" not being or a being, since it precedes any 
distinction between being and non-being. It is not finite givenness as such, since this 
givenness is experienced in the mode of temporal finitude. Nor is it "beyond" being as 
48 It is interesting to look ahead to a later work, the Letter on Humanism, where 
Heidegger writes the following in relation to the es gibt Sein: " ... the "it" that "gives" is 
being itself. The "gives" names the essence of being that is giving, granting its truth. The 
self-giving into the open, along with the open region itself, is being itself' (BH:25\238). 
But this is a giving to (finite) Dasein. In order for there to be a giving to Dasein, there 
must always already be givenness as such. This we could call the condition of the 
possibility of the es of the es gibt Sein. 
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a transcendental cause of what is; though perhaps as the ground for any givenness, or 
non-givenness, it is the condition for the possibility of thinking the finite given as finite. 
As the givenness of given possibility itself, the infinite is the ground of Dasein's 
transcendence as reaching out beyond itself towards the finite possibilities open to it. 
Is this infinite therefore a necessary part of Heidegger's ontology? I cannot make 
that claim here. My argument is simply that this notion of the infinite allows for a God 
that is not in conflict with Heidegger's ontology. Can such a peculiar notion as the 
givenness of the given be associated with God or Divinity? Can we pray to such a 
thing\non-thing? Feeling gratitude for being here is a first step in the appreciation of a 
dimension that opens out beyond the self. Perhaps the mystery of the incomprehensible 
fact of our being here fills us with awe, or with gratitude- but why also not indifference 
and resentment? Only because to be here is a gift. 
CONCLUSION 
What is to be learned from this extensive contrast and comparison between Aristotle 
and Heidegger? For one thing, that the question of being, which though "long forgotten" 
has remained with philosophy for almost 2500 years, continues to trouble us. But how the 
question is phrased, and what method we use to approach it, go a long way towards 
determining the sort of solution we can expect. 
The way in which God relates to the human attempt to understand what it means 
to be has changed, as has also the way in which humans see themselves in relation to 
what it means to be. In Aristotle, the perspective of the subject involved in questioning 
what "being" means is left out. He approaches the question of what "being" means 
aetiologically, seeking grounds for what is, and accepting a unity between what is the 
case in the world, and what humans correctly perceive to be the case. Seeking grounds 
for what is, leads to the positing of a god as first cause. The modern introduction of the 
subject reaches a climax of sorts in Heidegger, where the question of being shifts to the 
question of the meaning of being for humans as existent. No longer an aetiological search 
for grounds, Heidegger's ontology makes it possible to coherently and consistently 
describe what it is to be, and to be human, without reference to a god. 
But, though I only offer some hints in this direction, just as Aristotle's ontology may 
ignore the perspective of the individual human being, Heidegger's ontology, convincing 
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as it is in its descriptive content, may not capture all of what it means to be, and to be 
human. Though the later Heidegger continues in the direction of the mystery of being 
here, and towards a rather pantheistic divinization of the earth, sky, and material 
conditions of our presence in the world, the pre-war works which I have discussed above 
begin and end with human being standing alone. How does this fit with our twentieth 
century concerns? 
The twentieth century limps to a close, and fin de siecle disorientation is setting in. 
This century has borne the effects of "the death of God", pronounced by Nietzsche, but 
expressed in the works of Marx, Freud, Heidegger, Foucault and Derrida, among others. 
Spellbound by materialism, alienated in the separation of God and state both from ancient 
religions and giant corporate governments, struggling with consumer-driven spirituality 
in "New Age" thinking, disoriented by the failure of grass-roots revolution, and faced 
with the cynicism of post-modernist deconstruction, in the West we are experiencing a 
paradoxical crisis: the decline of belief in reason. Perhaps the vicissitudes of materialism, 
which, among other factors, have been at play in this century in the years 1933-1945, as 
well as in East Timor, in Rwanda, in Zaire, in Bosnia, in Argentina, in Chile, in El 
Salvador, in Guatemala, in Israel, in Mozambique, and on and on, need tempering with 
some hope of another dimension, a hope that is not manipulated by political concerns. 
Perhaps we need a renewed look at the possibility that reason can encompass a concept 
of the infinite\God. 
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